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[ G.R. No. 137465-66. August 9, 1999]
MARIA TUAZON, et al vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 9, 1999.
G.R. No. 137465-66 (Maria Tuazon and Anita T. Pablo vs. People of the Philippines.)
Petitioners seeks to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1998 and February 4, 1999, respectively, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Criminal Case Nos. 1245 and 1246 finding them guilty of Estafa under paragraph 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
These two (2) cases were ordered consolidated by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 31, 1996.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 19119, the facts are as follows:
Gloria Manalastas was engaged in the selling of palay and rice while herein petitioners, Maria Tuason and Anita T. Pablo, mother and daughter, respectively, were barriomates and were likewise engaged in the selling of rice. 1 [Rollo, p. 46.]
On May 27, 1988, Tuason called up Manalastas to inform her of her desire to buy a truckload of rice. Manalastas asked her to come over her house to discuss the matter but Tuason failed to show up. Instead, Pablo went to Manalastas' house and transacted business with her. Manalastas was made to understand that the transaction will be on cash basis. When Manalastas delivered the rice, however, Pablo paid her in cash amounting to P19,000.00 and for the balance, she gave her a Trader's Royal Bank Check in the amount of P25,000.00 payable to "cash" and in the name of Corazon Antonio. On the assurance of Tuason that the check were good and because she was abarriomate and a "comadre," Manalastas accepted the checks. 2 [Id., at 47.] Thereafter, several transactions were made between Tuason and Pablo on one hand and Manalastas on the other hand. Each time there was a transaction, Pablo would pay partly in cash and partly in check which was in the name of Antonio. 3 [Ibid.]
When the checks, however, were presented for payment, they were dishonored either for being drawn against insufficient fund (DAIF), surrender unissued checks (SUCBAC) or account closed. 4 [Id., at 37-43.] Demands were made by Manalastas upon Tuason and Pablo to redeem the checks but these were ignored. Thus, an Information for Estafa was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija against Tuason, Pablo and Antonio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1245.
On the other hand, in CA- G.R. No. 19120, the antecedents are as follows:
On May 28, 1988, Tuason again called up Manalastas telling her that she has good buyers of rice and if Manalastas had available rice and would agree on the terms and conditions, Tuason would get the rice.
On June 7, 1988, Tuason and Pablo bought 370 cavans of rice valued at 113,650.00 at the place of business of Manalastas. Pablo loaded them into trucks and simultaneously paid Manalastas in cash and in check. Manalastas refused to accept the check and insisted that the payment be made in cash but because of the representation made by Tuason and Pablo who were her barriomates and the former being her "comadre" that the check was good, she accepted payment in an Equitable Bank Check in the name of Anita T. Manalo in the amount of P45,000.00. She asked Pablo to endorse the check which the latter did, thus suggesting an assurance from the petitioners that the check was good. 5 [Id., at 56.]
When the check was, however, deposited in her savings account with Luzon Development Bank, the same was dishonored on the ground that the account was closed. Despite repeated demands from Manalastas both Tuason and Pablo failed to pay the amount of the check. Thus, another Information for Estafa was filed against Manalo, Tuason and Pablo before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, Branch 36, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1246.
On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision on both cases finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-pricipals in the crime of Estafa under paragraph 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 6 [Decision in Criminal Case No. 1245, id., at 35-49; Decision in Criminal Case No. 1246, id., at 50-58.] Motions for reconsiderations were filed by petitioners but these were denied by the trial court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on appeal. The two (2) cases were docketed as CA-G.R. CR Nos. 19119 and 19120. As earlier stated, these two (2) cases were ordered consolidated by the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused-appellants are sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of: (1) Four (4) years and two (2) months of prision Correctional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum in CA-G.R. No. 19119 and (2) Six (6) years prision correctional maximum, as minimum to ten, (10) years prision mayor as maximum imprisonment in CA-G.R. CR No. 19120, for each accused.
The decision in the consolidated criminal cases appealed from except for the above modification in CA-G.R. CR No. 19119, is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 7 [Id., at 30.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed but this likewise denied.
Hence, this petition with petitioners raising the following assignments of error, to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISIOS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1245 AND 1246, CONVICTING HEREIN PETITIONERS FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER PAR. 2(a) ART. 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE THRU ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSES DESPITE OF THE ESTABLISHED FACT THAT COMPLAINANT GLORIA MANALASTAS RELIED NOT ON THE ALLEGED REPRESENTATIONS OF PETITIONERS BUT ON THE ASSURANCE MADE BY HER DRAWEE BANK THAT NO CHECKS OF ACCUSED ANITA MANALO BOUNCED.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1245 AND 1246, CONVICTING HEREIN PETITIONERS FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER PAR. 2(a) ART. 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE THRU ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE DESPITE THE ESTABLISHED, FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT GLORIA MANALASTAS PARTED WITH THE CAVANS OF RICE AND AFTER THEIR DELIVERIES SHE WAS PAID IN CASH AND IN CHECKS ISSUED BY THE BUYERS ANITA MANALO AND CORAZON ANTONIO BY ANITA PABLO SUCH THAT THERE WAS NO DECEIT NOR FALSE PRETENSE COMMITTED BY PETITIONERS SIMULTANEOUS TO THE PARTING OF THE GOODS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THEIR CLOSE RELATIONASHIP WITH PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN INDUCING THE LATTER TO DELIVER THE TRUCKLOADS OF RICE TO THEM DESPITE THE CONTRARY ADMISSION MADE BY THE COMPLAINANT THAT THERE WA NONE.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BASED ON THE DICTUM THAT FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SAME ARE ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT DESPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE WHO PENNED THE ASSAILED DECISION WAS NOT THE SAME JUDGE WHO HEARD AND OBSERVED THE TESTIMINY AND DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. 8 [Id., at 10-11.]
