ChanRobles Virtual law Library

[G.R. No. 137351.June 16, 1999]

SPS. CANO vs. PAPA

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information. is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 16 1999 .

G.R. No. 137351(Spouses Ernesto P. Cano and Erlinda P. Cano v. Rafaela T. Papa.)

Petitioner spouses Ernesto and Erlinda P. Cano were lessees of a parcel of land in Abangan Sur, Marilao, Bulacan, which the spouses Rafael and Constancia Fernando formerly owned. The period of the lease was for ten years, up to January 10, 1989, but it was subsequently extended to June 4, 1994.

On March 30, 1990, during the life of the lease, the Fernandos sold the property to herein respondent Rafaela T. Papa, as a result of which the property was registered in the latter's name under TCT No, T-119723.

On June 16, 1994, petitioners sought the annulment of the sale in an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 545-M-94, flied by them in the Regional Trial Court of Marilao. Petitioners alleged that they had the right of first refusal respecting the subject property pursuant to the "Kasulatan ng Pautangan na Mayroong Kapananagutan," dated January 12. 1979, between them and the Fernandos, the original owners of the land.

In turn, respondent filed on August 23, 1995 a complaint for ejectment against petitioner spouses in the Municipal Trial Court of Marilao, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 787. She alleged that despite demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the property.

In their answer, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the action against them or its suspension in view of the case filed by them in the RTC (Civil Case No. 545-M-94) and on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action as it "does not allege anything about the manner the dispossession was effected," i.e., whether through forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

The MTC gave judgment for respondent and ordered petitioners to pay her P3,000.00 by way of rentals from January 10, 1989 until petitioners have vacated the property, P3,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs. On appeal, its decision was affirmed, first by the RTC and, later, by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, reduced the rent to P300 a month on the ground that this was the amount stipulated in the contract of lease. The Court of Appeals further ordered that rentals should begin from June 5, 1994 as the rentals until June 4, 1994 had already been paid by the mutual set-off of claims of the Fernandos and petitioners.

Hence this petition. Petitioners contend that (1) the MTC has no jurisdiction over me case because respondent's complaint does not make out a case for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry and (2) under the lease contract with the Fernandos, the latter cannot alienate the subject property without petitioners' consent during the pendency of the lease and, therefore, the sale of the property to private respondent was invalid and petitioners have a right to the possession of the property "anchored on the violation of the terms and condition of the lease."

First. - Respondent's complaint in the MTC alleged:

5. From the time the plaintiff acquired said parcel of land on March 30, 1990, defendants failed and continuously failed to vacate the parcel of land without any justifiable cause. Despite repeated demands upon the defendants, the last demand of which was made on August 22, 1995.

This is almost the same as the form for complaints in ejectment cases prescribed in the Rules of Court which reads:

FORM 1. -Complaint for Ejectment

Plaintiff alleges that defendant has unlawfully turned him out of possession (or unlawfully withholds from him the possession, as the case may be) of certain lands and building (here described the premises), situated in the municipality of. . . .(Emphasis added)

Wherefore, he prays that he be restored to the possession of said premises, with damages and costs.

In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 (1946), it was held that in ejectment cases, it is not necessary for the complaint to contain a statement of the particular facts relied on to constitute the alleged forcible entry or unlawful detention, the complaint being sufficient if it is a substantial compliance with the form. (Id. at 682-683)

In this case, while the complaint did not specify on what ground respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the subject property, this was not necessary as the allegation that "defendants failed and continuously failed to vacate the parcel of land without any justifiable cause" is equivalent to an allegation that defendants (the herein petitioners) were unlawfully withholding possession of the property from respondent. The action, therefore, was clearly for unlawful detainer. In the subsequent proceedings and in her position paper, it was stated that the ejectment of petitioners was being sought on the ground of the expiration of petitioners' lease.

Second. Petitioners' contention that they had right of possession over the property because the Fernandos allegedly violated the terms or the lease by selling the property to respondent prior to the expiration of the lease on June 4, 1994, without petitioners' consent, is untenable. Even assuming that there was a violation of the lease contract (a matter which is apparently still under litigation in Civil Case No. 545-M-94), the fact is that petitioners have remained in possession of the property for the remainder of the term of the lease and even beyond that period. There is no question, therefore, that they are unlawfully withholding possession of the land from respondent. Respondent is the registered owner of the property. As such, she is entitled to possession thereof as the lease entered into by her predecessor-in-interest and petitioners had expired on June 4, 1994 and petitioners did not pay compensation for their use and occupation of the property.

Thus, petitioners have not shown that the Court of Appeals has committed any reversible error. In addition, the denial of their petition is warranted by the fact that there is a variance between the allegation in the affidavit of service (Rollo, p. 111) that service was made on respondent's counsel by registered mail on March 22, 1999 and the registry receipt (Rollo, p. 19) which shows that this was done on March 19, 1999. Apparently, it is to cure the discrepancy that the date of the registry receipt was changed to March 22, 1999.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court

Back to Home | Back to Main

CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE