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[ G.R. No. 142265. April 5, 2000]
P/SUPT. FRANCISCO E. OVILLA vs. HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated
APR 5, 2000.G.R. No. 142265 (P/Supt. Francisco E. Ovilla vs. Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 95 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, et al.)
Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied his petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, thus upholding the resolution of the regional trial court denying petitioner's application for bail.
Petitioner Police Superintendent Francisco Ovilla and eleven police officers were charged with the crime of Qualified Robbery before the Regional Trial Court under the following information:
That on or about the 22nd day of August, 1999, or sometime subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named Accused, all public officers entrusted with law enforcement, being then members of the Philippine National Police, assigned at Central Police District - Police Station 9, taking advantage of their position and in grave abuse thereof, committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, give unwarranted benefit preference and advantage to the following Detainees of Police Station No. 9 namely: Jimmy Tan alias Tony, Albert/Randy Koo and Ester Ulpindo, said Jimmy Tan and Albert/Randy Koo, having been duly arrested by above-named Accused in a legitimate drug buy-bust operation in the act of selling 1.5 kilos worth of "shabu", an offense punishable by death, while said Ester Ulpindo having been duly arrested also by above-named Accused in a similar drug buy-bust operation involving an undetermined quantity of shabu, by then and there releasing said detainees from police custody, in exchange for cash amounting to P650,000.00 given to, received and distributed among all the said Accused by said Jimmy Tan and Albert/Randy Koo, to the end that said Detainees be freed from investigation and criminal prosecution before a court of law, thereby causing undue injury to the Philippine Government.
Petitioner was arraigned and the pre-trial conference accordingly followed.
After conducting a hearing on petitioner's application for bail, the trial court denied the same, ruling thusly:
The prosecution's evidence, which remain unrebutted at this time, further shows that no charges were filed against the two (2) Chinese nationals and the stuff, subject matter of the sale, cannot be accounted for. Was the failure then of the police officers who comprised the team that arrested the two (2) Chinese nationals and purposely failed to prosecute and apprehend the accused in consideration of promised gift and present? The two (2) prosecution witnesses, police officers Gonzales and Resurreccion, did not testify but they actually saw any bribe money being handed to the police officers in exchange for the release of the two (2) Chinese nationals. There are, however, unrebutted circumstantial pieces of evidence showing that there was money used in the release of the two (2) Chinese nationals. In fact, there are admissions by some of the accused that the two (2) Chinese nationals were released in exchange for money.
The Court incisively analyzed the testimony of the two (2) prosecution witnesses and holds that all the members of the team that participated in the operation involving Ester Ulpindo and the two (2) Chinese nationals must answer for the release of the two (2) Chinese nationals without any charge against the two (2) Chinese nationals especially at this stage of the proceedings that no evidence has yet been presented to rebut the evidence of the prosecution. x x x.
x x x The Petitions for Bail of the other eleven (11) accused are hereby DENIED in view of the findings of the Court that the Prosecution, at this stage of the proceedings and without any evidence of the accused to rebut the Prosecution's evidence, has established a strong evidence of guilt of the crime charged (Qualified Bribery) in the Information.
Displeased, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus urging the Court of Appeals to issue the writ prayed for so that the legality or illegality of his detention may be ventilated in court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Thus, the instant petition.
The crime of qualified bribery as defined in and penalized by Article 211-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains form arresting or prosecuting an officer who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer , promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death. (As added by Sec. 4, R.A. No. 7659).
From the above, the crime is considered a capital offense, in which case, bail is a not a matter of right.
Since the right to bail partly depends on the quantum of evidence of guilt, the prosecution has the burden of proving why bail should not granted or allowed. The prosecution must show that there is strong evidence of guilt of a capital offense, meaning that which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The word "strong", however, does not mean that the prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt (Pareja vs. Gomez, 5 SCRA 830 [1962]).
In the case at bar, the trial court rules that the evidence presented by the prosecution overcame such burden while petitioner merely insist on allegation of violation of his constitutional rights.
Although the judge is under legal obligation, upon proper application, to receive evidence with a view of determining the right to bail in appropriate cases, the determination of the weight of the evidence is discretionary upon him and its outcome cannot be compelled by mandamus (Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil 210 [1936]), or in this case circumvented by the issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
Finally, the Court of Appeals committed no error in denying the petition for habeas corpus considering that: 1) the information has already been filed in court against petitioner (Cruz vs. Montoya, 62 SCRA 543); 2) petitioner had petitioned for bail but the same was denied (Galvez v. CA, 237 SCRA 685); 3) petitioner is in custody of the jail warden under process issued by a court which has jurisdiction to issue said process (Sec. 4, Rule 192, Rules of Court); and 4) a writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued to the correct errors of fact or law for as long as the court has jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused (Talabon v. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599).
The Court has ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial (Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685 [1994]).
WHEREFORE
, petition is denied due course.SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
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