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[ G.R. No. 130995. August 9, 1999]

ANDREW M. BRADLEY, et al vs. HON DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 9,1999.

G.R. No. 130995 (Andrew M. Bradley, et al. vs. Hon. Delia H. Panganiban, et al.)

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners ask that the Regional Trial Court be decided by summary judgment. They assail the decision1 [Rollo, pp. 82-88.] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42283 dismissing their petition for certiorari and mandamus.

The court of Appeals made the following statement of the case in its assailed decision:

On 29 July 1993, petitioners filed a Complaint for "Annulment of Levy on Execution and Sheriff's Sale with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction," docketed as Civil Case No. 93-2569, and raffled to the sala of public respondent, Judge Delia H. Panganiban. In essence, petitioners (as plaintiffs in the original cases) sought the annulment of the City and consisting of 601 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77650, and registered in petitioner Cristina Bradley's name. Impleaded therein were private respondent Aurora Lim Ang (Ang for brevity), and public respondents Deputy Sheriff Ronald E. Lampitoc (Sheriff for brevity) and the Register of Deeds of Makati (Makati RD, for brevity). In the Complaint, petitioner Andrew M. Bradley (Andrew, for brevity) alleged, inter alia, that he was the true owner of the property by virtue of intestate succession; that while the land was sold to petitioner Cristina Bradley (Cristina, for brevity) by his father John L. Bradley on 11 October 1977, after the death of his mother Lydia Bradley, the former subsequently married Cristina on 22 November 1977, making the sale null and void as a sale between husband and wife; that Cristina Bradley never paid any consideration on the sale, thus making the sale rescissible, as in fact petitioners between themselves have agreed to so rescind the sale; that as a result, as only heir of John Bradley and the late Bradley, the property descended to him by operation of law; that upon learning that the property was to subject of execution proceedings as a result of a judgment debt against Cristina, he forthwith a third-party claim before it could be sold by respondent Sheriff, but the latter unjustly ignored the third-party claim and proceeded with the same without requiring the judgment creditor Salem Investment Corporation to put up a bond. Petitioners thus posit the view that since the levy on execution and subsequent certificate of sale are null and void for having been made on proper not belonging to judgment debtor Cristina, then the same should be declared by the lower court, the certificate of sale annotated at the back of the title of the subject property be cancelled, and respondent Ang (as defendant therein) be made to pay attorney's fees with costs. Petitioners further prayed for injunctive relief.

On 06 January 1994, the Complaint was amended to implead private respondent Salem Investment Corporation (Salem, for brevity), and to allege actual damages. On 14 March 1994, petitioners filed a Second Amended Complaint, with the additional allegations that TCT No. 77650 had been cancelled and a new title over the same property, TCT No. 18857, was issued by respondent Makati RD in the name of private respondent Ang, allegedly in collusion with each other, Petitioners thus prayed for moral and exemplary damages.

To the Complaint, private respondent Ang and respondent Sheriff filed their Answer on 13 November 1995, alleging, among others, that the subject property was truly owned by petitioner Cristina, as shown by the fact that title thereof was registered in her name; that the third-party claim filed by petitioner Andrew was defective; that the action is barred by res judicata; and that assuming Andrew to be the real owner of the property, respondent Ang had a better right thereto. They thus counterclaimed for actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorney's fees, and made a cross-claim against respondent Salem for compensation and/or reimbursement. On 17 October 1995, Salem filed its Answer, likewise contending that the property belonged to Cristina; that the writ of execution is valid; that the sheriff correctly disregarded the third-party claim; and denying the claim for actual and other damages, it counterclaimed for in moral damages and legal fees.

Now comes the event which gave to the present action. On 05 February 1996, petitioners filed a verified Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging as grounds therefor that there is no genuine issue as to matters of fact in the original case, petitioners asserting that the denials made by respondents Ang Sheriff and Salem in their respective Answers were either "insincere" or did not set forth matters relied upon to support the denials so that they operate as admissions. To this respondent Salem filed its Opposition on 26 February 1996, respondents Sheriff and Ang on 02 March 1996. Opposing respondents were one in maintaining that summary judgment is not proper as their respective Answers tendered genuine issues which required a full-blown trial. Both oppositions were not under oath, nor were they accompanied by affidavits controverting the allegations in the aforestated Motion. 2 [Rollo, pp. 82-84.]

The Regional Trial Court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment, on the ground that genuine issues of fact existed. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and mandamus.

However, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition, holding that:

In the case at Bench, there is no gainsaying the fact that, as appearing in the respective Answers of the respondent Ang, Sheriff and Salem there were bona fide issues posed with respect to the main causes of action of petitioners regarding the nullity of the levy on execution. To be more specific, the sole heirship of petitioner Andrew, the existence and validity of the marriage between John and Cristina Bradley, the execution of the sale over the property in favor of Cristina, and the asserted nullity thereof, the effect of the rescission allegedly executed by Cristina, the efficacy of Andrew's third-party claim, and many more, are veritable issues of fact which necessitate a trial on the trial on the merits for the respondent court to be able to render its findings thereon. 3 [Rollo, p. 85.]

Petitioners filed the instant petition, offering the following reasons for allowing said petition.

I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT THAT BARS SUMMARY JUDGEMENT:

II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW;

III. THAT THE COURT OF APPEAL SERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS 4 [Id., at 12.]

The petition is utterly devoid of merit.

The first point of petitioners' contention is that the respective answers of respondents Lim Ang, Lampitoc and Salem in the trial court contained denials which were ineffective, such that the allegations in petitioners' complaint were deemed admitted. The pleadings in the trial court are annexed to the instant petition, and notwithstanding their examination by the appellate court, we gave the pleadings a second careful evaluation. However, the inescapable conclusion is that the allegations of material facts in petitioners' complaint were properly denied by respondents in their respective answers, such that issues of fact were tendered.

We agree with the appellate court in its evaluation of the denials.

It bears noting that, contrary to the view of petitioners, the denials embodied in the respondents' respective responsive pleadings do not operate as admissions of the facts of which they were pleaded in denial. We have repeatedly analyzed and dissected the denials adverted to by petitioners in their Petition as justifying a summary judgment, and they appear to us to be sufficient to serve as specific denials, as the same is defined under the adjective rules then (and now) in force. For instance, in denying the claim of ownership made by petitioner Andrew, both sets of private respondents plead the existence of a Torrens title in the name of Cristine; in denying the invalidity of the execution sale, the concerned respondents invoke in the sufficiency of the third-party claim, the lack of good faith, prescription, laches, and a host of other defenses by way of new matters, as well as confession and avoidance. 5 [Rollo, p. 85.]

The second point of petitioners' contention is that, even assuming that respondents' denial were effective and issues of fact existed, these issues of fact were not genuine because respondents did not offer opposing affidavits. The absurdity of petitioners' contention is readily apparent. As petitioners would have it, failure to submit opposing affidavits means that existing factual issues are sham, not genuine.

Under the Rules of Court, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment has the option of submitting opposing or counter-affidavits.6 [Rule 34 (now Rule 35), prior to its amendment, read:

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.-The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.] However, the controlling factor in a motion for summary judgment is not the submission or non-submission of opposing affidavits, but the presence or absence of any genuine issue as to any material fact that would require the presentation of evidence.7 [Spouses Go v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 568 (1996), per Francisco, J.]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Absent any valid objection, trial should ensue in the Regional Trial Court to resolve the issues of fact.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolved to DENY the petition.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court

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