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SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 158385 : February 12, 2010 MODESTO PALALI, Petitioner, v. JULIET AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO AWISAN, Respondent. D E C I S I O N DEL CASTILLO, J.: A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest, enjoys the presumption of ownership. Anyone who desires to remove him from the property must overcome such presumption by relying solely on the strength of his claims rather than on the weakness of the defense. This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1cralaw under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the September 27, 2002 Decision2cralaw and the April 25, 2003 Resolution3cralaw of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
Factual Antecedents Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner5cralaw of a parcel of land in Sitio Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain Province, allegedly consisting of 6.6698 hectares6cralaw and covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in her name.7cralaw On March 7, 1994, she filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner Modesto Palali, alleging that the latter occupied and encroached on the northern portion of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes.8cralaw We shall refer to this land occupied by petitioner, which allegedly encroached on the northern portion of respondent's 6.6698-hectare land, as the "subject property". Respondent prayed to be declared the rightful owner of the northern portion, for the cancellation of petitioner's tax declaration, and for the removal of petitioner and his improvements from the property.9cralaw Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Allegations According to respondent, the 6.6698 hectare land was originally owned by her father, Cresencio Cadwising. The latter testified that he and his wife were able to consolidate ownership over the land by declaring them from public land as well as by purchasing from adjoining landowners. He admitted including in his tax declaration a communal sacred lot (patpatayan) even if he did not acquire free patent title over the same. As for the properties he bought, these were generally purchased without any documentation, save for two.10cralaw Cadwising also claimed having introduced improvements on the subject property as early as the 1960s.11cralaw The 6.6698 hectare land was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which acquired it in the foreclosure sale. DBP then sold the land to one Tico Tibong, who eventually donated the same to respondent. Petitioner's (Defendant's) Allegations In his defense, petitioner denied the encroachment and asserted ownership over the subject property. He maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-interest have openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. He and his siblings were born on that land and, at that time, the area around the house was already planted with bananas, alnos, and coffee.12cralaw When his mother died, he buried her in the lot beside the house in 1975; while his father was buried near the same plot in 1993.13cralaw His own home had been standing on the property for the past 20 years. Petitioner insisted that during this entire time, no one disturbed his ownership and possession thereof.14cralaw Sometime in 1974, petitioner declared the said land in his name for taxation purposes.15cralaw The said Tax Declaration indicates that the property consists of 200 square meters of residential lot and 648 square meters of rootcrop land (or a total of 848 square meters). Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court It is worth mentioning that both the complaint16cralaw and the pre-trial brief17cralaw of respondent alleged encroachment only on the northern portion of her 6.6698-hectare land. During trial, however, respondent's attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Awisan,18cralaw and respondent's predecessor-in-interest, Cresencio Cadwising,19cralaw both alleged that there was an encroachment in the southern portion also. This was done without amending the allegations of the complaint. Confronted with this new allegation of encroachment on the southern portion, petitioner tried to introduce his tax declaration over the same (in the name of his deceased father), but was objected to by respondent on the ground of immateriality.20cralaw After such objection, however, respondent surprisingly and inconsistently insisted that the ownership of the southern portion was included in the complaint and was an issue in the case. The ensuing confusion over the subject of the case is revealed in the following exchange between the parties lawyers:21cralaw
The trial court, apparently relying on the allegations of the complaint, ruled on the northern portion as the subject property of the case. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court After due trial, the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35, dismissed22cralaw the complaint. It based its decision on respondent's failure to prove her allegation of physical possession of the land. Going by the results of its ocular inspection23cralaw of the land in question, the trial court noted that Cadwising (respondent's predecessor-in-interest) could not pinpoint and the court did not see any of the improvements that Cadwising had allegedly introduced to the land.24cralaw Thus, the trial court held that respondent's claim of ownership was supported solely by her tax declarations and tax payment receipts which, by themselves, are not conclusive proof of ownership.25cralaw In contrast, the trial court duly verified during the ocular inspection the existence of the improvements introduced by petitioner and his predecessors on the subject property.26cralaw Moreover, the trial court observed that the witnesses for the petitioner all lived continuously since their births within or near Sitio Camambaey in Tapapan and that they knew the land very well. They knew petitioner and his predecessors, as well as the improvements introduced by them to the land. Thus, the trial court found that the petitioner presented overwhelming proof of actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the property since time immemorial. Petitioner's possession, coupled with his tax declarations, is strong evidence of ownership which convinced the court of his better right to the property.27cralaw For purposes of clarity, we cite the dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision thus:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the CA, which reversed the same. The CA found that petitioner failed to prove actual possession of the entire 6.6698 hectare land, which the CA believed to be the subject of the case. According to the appellate court, petitioner was only able to prove actual occupation of the portion where his house was located and the area below where he had planted fruit-bearing plants.29cralaw The CA also ruled that based on the ocular inspection report of the trial court, petitioner's possession did not extend to the entire 6.6698 hectares. In its own words:
The appellate court also refused to give credence to petitioner's tax declaration. The CA held that petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 31793, which covers only an 848-square meter property, is incongruous with his purported claim of ownership over the entire 6.6698-hectare land. Proceeding from this premise, the CA gave greater weight to the documentary and testimonial evidence of respondent. The presumption of regularity was given to the public documents from which respondent traced her title to the subject property. Thus, the CA awarded the entire 6.6698-hectare property to respondent and ordered the cancellation of petitioner's tax declaration (except for the 200-square meter residential lot thereof which was not being claimed by respondent).31cralaw Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the unfavorable Decision, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Preliminary Matter The CA Decision is based on a mistaken understanding of the subject property It is apparent that the CA Decision proceeded from an erroneous understanding of what the subject property actually is and what the trial court actually ruled upon. The CA was under the mistaken impression that the subject property was the entire 6.6698 hectares of land allegedly owned by respondent under her Tax Declaration No. 147. Because of this, the CA ruled against petitioner on the ground that he failed to prove possession of the entire 6.6698 hectares. The CA also disregarded petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 31793 (despite being coupled with actual possession) because the said tax declaration covered only an 848-square meter property and did not cover the entire 6.6698 hectare property. This is clear from the following text lifted from the CA Decision:
