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[G.R. No. 135390. November 22, 1999]
POLICARPIO JR., vs. COMELEC, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated NOV 22, 1999.
G.R. No. 135390(Modesto Policarpio, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Glenn Samson.)
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Commission of Election's (COMELEC's) Resolution dated September 7, 1998 nullifying the Order of Execution pending appeal issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal.
Petitioner Modesto Policarpio, Jr., and private respondent Glenn Samson vied for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal during the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. Based on the counting and canvassing of votes, private respondent garnered 2,982 votes while petitioner got 2,918 votes. Resultantly, private respondent was proclaimed Punong Barangay and thereafter assumed the said position.
Private respondent's proclamation and assumption of said position prompted petitioner to file an election protest against private respondent on May 22, 1998 before the Municipal Trial court of Taytay, Rizal. After invalidating several votes cast in favor of private respondent, the MTC declared petitioner as the duly elected barangay chairman of Barangay Dolores.
Private respondent filed a
notice of appeal. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the
decision which was granted on March 6, 1998 directing the issuance of a writ of
execution for the immediate enforcement of the court's decision upon filing by
petitioner of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition to annul the MTC Order of Execution with the COMELEC. The COMELEC, in an en banc resolution nullified the assailed MTC order.
Hence, this petition. Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in annulling the MTC order granting immediate execution pending appeal of its decision in an election case?
This Court rules in the negative.
To be sure, this Court, in Ramas v. COMELEC 1 G.R. No. 130831, February 10, 1998. has recognized and approved execution of judgment pending appeal in election cases filed under existing election laws in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which reads:
"Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special order shall be included therein."
In the same case, this Court has held that all that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
In this case, the trial court issued an order for execution pending appeal for the reason that private respondent had been occupying the position of Punong Barangay of Dolores, Taytay, Rizal since May 1997 up to April 15, 1998 while the term of office of barangay officials is only three years. It contended that "due to the fact that the protestant has been clearly shown as the winner then protestee has lost his moral right to hold office which will prevent him from exercising his office."
On this score, this court agrees with the COMELEC when it held that:
"The Commission has consistently ruled that when an election protest is filed, the protestee is only considered a presumptive winner until the protest is resolved, in the same way, when a protestant is adjudged the winner by a court of law but the case is on appeal with the Commission, such appeal likewise makes the protestant a presumptive winner and, unless meritorious grounds exist to execute judgment pending appeal, it is illogical to replace a presumptive winner proclaimed by the board of canvassers by another presumptive winner so declared by a court.
Perforce, it can be readily stated that executions pending appeal are exceptions to the rule, and, therefore, must be restrictively construed to comply with the stringent requirements of the law. The Commission looks with disfavor on orders of execution pending appeal, without clear and justifiable good reasons. This is one reason why the Commission in its Rules of Procedure, provided in Part VI, rule 35, Sec. 17, that: "xxx The party who in the judgment has been declared elected shall have the right to assume the office as soon as the judgment becomes final. In the case at bench, the judgment of the trial court has not become final due to the timely appeal of the protestee. Thus, the right of protestant to assume the office is only inchoate and will not precipitately ripen through execution pending appeal.
Here, there is no good reason to allow execution pending appeal. Respondent has not cited a superior circumstance "demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment." 2 Annex "A," Resolution dated September 7, 1998, Rollo, p. 29. (citation omitted)
Under the guidelines laid down by this Court, a combination of two or more "good reasons" should be present to warrant execution pending appeal in election cases. The reason given by the trial court failed to justify its order pending appeal. This Court agrees with the Solicitor General in its Comment 3 Rollo, p. 96. that:
"This observation of the trial court cannot be considered as a valid reason to justify the immediate execution of its decision. In the first place, the period from May 7, 1997 to April 15, 1998 cannot be considered long enough in relation to the term of office of private respondent to deprive the latter of his position. Under the circumstances, petitioner has no justifiable ground to complain because the risk attendant in the disposition of cases is not extraordinary and is commonly shared by all party litigants.
In the second place, there is no showing in this case that the appeal of private respondent is frivolous to warrant immediate execution of the decision. On the contrary, it would appear that it is meritorious. This could be gathered from petitioner's admission in the petition that the result of the counting of votes showed that private respondent garnered 2,982 votes while petitioner only got 2,918 votes. On account of this result, an election protest was filed with the Municipal Trial Court. However, the votes of private respondent were reduced and petitioner was declared winner by the trial court after many votes cast in favor of private respondent were invalidated on the basis of the court's appreciation of the ballots.
These votes cast in favor of private respondent which were invalidated by the trial court are now the subject of the appeal. Should private respondent as appellant be able to establish the error committed by the trial court in applying the rule on the appreciation of the ballots and, for that matter, the appealed decision is reversed, it is private respondent who will really suffer the injury or damage in the event the appealed decision is immediately executed.
As correctly pointed out by respondent COMELEC in its assailed resolution, the trial court was not able to cite in its decision any superior circumstance demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. On this score, the instant petition has no leg to stand on and must perforce be dismissed."
The reasons given by the MTC to justify its assailed decision are not sufficient to justify its execution pending appeal. In not complying with the requirement that a combination of two or more "good reasons" should be present, the instant petition must, perforce, fail
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC en banc when it annulled the MTC order granting immediate execution pending appeal of its decision. Pardo, J., no part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
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