We find no merit in the petition.
At the outset, we find the questions raised by petitioners to be factual in nature. Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts of the trial court are accorded with respect and will not be disturbed by this Court.9 [Laza vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 654 (1997); Alicbusan vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 336 (1997); Inland Trailways, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 178 (1996); Engineering & Machinery Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 156 (1996); Ta�edo vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80 (1996).] This is subject to certain exceptions such as when there is whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment and there is lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts.10 [Ta�edo vs. Court of Appeals, supra.] We find no exception in this case.
Petitioners claim that in prosecuting for estafa under paragraph 2(a) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induced complainant to part with the thing. In this case, petitioners assert that Manalastas parted with her cavans of rice on the agreement that payment shall be made by petitioner Pablo after delivery. It is, therefore, clear that there could not have been any prior or simultaneous false statement or misrepresentation that attended the transaction, since the dishonored checks of accused Antonio and Manalo were paid or delivered to private complaint only after the cavans of rice were delivered to herein petitioner Pablo.11 [Id., at 13-14.] Petitioners likewise claim that Manalastas did not rely on their assurance but upon the information she got from the banks that no checks of Antonio and Manalo bounced.
We disagree.
While it may be true the checks were given to Manalastas after the cavans of rice were loaded into the trucks, the misrepresentation or deceit, however, took place even before the delivery of the goods. It was clear that the parties agreed that the transaction would be on a cash basis, meaning that simultaneous to the delivery of the cavans of rice, petitioners were to pay Manalastas in cash. As the Solicitor General would put it, the transaction was on a cash on delivery basis (COD).12 [Comment of the Solicitor General, id., at 93.] Manalastas was made to believe that this would be the case. At the time the cavans of rice were delivered, however, Pablo paid her partly in checks. Manalastas made it clear before the trial court that she relied on the assurance of Tuason and Pablo that the checks were good. Of not the assurance of her barriomates and "comadre," she would not have accepted the checks.13 [Decision in Criminal Case No. 1245, id., at 48; Decision in Criminal Case No. 1246, id., at 57.] Clearly, the deceit on the part of petitioners was committed simultaneous to the delivery of the rice.
As to the claim of petitioners that Manalastas relied on the statements of the banks regarding the checks and not on their assurance, we agree with the Solicitor General that Manalastas called up the bank merely to confirm what she had been led to believe by petitioners.14 [Id., at 92.] The main reason why she accepted those checks was still the assurance of petitioners that they were good.
Petitioners also deny there was a close relationship between them and Manalastas. They claim that aside from being barriomates, they had no other relationship.15 [Id ., at 16-17.]
We are not persuaded.
It has been established that Tuason and Manalastas were barriomates, "comadres" and had known each other for a long time. Close relationship is not limited only to blood or filial relationship.
Petitioners also assail the fact that the judge who penned the decision of the trial court was not heard and observed the witnesses during trial.
There is no merit in the argument.
In a long line of decision, this Court ruled that the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb his decision. After all, he had the records of the case before him including the transcript of stenographic notes. The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts.16 [People vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. 116059, July 23,1998; People vs. Ulzoron, 286 SCRA 741 (1998); People vs. Gecomo, 254 82 (1996); People vs. Fulinara, 247 SRA 28 (1995).] In the present case, we find no reason to invalidate the decision of the trial court. The findings of the judge were all based on the stenographic notes taken when the prosecution witnesses gave their testimonies before the trial court.
Anent the claim of petitioners had their guilt has not been sufficiently proven by the prosecution, all the elements of the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(a) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
In order to convict an accused for estafa by means of deceit, the following elements should be present, to wit:
1.) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2.) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
3.) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
4.) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 17 [Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. II, 1993 Ed., p. 684.]
In the case at bar, it has been sufficiently shown that the parties agreed that simultaneous to the delivery of the cavans of rice, petitioners were to pay Manalastas in cash. At the time, however, of the payment, they paid her partly in cash and partly in checks with the assurance that the checks were good and Manalastas relied on that assurance. If not for the deceit committed by petitioners, Manalastas would not have parted with her sacks of rice and accepted the checks in question. Clearly, when Manalastas failed to encash the checks from the bank, she suffered damages. Thus it is very clear that all elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are present.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the petition is DENIED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)VIRGINIA
ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
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