This was perhaps not entirely the appellate court's fault, because a reading of the issues presented by respondent to the CA gives the wrong impression that the subject property is the entire 6.6698 hectares: x x x [T] he plaintiff-appellant elevated the matter on appeal assigning the following errors committed by the trial court:
x x x x33cralaw The foregoing formulation of the issues presented by respondent before the CA erroneously described "the land in question" as "consisting of 6.6698 hectares" and erroneously stated that the trial court "adjudicated the land in question to [petitioner] ". Said formulation is very misleading because the case before the trial court did not involve the ownership of the entire 6.6698 hectares, but merely the northern portion thereof the property actually occupied by petitioner and much smaller than 6.6698 hectares. Even if we go back to the respondent's complaint, we would find there that respondent is claiming encroachment merely of the "northern portion" of her 6.6698-hectare property, and not of the entire 6.6698 property.34cralaw Neither did the trial court adjudicate to petitioner the entire 6.6698-hectare land; it simply upheld petitioner's right to the property he is actually occupying. It only declared petitioner as the lawful owner and possessor of the "subject property", which is the property to the north of the 6.6698-hectare land and occupied by petitioner. This is evident from the trial court's summary of the facts established by the respondent and her witnesses, to wit:
Proceeding from a wrong premise as to what is the subject property, the CA utterly failed to appreciate the evidence as they relate to the parties claims. Thus, while the general rule is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised, the Court is behooved to admit the instant case as an exception.36cralaw Issue The issue in this case is who between the parties has the better right to the subject property. Our Ruling Having gone over the parties evidence before the trial court, we find adequate support for the trial court's ruling in favor of petitioner. The CA erred in reversing the trial court's findings, particularly because, as discussed above, such reversal was premised on the CA's erroneous understanding of the subject property. As found by the trial court, petitioner was able to prove his and his predecessors actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war era (aside from petitioner's tax declaration over the subject property). Petitioner's witnesses were long time residents of Sitio Camambaey. They lived on the land, knew their neighbors and were familiar with the terrain. They were witnesses to the introduction of improvements made by petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest. From their consistent, unwavering, and candid testimonies, we find that petitioner's grandfather Mocnangan occupied the land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the property because this was the staple food at that time. He then gave the subject property to his daughter Tammam, while he gave a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan. In the 1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated the land, built a cogon home, and started a family there. Palalag introduced terraces and, together with his sons, built earth fences around the property. Palalag's family initially planted bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added avocadoes, persimmons, and pineapples. When Tammam and Palalag died, their son, petitioner herein, buried them in the subject property and continued cultivating the land. He also constructed a new home. On the other hand, respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as the subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent attempted to prove possession of the subject property. Her predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had allegedly introduced improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing, plantings, and a barbed wire fence. However, not one of these alleged improvements was found during the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court. The absence of all his alleged improvements on the property is suspicious in light of his assertion that he has a caretaker living near the subject property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to explain the absence of the improvements. The trial court's rejection of Cadwising's assertions regarding the introduction of improvements is therefore not baseless. Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.37cralaw Respondent's tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war. Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments dealing with the 6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax declaration. Such public documents merely show the successive transfers of the property covered by said documents. They do not conclusively prove that the transferor actually owns the property purportedly being transferred, especially as far as third parties are concerned. For it may very well be that the transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred, in which case he transfers no better right to his transferee. No one can give what he does not have nemo dat quod non habet .38cralaw Thus, since respondent's predecessor-in-interest Cadwising appeared not to have any right to the subject property, he transferred no better right to his transferees, including respondent. All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better claim or title to the subject property. While the respondent merely relied on her tax declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the subject property coupled with his tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a weighty evidence of ownership.39cralaw It certainly is more weighty and preponderant than a tax declaration alone. The preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor of petitioner, particularly considering that, as the actual possessor under claim of ownership, he enjoys the presumption of ownership.40cralaw Moreover, settled is the principle that a party seeking to recover real property must rely on the strength of her case rather than on the weakness of the defense.41cralaw The burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. For he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. Having failed to discharge her burden to prove her affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court rightfully dismissed respondent's complaint. A final note. Like the trial court, we make no ruling regarding the southern portion of the property (or Lot 3, as referred to by the parties), because this property was not included in respondent's complaint. Although the Rules of Court provide that "when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings,"42cralaw such rule does not apply here. Respondent objected43cralaw when petitioner tried to prove his ownership of Lot 3 on the ground of immateriality, arguing that ownership of Lot 3 was not an issue. Respondent cannot now insist otherwise. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 27, 2002 Decision as well as the April 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 24, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondent. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO
JOSE P. PEREZ A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Endnotes:
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