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[ G.R. No. 135544. June 29, 1999]
NELINIA N. ESCALANTE vs. COMELEC
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 29, 1999.
G.R. No. 135544 (Nelinia N. Escalante vs. Commission on Elections and Purito Caingoy.)
The records reveal that on April 21, 1998, respondent Purito Caingoy filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification of petitioner Nelinia N. Escalante as candidate for the position of mayor of Almagro, Samar on the ground that the latter was a fugitive from justice. On April 27, 1998, respondent Caingoy filed a supplemental petition for the disqualification of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner was found guilty by final judgment by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI in Criminal Case No. 59209 for illegal recruitment and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Meanwhile, on April 23, 1998, the COMELEC issued an order (1) requiring the petitioner to file an answer and (2) setting the case for hearing on April 30, 1998. On April 30, 1998, the COMELEC issued another order requiring petitioner to personally appear at the hearing set for May 5, 1998.
On May 5, 1998, petitioner through counsel filed with the COMELEC an answer with motion dismiss asseverating that the petition was filed out of time and that she was not fugitive from justice.
On July 1, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution which dispositively reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Commission (SECOND DIVISION) hereby renders judgment DISQUALIFYING respondent Nelinia N. Escalante as candidate for Municipal Mayor of Almagro, province of Samar in the May 11, 1998 elections.
SO ORDERED. 1 [ Rollo , p. 54.]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the COMELEC en banc was denied in August 28, 1998.2 [ Id., at 26.]
Hence, this petition for certiorari raising the following issues:
I
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
II
RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISQUALIFIED THE PETITIONERFOR BEING ALLEGEDLY A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE DESPITE THE UTTER LACK OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES THEREFOR. 3 [ Id., at 12.]
The petition is not meritorious.
First. Petitioner was not denied due process when the COMELEC issued the questioned resolutions because she was given all opportunity to prove that the evidence on her disqualification was not strong. On April 23, 1998, the COMELEC required her to file an answer to the petition filed against her and set the case for hearing on April 30, 1998. On April 30, 1998, the COMELEC issued an order requiring her to appear personally at the hearing set on May 5, 1998. On May 5, 1998, instead of appearing personally at the COMELEC, petitioner through counsel filed an answer with motion to dismiss claiming that the petition was filed out of time and that she is not a fugitive from justice. In all these hearings, petitioner was represented by counsel. She filed a memorandum ventilating her defenses to the petition for disqualification before the case was submitted for decision. After the COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution dated July 1, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof. It is a settled rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 4 [Nolasco v. Commission on Elections. 275 SCRA 762 (1997); Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 573 (1996); Padilla v. Sto. Tomas , 243 SCRA 155 (1995).] Certainly, all these avenues were available to the petitioner and she actively took advantage of them.
Second. Section 40 of the Local Government Code lists seven (7) grounds for the disqualification of any candidate for any local elective position and any one ground is enough to disqualify a candidate. Section 40 provides:
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a)������� Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b)������� Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c)������� Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d)������� Those with dual citizenship;
(e)������� Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f)������� Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad ad continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g)������� The insane or feeble-minded.
It has been established that petitioner is indeed disqualified to run for any elective local position under subsections (a) and (e).
Subsection (a) disqualifies candidates sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude of for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. Petitioner was found guilty of illegal recruitment by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Subsection (e) disqualifies candidates who are fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad. In one case, 5 [Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, 259 SCRA 298 (1996).] we defined a fugitive from justice as including not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. We further stated therein that there is an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or a promulgated judge of conviction. As correctly found by the COMELEC, petitioner was a fugitive from justice at the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she evaded prosecution for the several crimes with which she was charged. In fact, by her own admission in her memorandum, she did not attend the hearing before he COMELEC on May 5, 1998 for fear that she might get arrested. We quote with favor the COMELEC's ratiocination, thus:
The essence of being a fugitive from justice as exemplified by the Supreme Court in the case of Rodriguez, supra, is intent to evade, i.e., the fleeing subject must have knowledge of the already instituted indictment. The warrants of arrest submitted to support the petitions were issued after the respondent had already been charged of illegal recruitment and estafa. Precisely, respondent is presumed to have known these charges against her at the time she transferred her residence from Quezon City to Almagro, Samar. No less than the respondent herself had admitted in her memorandum that she did not attend the May 5, 1998 hearing for she might be arrested at the behest of the petitioner. Verily, respondent is fully aware of the arrest warrants issued against her and her acts indicative of her to evade arrest led to the finding of this Commission that she falls under the terms 'fugitive from justice.' 6 [ Id ., at 53-54.]
Consequently, any one of these two (2) grounds properly operated to disqualify petitioner from running for the mayoralty of Almagro, Samar.
In view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Romero, J., is abroad on official business.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
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