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[A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 97-422-RTJ.June 21, 1999]

GENATO vs. JUDGE SULTAN, RTC, BR. 98.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 21 1999.

A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 97-422-RTJ(William Ong Genato vs. Judge Justo M. Sultan, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City.)

This is a complaint for ignorance of the law and gross disregard of the mandate of the Supreme Court filed by William Ong Genato, plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3814 (for foreclosure of real estate mortgage), against Judge Justo M. Sultan, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City. The complainant alleges the following:

On May 21, 1991, Judge Sultan rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3814 in favor of complainant ordering Oakland Development Resources Corporation (ODRC) to pay P2,000,000.00, as principal obligation; P100,000.00, as interest; P100,000.00, as attorney's fees; and P9,292, as cost of suit. Judge Sultan also ordered the sale of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 356315 and 366380, which are subject to a real estate mortgage, in the event ODRC fails to pay the aforesaid amount. ODRC appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of Judge Sultan.

Meanwhile, the persons who bought lots from ODRC filed a special civil action for prohibition in the Supreme Court. The case was eventually referred to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition in its decision dated February 3, 1994. The lot buyers then appealed to the Supreme Court but their petition was dismissed on September 12, 1949. They filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was likewise denied.

The lot buyers then questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 356315 and 366380 before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which rendered a decision on March 20, 1995 in their favor, declaring the real estate mortgage null and void and enjoining the complainant from foreclosing the said properties, as the lot buyers have a superior right over the properties in question. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution with Judge Sultan, which the latter denied in a resolution, dated July 1, 1997, on the basis of the decision of the HLURB declaring the mortgage between complainant and ODRC null and void.

In the instant complaint, complainant alleges that by denying the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, Judge Sultan gave precedence to the ruling of the HLURB over that of the Supreme Court. He contends:

The Supreme Court has already spoken. It affirmed the decision of the lower court as well as that of the Court of Appeals as essayed out earlier in this complaint. And yet, despite all these, the respondent judge chose to ignore the rulings and deferred to the decision of the HLURB.

If the actuation of the respondent judge will not be sanctioned, then complainant fears that other similarly situated would likewise, do the same.

Indeed, the act of the respondent judge in ignoring the decision of this Honorable Court and entertaining more that of the HLURB is a sore thumb that cries for notice.

The complainant also filed an appeal from the resolution dated July 1, 1997 of Judge Sultan with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56750.

In his Comment dated November 17, 1997, Judge Sultan alleged:

(d) Your respondent is fully aware of the Supreme Court decision in the instant case. Also, it did not lose sight of the fact that while the instant case was pending appeal, the lot buyers (intervenor) filed an action against William Ong Genato, the Oakland and Prater Esplana with the HLURB, praying for the annulment of the real estate mortgage entered into by the latter two; that in said case, the lot buyers (Intervenors) prevailed when the HLURB ruled that the said contract was null and void. Under the obtaining facts, there are therefore two decisions rendered by a Court of general jurisdiction (RTC) and a body exercising quasi-judicial function. In both cases, each decision is ripe for execution, it is now final and executory.

(e) In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority (now the Housing Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases. To the extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Decree." Section 3 of this statute provides that the National Housing Authority, now The Housing Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provision of said decree.

There is no dispute that the subject of the contract of real estate mortgage entered into by the Oakland Resources Development Corp. (Oakland for short) represented by Prater Esplana as its president and William Ong Genato, was a subdivision known as Prater Village III; that the amount of P2,000,000.00 borrowed by the latter from plaintiff Genato was use to defray for the development of the said project; that the HLURB approved the Subdivision Plan on the subject parcel of land and that it issued a development permit to Oakland.

Before a subdivision project would come within the purview of Pres. Decree No. 957, it is essential that the subdivision lots be offered for sale to the public. In the instant case, it is conceded that intervenors herein are lot buyers of the Prater Village III subdivision; that the subdivision lots covered and embraced in T.C.T. No. 366380 were offered for sale to the public. Consequently, the property became subject to the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and Oakland could no longer sell the same without a License to Sell, or mortgage the same without prior approval of the HLURB.

Section 18 of the statute states:

Section 18. Mortgages - No mortgage of any Unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority (HLURB). Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the Condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization . . . .

Since the act of mortgaging the property (whether without license and clearance of the HLURB) is an issue which can be resolve only by the quasi-judicial body concerned. Your respondent, therefore, believes and so holds that the Court of general jurisdiction (RTC) is not competent to take cognizance over the case.That such authority resides and is reserved for the proper quasi-judicial body only.

Based on the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends the dismissal of the instant Complaint against Judge Sultan.

The recommendation is well taken.

Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory to, or a substitute for, the judicial remedies which are available. Resort to judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, is a pre-requisite for the taking of administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the judges concerned. ¹ In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 (1995).

Indeed, judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation and the fear of civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions for acts done by them in the performance of their duties and functions.For judges are not liable for acts done in good faith and within the scope of their function as such.The prosecution of a judge is justified only if there is a final determination by a competent Court of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order and evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance, or inexcusable negligence in rendering said judgment or order. ² Flores v. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302 (1997). Since complainant has appealed the resolution dated July 1, 1997 of Judge Sultan to the Court of Appeals, there is no basis for him to proceed against Judge Sultan administratively.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

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