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[A.M. No. OCA-I.P.I. 98-509-RTJ.June 16, 1999]
SPS. PADILLA vs. JUDGE SILVA
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 16 1999 .
A.M. No. OCA-I.P.I. 98-509-RTJ (Spouses Noli and Angelita Padilla vs. Judge Lorenzo R. Silva, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga, Bataan.)
This is a complaint for violation of the right to due process, grave partiality, and issuance of unjust writs and orders filed by complainants, the spouses Noli and Angelita Padilla, in connection with Civil Case No. 6358 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, of Balanga, Bataan. The spouses Padilla are the defendants in that case, which is for damages.
It appears that on July 13, 1995, Judge Lorenzo R. Silva rendered a decision based on a compromise agreement entered into by the parties with the assistance of their respective counsels.
On January 5, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which the spouses Padilla opposed on grounds that (1) the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan has no jurisdiction over a fishpond located in Pampanga; and (2) the compromise agreement has been extinguished by novation. In addition, the complainants sought the inhibition of Judge Silva on the ground that their counsel had previously filed an administrative case against the judge.
In an order, dated January 26, 1998, Judge Silva denied the motion for his inhibition and the opposition to the motion for execution with respect to the ground of lack of jurisdiction even as he set the case for hearing on February 6, 1998 as to the question of novation of the compromise agreement. On January 30, 1998, complainants filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of January 26, 1998. At the same time, they asked for the postponement of the hearing on February 6, 1998 on the ground that their counsel would be unavailable on that date.
In an order, dated February 6, 1998, respondent judge denied the motion of complainants and considered them to have waived their right to present evidence on the issue of novation of the compromise agreement.
Complainants filed a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the orders, dated January 26 and February 6, 1998, issued by Judge Silva. They also filed the instant complaint against Judge Silva, alleging the following:
11. The Respondent Judge has grossly violated the fundamental principle and basic tenet of due process of law enshrined in the Constitution and existwg jurisprudence which is as old as civilization itself, and has been espoused by this Most Honorable Supreme Court, thus:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike - but hear me first" (Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 659) by resorting to "short-cuts" and consequently sacrificed the fundamental and substantive rights of the herein Complainants to "due process of law" when he issued Order dated February 6, 1998 (Annex "E"), and considered the pending incidents submitted for resolution notwithstanding the request of the Petitioners for the postponement of the hearing on February 6, 1998 on the ground that the undersigned counsel was already committed to appear before RTC-53, Guagua, Parnpanga in the Election Protest of Abelardo Panlaqui, et al. - thus depriving Petitioners the right and opportunity to present evidence to prove that there has been a novation of the said Decision.
In his comment, dated April 16, 1998, Judge Silva stated:
4. The Court on January 26, 1998 resolved to deny the motion for inhibition and the opposition on ground of jurisdiction, and opined thus:
4.athat the defendants have nothing to fear; the cited administrative case was not filed by the defendants herein or by Atty. Dimalanta, their lawyer or even if it was filed by him, his clients should not be prejudiced by his actuations; the arguments and facts proved in a case are matters of record and a judge has to decide on the basis of the facts proved and arguments according to law and jurisprudence. For the Presiding Judge to inhibit himself would be to shirk from his duty in resolving the motion for execution of a decision rendered by him on the basis of a compromise agreement signed by the parties with assistance of their lawyers.
4.bthe court has jurisdiction to decide the motion for execution which it had when it approved the compromise agreement on which its decision was based and therefore has jurisdiction to implement the same. The compromise agreement did not confer jurisdiction over the case which the court already had but was an agreement on venue. Said agreement was with the assistance of the counsel of the defendants who never attacked the validity of the decision since it was rendered on July 13, 1995.
4.b.1As the alternative issue on novation was raised, the Court regarded the matter as evidentiary, hence set a hearing therefor on February 6, 1998.
. . . .
6.The motion for reconsideration and deferment of hearing were both denied in the Order dated February 10, 1990 in that:
6.1The motion for reconsideration is but a rehash of the arguments in defendants' comment/opposition earlier submitted.
6.2The motion for deferment of hearing cannot be granted as a matter of course unless it is clearly shown that the reason for postponing the hearing on the case is of lesser weight and importance than the other. While the defendants say that the question involved in this case is of great importance involving a considerable amount, they have opted to rely on a lawyer who does not intend to present evidence on the alleged novation of the decision until after the higher court has finally decided on the question of jurisdiction. This is misplaced as evidence on the alleged novation could be presented without prejudice to the question of jurisdiction.
. . . .
8.The charge that respondent has grossly violated the constitutional rights and complainant in depriving them due process of law is unfair as in fact the defendants were given the opportunity to prove the alleged novation in the compromise agreement only that even before the date set for the hearing their counsel manifested his unavailability. The alleged unavailability could have been remedied as in fact at the time set counsel was not attending to any election hearing as certified to by the BCC of RTC Guagua, Pampanga (Annex 4)
On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of complainants. It held:
To be sure, it is too late in the day for petitioners to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. The record shows that they did not assail the jurisdiction of said court when they entered into a Compromise Agreement with the private respondents with the assistance of their co-defendant and counsel, Atty. Norbin P.Dimalanta. Neither did they allege any fraud in the execution of such compromise agreement. It was only when the judgment by compromise was sought to be executed by the private respondents that they started to question the jurisdiction of the respondent court on the theory that it lacks jurisdiction over the property that was the subject of their compromise agreement.
The petitioners cannot anymore raise such issue wider the principle of estoppel (Zamboanga City Electric Cooperative vs. Bual, 243 SCRA 47).
Moreover, the execution of a judgment over an immovable property located in another territorial jurisdiction of a co-equal court is not contrary to the rules. The cited case of De la Cruz vs. Gabor (supra) is not applicable to the case at bar, considering that the extraordinary writ referred to therein was a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and the said judgment was based on the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296). Under the said Act, extraordinary writs were operative only within the respective provinces and districts of the then Courts of First Instance. The rule now obtaining is found in Section 3 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, which provide:
3.Writs and processes. --
(a)Writs of certiorari , prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court,. may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the regional trial court.
Writs of execution fall under paragraph (b) above, and is therefore enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Anent the alleged lack of due process, We find the same to be untenable. The Motion for Execution was originally set for January 9, 1998, but the same was reset several times upon motion of the petitioners. When their counsel filed a motion to reset the third scheduled hearing on February 6, 1998, they should not have assumed that the motion for postponement would be granted. The denial thereof could not be equated to denial of due process.
There is no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so (Loong vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 1).
Finally, We cannot see how a judgment which has long become final and executory could be novated by the alleged verbal agreement of the parties. It is fundamental that a final and executory decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes, A definitive judgment can no longer be subject to revision, amendment or reversal, and the court loses jurisdiction over it, except to order its execution (Yu vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 134 ; Firs t Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Hernando, 199 SCRA 796).
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Based on the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends the dismissal of the instant complaint against Judge Silva.
The recommendation is well taken.
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory to, or a substitute for, the judicial remedies which are available. Resort to judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, is a pre-requisite for the taking of administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the judges concerned. 1 In Re: Joaquin T . Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 (1995) .
Indeed, judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation and the fear of civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. For judges are not liable for acts done in good faith and within the scope of their function as such. The prosecution of a judge is justified only if there is a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order and evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance, or inexcusable negligence in rendering said judgment or order. 2 Flores v. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302 (1997). With the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the complainants' petition for certiorari to annul the orders of January 26 and February 6, 1998 of respondent Judge Silva, there is no longer any basis for an administrative action against him.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk of Court
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