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SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the state of rebellion declared by the President through Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 in the wake of the so-called Oakwood Incident. The questioned issuances, however, were subsequently lifted by her on August 1, 2003, when she issued Proclamation No. 435. Hence, as of today, there is no more extant proclamation or order that can be declared valid or void.

For this reason, I believe that the Petitions should be dismissed on the ground of mootness.

The judicial power to declare a law or an executive order unconstitutional, according to Justice Jose P. Laurel, is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.¹ Following this long-held principle, the Court has thus always been guided by these fourfold requisites in deciding constitutional law issues: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; 3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4) adjudication of the constitutional question must be indispensable to the resolution of the case.² ςrνll

Unquestionably, the first and the forth requirements are absent in the present case.

Absence of Case and Controversy

The first requirement, the existence of a live case or controversy, means that an existing litigation is ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination; as opposed to one that is conjectural or anticipatory,³ hypothetical or feigned.⁴ A justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.⁵ Hence, it admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, in contrast to an opinion which only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.⁶ ςrνll

As a rule, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or friendly suits between parties without real adverse interests.⁷ Neither do courts sit to adjudicate academic questions no matter how intellectually challenging⁸ because without a justiciable controversy, an adjudication would be of no practical use or value.⁹ ςrνll

While the Petitions herein have previously embodied a live case or controversy, they now have been rendered extinct by the lifting of the questioned issuances. Thus, nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue.

Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the Petitions¹⁰ have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. Be it remembered that they were filed directly with this Court and thus invoked its original jurisdiction.¹¹ ςrνll

On the theory that the state of rebellion issue is capable of repetition yet evading review, I respectfully submit that the question may indeed still be resolved even after the lifting of the Proclamation and Order, provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance.

In the present case, petitioners have not shown that they have been or continue to be directly and pecuniarily prejudiced or damaged by the Proclamation and Order.Neither have they shown that this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. I would venture to say that, perhaps, if this controversy had emanated from an appealed judgment from a lower tribunal, then this Court may still pass upon the issue on the theory that it is capable of repetition yet evading review, and the case would not be an original action for declaratory relief.

In short, the theory of capable of repetition yet evading review may be invoked only when this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.It cannot be used in the present controversy for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

The Resolution of the Case on Other Grounds

The fourth requisite, which relates to the absolute necessity of deciding the constitutional issue, means that the Court has no other way of resolving the case except by tackling an unavoidable constitutional question.It is a well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be disposed on some other grounds.¹² ςrνll

With due respect, I submit that the mootness of the Petitions has swept aside the necessity of ruling on the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General order No. 4. In the wake of its mootness, the constitutionality issue has ceased to be the lis mota of the case or to be an unavoidable question in the resolution thereof.Hence, the dismissal of the Petitions for mootness is justified.¹³ ςrνll

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions.On the constitutionality of a state of rebellion, I reserve my judgment at the proper time and in the proper case.

Endnotes:

¹ Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158, July 15,1936.

² Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44, 53-54, February 1, 2001; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103, July 30, 1996; Lalican v. Hon. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 498, July 31, 1997; Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, 518-519, August 19, 1994.

³ Tan v. People, 352 Phil. 724, 735, May 19, 1998; Board of Optometry v. Colet; id., p. 104.

⁴ Guingona Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 426, July 10, 1998; Meralco Workers Union v. Yatco, 125 Phil. 590, 594, January 30, 1967.

⁵ Guingona Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 811, October 31, 1955.

⁹ Jaafar v. COMELEC, 364 Phil. 322, 328, March 15, 1999; Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 473, 479, June 26, 1998; Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 337 Phil. 654, 658, April 14, 1997.

¹⁰ The Petitions were originally filed before the Supreme Court.

¹¹ The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution is limited to petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Declaratory relief is not included.

¹² Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, supra; Intia Jr. v. COA, 366 Phil. 273, 292, April 30, 1999, citing Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516, 522, April 16, 1946; Lalican v. Hon. Vergara, supra; Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81, 103, December 1, 1995; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242, July 1, 1993.

¹³ Republic v. Hon. Judge Villarama Jr., 344 Phil. 288, 301, September 5, 1997; Lachica v. Hon. Yap, 134 Phil.164, 168, September 25, 1968; Meralco Workers Union v. Yatco, supra.