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[ G.R. No. 134497. September 8, 1999]

PETRON CORP. vs. FRANCISCO GALMAN CRUZ, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this court dated SEPT 8 1999.

G.R. No. 134497 (Petron Corporation vs. Franciso Galman Cruz and Armanda Ternida Cruz.)

In 1977, petitioner and private respondents entered into three contracts: (1) the Retail Dealer Contract whereby the latter shall purchase petroleum products of the former; (2) the Equipment Lease Agreement whereby the former leased to the latter equipments used for selling petroleum products; and, (3) the Lease to Dealer contract whereby petitioner leased to private respondent the premises where the station is to be established. Upon expiration of these contracts, they were renewed in 1982 and allegedly impliedly renewed in 1987 for another 5 years. Sometime. In 1990, however, petitioner terminated the Lease to Dealer contract and demanded that respondent vacate the premises. When the latter failed to do so, petitioner filed an ejectment suit against them which was however, dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). In 1991, petitioner filed a second ejectment suit against respondents but the same was also dismissed. Two days before the expiration of the lease contract in 1992, petitioner again demanded from respondents to vacate the premises. For failure to heed the demand, petitioner filed a third unlawful detainer case against private respondents in the MTC. After trial, the MTC fixed a period of 15 months for the lease contract after which private respondents shall vacate the premises and also ordered them to pay rents, attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision of the MTC. In a petition for review, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the lower courts and ordered the dismissal of the detainer case for lack of cause of action. Hence, this petition for review.

The petition is without merit. First, it strikes at fundamentally factual questions which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 (Sanchez v. CA, 345 Phil. 155) in as much as only questions of law may be raised therein (Lisa v. CA, 269 SCRA 654; Oarde v. CA, 345 Phil 457). Moreover, it is a settled rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts (Davide-Chan v. CA, 268 SCRA 677; Macapagal v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 110610, October 8, 1998). Second, assuming that the court can take cognizance of the petition and regardless of whether the suit should be premised on the 1977 contract or the 1982 contract, the three contracts mentioned above are independent agreements that can stand on their own such that the termination of the lease over the premises cannot be construed as applicable to the other two contracts nor would it constitute a valid and automatic termination of the latter two. Finally, assuming further, that the lease contract shall automatically expire at the end of the 5-year period and the Retail Dealership expires with it, petitioner, however, stopped delivering petroleum products sometime in 1990. If the contracts expired in 1987, it cannot be said that the same were not impliedly renewed from that year considering that petitioner continued to deliver petroleum products beyond 1987 until 1990 when it ceased to make deliveries. Thus, notwithstanding the terms of the lease contract, the actions of petitioner cannot be construed in any other way except that of an implied renewal thereof until 1992. Hence, petitioner has no cause of action to file the third ejectment suit against respondents.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. DAVIDE, JR., C.J. and CHAIRMAN, is on official leave.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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