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[ G.R. No. 129570. June 9, 1999]
TERESA RABELAS vs. GSIS, et al.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 9, 1999.
G.R. No. 129570 (Teresa Rabelas vs. GSIS, et al.)
For this consideration of this Court is a petition for review assailing the Decision dated March 31, 1997, of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On May 8,
1959, herein petitioner Teresa B. Rabelas bought from Manotoc Realty, Inc. a
parcel of land situated in Baesa, Quezon City for the total price of P7,620.00.
Petitioner was able to pay Manotoc Subdivision the sum of P2,909.78
only.
Sometime in
February 1963, petitioner applied for, and was granted, a loan by re Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of P11,500.00 for which
she executed a promissory note. The loan was granted under a special
arrangement called "Kaliwaan System" whereby respondent GSIS remitted
part of the loan proceeds to Manotoc Subdivision which in turn executed a Deed
of Sale over the land in question to petitioner. Petitioner then mortgaged the
land in question to GSIS to secure the loan. As a consequence of the issuance
of the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 619910 covering the subject land was issued to
petitioner.1 [Rollo, p. 30.]
On October
14, 1968, petitioner obtained from respondent GSIS another loan in the amount
of P7,000.00 for the improvement of the house which she built on the
subject land; for said amount, she likewise executed a promissory note and
another mortgage contract over the same lot in favor of GSIS.2 [Ibid.]
Thereafter, from August 28, 1964 to June 30, 1982, petitioner paid the installments on the aforesaid loans as evidenced by official Receipts (Exhs. H to H-65).3 [Id., at 31.]
Sometime in
April 1982, respondent GSIS notified petitioner thru letters, that her two loan
accounts had already reached the amount of P17,639.44 as of March 31,
1982; and asked her to settle the same or foreclosure proceedings would be
instituted against her mortgaged property. Petitioner failed to settle.
Consequently, respondent GSIS proceeded with the foreclosure proceedings and a
public sale of the mortgaged property was held on July 14, 1982 with the
mortgagee (GSIS) as the highest bidder in the amount of P25,195.00.
Petitioner was duly informed of these events and of her right to redeem the
subject property within a period of one year.4 [Ibid.]
On September 6, 1983, respondent notified petitioner that the one-year period of redemption had expired and that if she wanted to continue staying in the premises, she had to pay rentals to the respondent. Petitioner continued to stay on the subject property.5 [Ibid.]
Sometime in 1992,
however, the Acquired Assets Department of GSIS informed petitioner that the
accrued rentals for the property already amounted to P83,600.00,
computed at P800.00 per month for the period from September 1, 1982 to
September 30, 1992.6 [Ibid.]
Confronted with this critical development, petitioner filed an action against respondent GSIS for Declaration of Nullity of the Foreclosure Sale with Damages. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 312426 in the name of respondent GSIS and replace it with another in the name of petitioner and to pay damages to the latter.7 [Id., at 31-32.]
Respondent GSIS appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, dated March 31, 1997, the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling and dismissed petitioner's complaint.8 [Id., at 36.]
Her motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petitioner for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
For the record, it is worthy to note that the instant petition had been dismissed twice by this Court: once, in a resolution dated September 8, 1997, for failure to submit a verified statement of material dates to determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition and the timeliness of the payment of legal fees; and, after having been reinstated, for the second time for petitioner's failure to file her reply as required by the Court.
Looking now at the merits of the instant petition, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.
In the first place, a perusal of the petition shows that it raises questions of fact. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.9 [Atillo III vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596.]
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court held, and correctly so, that:
One. The trial expressed serious doubts about the correctness of
GSIS's computation of the loan balance of the appellee. This doubt was partly
engendered by a Certification (Exhibit 1) issued by Arturo Soriano, Chief of
the GSIS Residential Account Division which states in effect that 5 payments
totalling P1,600.00 were not included in the computation of her account.
This court believes that this Certification does not deserve any probative
value. The GSIS presented Divina Lanting of the Real Estate Accounting Office
of the GSIS who presented the entire accounting ledger of appellee's loan and
the official receipts (Exhibit 8 and 9) of his (sic) payments and testified
that those records and documents indubitably showed that the 5 payments
mentioned in the Certification were actually included in the computation of
appellee's balance account save one (1) payment on May 7, 1992 in the amount of
P500.00 which was not included because it did not reach the cut-of (sic)
date before foreclosure. This payment however, was transferred to the Acquired
Department which credited it to appellee, albeit for a different purpose. With
the foregoing controverting testimonial and documentary evidences, the appellee
should have compelled the appearance of Arturo Serrano to testify on rebuttal
to substantiate his Certification. But she did not. Therefore, as between the
Certification whose number author did not testify nor whose basis was
unsupported and unexplained and the controverting testimony of Divina Lanting
which was adequately corroborated by Exhibits 8 and 9, there could be no second
thought in giving the weight of evidence upon the latter. Withal, considering
that the arrearages of appellee at the time of foreclosure was P21,889.07,
the non-inclusion of the payment of P500.00, even assuming that it was
improper, could not have prevented the foreclosure of the mortgage.
Another matter that the lower court questioned in the computation of
appellee's account was the failure of GSIS to deduct what appellee had already
paid to Manotoc Realty, Inc. from the sale price it remitted to the latter.
Obviously, the lower court overlooked Exhibit 4. When appellee was applying for
a real estate loan with GSIS, she was required to state how much did she owe
Manotoc Realty, Inc. to complete payment of the price of the land. In response,
she submitted the letter (Exhibit 4) of Manotoc Realty, Inc. addressed to her
stating that her balance was P7,603.59. So, since appellee endorsed the
letter to GSIS, the latter remitted said amount of P7,603.59 to Manotoc
Realty, Inc. Appellee's remedy is not to question the remittance of GSIS to
Manotoc Realty, Inc. for that was the amount she herself indicated by
submitting Exhibit 4 to GSIS but to demand and collect from Manotoc Realty,
Inc. any overpayment which she believes to have been mistakenly paid.10
[Rollo, pp. 32-33.]
Anent petitioner's contention that the appellate court had overlooked the weight and probative value of the lower court's findings regarding the respondent's acts of accepting payment of petitioner even after the foreclosure sale, we find that the appellate court correctly appreciated the evidence presented when it held that:
This matter was convincingly explained by appellant GSIS to the effect that payments made by the appellee after foreclosure could not have been payment of the loan because there was no more loan to pay. Those payments were forwarded to the Acquired Assets Department which applied them as rentals of the properties on their fair rental valuation. Appellee was informed in a letter that the period of redemption has expired and that if she wished to continue the occupancy of the property, she had to pay rentals. She continued occupying the property so she had to pay rentals.
As for the petitioner's allegation that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and denial of petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, this ground is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court, and not in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
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