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[G.R. No. 126561.November 17, 1999]

QUIJANO vs. MERCURY DRUG CORP. & NLRC

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated NOV 17, 1999.

G.R. No. 126561 (Dandy V. Quijano vs. Mercury Drug Corporation and National Labor Relations Commission.)

On August 19, 1998, private respondent moved for a reconsideration of our decision in the case at bar, but with respect only to our award of damages to petitioner and order of reinstatement, specifically raising the ground of "strained relations" in questioning petitioner's reinstatement. ¹ See Motion for Reconsideration; Rollo, pp. 274-281.

In a Resolution, ² Rollo, pp. 363-365. dated July 5, 1999, we denied private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed our ruling directing the reinstatement of petitioner to his former or substantially equivalent position, and the payment of backwages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. We directed Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac to fully dispose of the case within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of said Resolution under pain of contempt.

Arbiter Bartolabac received our Resolution on July 22, 1999. On August 30, 1999, more than 30 days after receipt of said Resolution, he filed a Manifestation ³ Id., pp. 366-367. before this Court informing us that he had already issued an Order ⁴ Id., pp. 372-379. on June 24, 1999, resolving petitioner's motion for execution. In said Order, he ruled that reinstatement was not feasible as private respondent brought to his attention that petitioner's former position as warehouseman has already been abolished and there is no other substantially equivalent position in the company. Thus, he directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages in the amount of P573,228.00, less necessary deductions, and separation pay. Arbiter Bartolabac likewise manifested that an alias writ of execution ⁵ Id., pp. 380-385. has been duly served and private respondent's cash bond in the amount of P297,930.75 has been released in partial satisfaction of petitioner's monetary award. ⁶ See Order, dated July 14, 1999; Rollo, at p. 390. Arbiter Bartolabac now prays that his June 24, 1999 Order be considered as his compliance with this Court's July 5 , 1999 Resolution.

The June 24, 1999 Order of Arbiter Bartolabac can in no case be considered as compliance with our Decision and Resolution in the case at bar. Our directives were specific: we ordered the reinstatement of petitioner, payment of backwages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Arbiter Bartolabac defied these directives despite his receipt of our July 5, 1999 Resolution. Neither has he exerted sufficient effort to ensure that all the amounts due petitioner are fully paid. To date, the records show that petitioner has received only a total of P297,930.075 as partial satisfaction of his backwages. The remaining amounts due him have not been paid. Our Decision in this case has long become final and executory, yet the judgment award therein has not been fully satisfied.

In issuing his June 24, 1999 Order, the labor arbiter exhibited contumacious conduct in completely disregarding the pendency of private respondent's motion for reconsideration before this Court where the very issue of the feasibility of petitioner's reinstatement had been raised. Instead of waiting for the resolution of said issue in deference to this Court, Arbiter Bartolabac proceeded to rule in his June 24, 1999 Order that petitioner's reinstatement to the same or substantially equivalent position is no longer feasible and ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay instead.

Indeed, private respondent's contention, as erroneously upheld by the labor arbiter, that there is no substantially equivalent position for petitioner's reinstatement has been categorically discounted by this Court. We took judicial notice of the fact that private respondent Mercury Drug Corporation operates nationwide and has numerous branches all over the Philippines. Petitioner, as warehouseman, occupied a clerical/rank and file position in said company and we find it highly inconceivable that no other substantially equivalent position exists to effect his reinstatement. ⁷ As petitioner pointed out in his Comment, the positions of deliveryman and self-service attendant, among others, may be considered as substantially equivalent positions. Moreover, it is quite obvious that the issue as to the lack of substantially equivalent position for petitioner was raised by private respondent before the labor arbiter as a mere afterthought, as an insidious ploy designed to block petitioner's reinstatement in the company. With obvious bad faith, private respondent belatedly raised the issue of non-feasibility of petitioner's reinstatement due to abolition of position and lack of substantially equivalent position only during the execution proceedings before the labor arbiter although at that time, it already had a pending motion for reconsideration before this Court where the only ground it raised to defeat reinstatement was "strained relations." Arbiter Bartolabac participated wittingly or unwittingly in this ploy when he failed to defer to this Court and wait for the resolution of private respondent's motion for reconsideration. Moreover, he acted in total disregard of our directives by failing to comply with our July 5, 1999 Resolution. To make matters worse, it took him more than thirty (30) days from receipt of our July 5, 1999 Resolution to file his Manifestation informing us of the action he had earlier taken on the matter.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. ⁸ Section 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac is hereby directed to fully comply with our July 8, 1998 Decision and July 5, 1999 Resolution in the case at bar, i.e., ordering petitioner's reinstatement to a substantially equivalent position and payment of backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, within the same period, he is required to explain in writing why he should not be punished for indirect contempt for his actuations in handling this case and defiance of this Court's directives.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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