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[G.R. No. 140115.December 15, 1999]

CEBEDO, et al. vs. HEIRS OF GARCINES, et al .

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated DEC 15, 1999.

G.R . No. 140115(Moderna C. Cebedo, et al. vs. Heirs of Simplicio J. Garcines, et al.)

Petitioners Moderna Cebedo, et al. were co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land which was originally cultivated by Florencio Garcines, the father of Simplicio Garcines, as tenant. In 1989, however, Simplicio Garcines obtained an Emancipation Patent and a Transfer Certificate of Title over the land in his own name. In a complaint filed against Simplicio Garcines with the Regional Branch of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) on November 3, 1993, petitioners sought to nullify the title of Simplicio contending that his succession to his father's rights is not in accord with Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which provides:

Sec. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties: In case of Death or Permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age.

Petitioners alleged that Simplicio was not a de jure tenant for which reason he could not be legally issued an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title because his father, the original tenant, was not yet dead or incapacitated and, thus, there could be no valid succession to tenancy rights; he was not one of the choices provided by law as he was not the spouse or eldest descendant; and assuming that there was succession, Simplicio was not the one chosen by lessors as provided by law.

Petitioners averred that since the succession to tenancy rights is void, the Emancipation Patent and Certificate of Title issued to Simplicio is, similarly, void. Petitioners further claimed that Simplicio is liable for rentals from 1991. Finally, petitioners asseverated that they had never been notified by the Department of Agrarian Reform regarding Simplicio's application for Emancipation Patent.

In his answer, Simplicio alleged that the late Teofisto Cebedo, Sr., the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners appointed and installed him, not his father, Florencio Garcines, unto the landholding in 1960 and that notices of the proceedings leading to the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in his name were sent to Teofisto Cebedo, Sr.

After hearing, DARAB dismissed petitioners complaint, holding that consent to Simplicio's tenancy on the landholding had been impliedly given by petitioners. They had knowledge of Simplicio's cultivation of the land since 1960 and had never contested the same.

Not satisfied with the decision of the DARAB. Regional Office, petitioners appealed to the DARAB Main Office, which affirmed the former's ruling.. Further, appeal to the Court of Appeals met the same fate.. Hence, the instant petition for review. wherein petitioners raise the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE LAW SIMPUCIO. GARCINES CAN BE CONSIDERED AS BONA FIDE TENANT CONSIDERING THAT AT THE TIME ORIGINAL TENANT FATHER FLORENCIO GARCINES WAS STILL ALIVE AND THAT THE FACT ALLEGEDLY THAT PETITIONERS DID NOT QUESTION HIS WORKING ON THE LAND IS INDEED GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL.AND IMPLIED WAIVER;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE VALID GROUNDS FOR THE CANCELLATION OF EMANCIPATION PATENT A-163504, UNDER TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-153 OF. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF OZAMIZ CITY;

III

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS REALLY PROOF OF ALLEGED FULL PAYMENT OF THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE LANDHOLDING IN QUESTION AND THAT ALLEGEDLY THERE WAS EVEN AN OVERPAYMENT AND HENCE, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR DEFENDANT TO DEPOSIT TO THE LAND BANK IN ORDER TO PAY THE UNAMORTIZED PORTION.

The petition is without merit.

The DARAB Regional Office, DARAB Main Office and the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals are one in saying that:

1.Estoppel in pais has set in. Petitioners gave their implied consent to the tenancy relationship with respondent as shown by receipt of lease rentals covering the period of 1984-1991.

2.The full value of the land was paid by :the crediting of prior rentals which represent amortization payments, as ruled by the Supreme Court in Locsin v. Valenzuela, 194 SCRA 194 (1991).

3.Due process was observed as the Annexes to the pleadings show that the landowners were actually notified.

Petitioners basically raise two main grounds for review, to wit, whether respondent is a bona fide tenant and whether there was proof of full payment of actual value of landholding. Anent the first issue, the Court of Appeals has ruled that substantial evidence exists which shows that during the early, 1980s, petitioners were aware of respondent's cultivation of the subject land. Receipts of payment of lease rentals covering the period of 1984-1991 paid for by respondent to petitioners support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that estoppel in pais has set in. Whether respondent made the payments as mere representative of his father or in his own capacity as tenant is a question of fact and a matter of proof that cannot be raised at this late stage. With regard to the matter of payment of the full value of the land, suffice it to state that the Court of Appeals and the DARAB made a factual finding that said value was in fact satisfied by the crediting of the rentals previously paid by respondents. This conclusion is not bereft of legal basis as the Supreme Court held in Locsin vs. Valenzuela. ¹ 194 SCRA 194 (1991).

It appearing that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence, and there being no showing that said decision is not in accord with law or jurisprudence, the Court resolved to DENY the petition.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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