SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

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SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

While the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition (along with petitions for prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction), that jurisdiction, however, is not exclusive.¹ A direct recourse to the Supreme Court, for the issuance of these writs, in disregard of the rule on hierarchy, should be appropriate only when, besides the attendance of clearly exceptional and compelling reasons clearly set out in the petition,² there are no contentious factual assertions of the parties that need to be threshed out before any objective and definitive conclusion can be reached.

What appears to be a significant issue in the instant petition is the legality of respondent COMELECs award of the contract relative to the procurement of automated counting machines to respondent Mega Pacific under alleged questionable circumstances.The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; indeed, a review of the evidence is not the proper office of a Petition for Certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.³ These proceedings are availed of only when there can be no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In certiorari or prohibition, issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and officers involved may be resolved solely on the basis of undisputed facts.⁴ The enormity of the factual disputes in the instant petition, among which include the eligibility of Mega Pacific to participate in the bidding process, the veracity and effectivity of the testing, and the technical evaluation conducted by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) on the automated counting machine of the bidders, would essentially require an extensive inquiry into the facts. An insistence that it be resolved despite unsettled factual points would be inadequate to allow an intrusion by the Court.⁵ ςrνll

The Supreme Court is not expected, whenever one is simply minded to pass judgment on an action of a government agency upon which authority, as well as corresponding duty, devolves.The Court neither controls nor supervises the exercise of authority and the discharge of function by another government office.If it were otherwise, the act of governance and the responsibility that thereto attaches are then effectively shifted from where they belong over to where they should not be.The Court is bound merely to construe and to apply the law, regardless of its wisdom and salutariness, and to strike it down only when constitutional proscriptions are disregarded.It is what the fundamental law mandates, and it is what the Court must do.

The electoral process, it is true, should be of paramount and immediate concern to every Filipino.It is also probably true that the computerization/automation of our electoral process, as well as the progress that it brings, is just as important.Nevertheless, it could also be unwise for the Court, for that sake alone, to precipitately take on the case; after all, we have been without it for decades.The opinions expressed by my colleagues, collectively and individually, should indeed give compelling reasons for the Commission on Elections to perhaps take notice and, on its own, to forthwith reexamine the assailed bidding process.

Accordingly, at this stage, I am constrained to vote against the Courts taking cognizance of the case.

Endnotes:

¹ People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415.

² Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633.

³ People v. Chavez, 358 SCRA 810.

⁴ Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 490; Mafinco Trading Corp. v. Ople, et al., 70 SCRA 139.

⁵ See Article VIII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.