ChanRobles Virtual law Library
[ G.R. No. 123051. August 14, 2000]
TO SIOK KENG, et al. vs. CA, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 14 2000.
G.R. No. 123051 (To Siok Keng, Jimmy Lao, Francisco Teng, Sps. Alfredo Villatuya and Amelia Villatuya, Chan Sook Ching, Rosalinda Pilares, Antonio Vidal, Helen Bedia, Angel Ang, and Rolando Ty, vs. Court of Appeals and Divisoria Land Development Corporation.)
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision, 1 Penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya and concurred in by Associate Justices Cesar D. Francisco and Bernardo LL. Salas. dated July 14, 1995, and the Resolution, dated November 6, 1995, of the Court of Appeals.
Gathered by the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals the antecedent facts are as follows:
"Plaintiff
corporation, the Divisoria Land Development Corporation, DLDC for brevity, was
organized, formed and incorporated on April 16, 1990. The incorporators of the
plaintiff corporation and the defendants in these cases are occupants of the
subject premises and are also members of the Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa
Narabel (sic) Building, Isp., better known as SAMAHAN. Sometime in 1988, the
SAMAHAM learned that the subject property was being sold. The property is
covered by four Transfer Certificates of Titles in the name of Prudential Bank
and Trust Company and Pacific Banking Corporation. On July 13, 1988, and on
June 5, 1989, the President of the SAMAHAN, Mr. Maximo G. Lacson, sent a letter
to the Deputy Liquidator, Mr. Zantua of Pacific Banking Corp. expressing the
desire of the SAMAHAN to buy the property and requested that it be given the priority
and on June 20, 1989 and on October 20, 1989, Mr. Zantua informed the SAMAHAN,
through its President, Mr. Maximo Lacson, that the property will be sold at
public bidding on November 9, 1989 with a floor price of P50,000,000.00.
Mr. Lacson attempted to raise from the members of the SAMAHAN the sum of
P50,000,000.00 but failed because some members did not want to contribute and
the others wanted to give only small amounts. The SAMAHAN was not able to bid,
fortunately, however, no bidders appeared. Later, the property was being sold
on a negotiated basis. Mr. Lacson and the other officers of the SAMAHAN tried
to raise the money from its members and in fact, the defendants except Helen
Bedia, Angel Ang and Rolando Ty contributed to the SAMAHAN various amounts. In
February or March, 1990, Mr. Lacson and the officers of the SAMAHAN learned
that B. S. Martin Enterprises, Inc. offered to buy the property. The SAMAHAN
failed to raise the money. Apprehensive that the property to be sold to B. S.
Martin, Mr. Lacson and the incorporators of plaintiff corporation (DLDC)
decided to organize the said stock corporation. On November 27, 1990 DLDC
bought the property and the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 156087, 156088,
156089 and 156090 in the name of Prudential Bank and Trust Company and Pacific
Banking Corporation were transferred/cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 196161, 196162, 196163 and 196164 were issued in the name of DLDC,
the plaintiff corporation. On December 10, 1990, the plaintiff, through its
president, Mr. Lacson sent letter to the occupants/tenants of the building,
informing the latter that the land and the building erected thereon known as
Narebel Building is already owned by plaintiff and that pending determination
of the terms and conditions under which they will be allowed to continue
occupying their respective premises and further requested the tenants to pay
the rentals due for the month of December, 1990 to plaintiff corporation. In
compliance thereto, defendants paid their monthly rentals for the months of
December, 1990 up to March, 1991. On March 13, 1991, plaintiff corporation
through its counsel sent a letter to defendant Helen Bedia informing the latter
the termination of their month-to-month lease contract and demanded defendant
to vacate the premises. On September 27, 1991, plaintiff corporation through
its counsel sent letters to defendants Rosalinda Pilares and Helen Bedia and on
December 13, 1991 another letters (sic) to defendants Jimmy Lao, Francisco
Teng, Sps. Alfredo and Amelia Villatuya, Chan Sook Ching, Cezar Ong and Antonio
Vidal, informing them that they have defaulted in paying their monthly rentals
since April, 1991 and notified them of the termination of their month-to-month
lease contract effective December 31, 1991 and further demanded to vacate the
premises and pay reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the
premises. Defendants, despite demand, refused to vacate the premises and pay
the reasonable compensation for their occupancy thereof. Hence, the filing of
these cases where plaintiff corporation claimed that it had incurred P10,000.00
expenses for each case.'"
2
Rollo
, pp. 17-19.
The Consolidated Decision rendered on June 29, 1992, by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, 3 Presided by Judge Virgilio N. Jiro. in Civil Cases Nos. 138546 to 138554, disposed thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them are ordered to vacate the respective premises they occupy as described in the earlier portion of this judgment;
2. defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the following:
a) Reasonable compensation for their unlawful use and detention of the subject premises at the rates and from the dates indicated hereunder until they shall have fully vacated the said premises, to wit:
a) Amelia Villatuya and Alfredo Villatuya - P1,658.30 per month starting April, 1991;
b) Antonio Vidal - P1,922.25 per month starting April, 1991;
c) Jimmy Lao - P1,961.25 per month starting April, 1991;
d) Chan Sok (sic) Ching - P1,925.00 per month starting April 1991;
e) Francisco Teng - P1,859.00 per month starting April 1991;
f) Cesar Ong - P1,792.50 per month starting April 1991;
g) To Siok Keng - P4,540.35 per month starting April, 1991;
h) Rosalinda Pilares - P1,234.60 per month starting April, 1991;
i) Helen Bedia, Manuel Ang and Rolando Ty - P3,031.00 per month starting March, 1991.
b) Attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00 for each case; and
c) The cost of the suit.
3. Defendants Helen Bedia, Angel Ang and Rolando Ty are also ordered to pay the bills for electrical consumption from February, 1991 at the rate of P124.40 per month until they shall have vacated the premises in question." 4 Decision pp. 11-12, Rollo, pp. 176-177.
From the aforesaid decision, petitioners seasonably appealed 5 Civil Cases Nos. 92-62003 to 92-62010; Rollo, pp. 148-149. before Branch 44 6 Presided by Judge Lolita O. Gal-lang. of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which came out with a judgment of affirmance. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 7 Order dated October 8, 1993, Rollo, pp. 156-159. met the same fate.
Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the appealed judgment in its decision of July 14, 1995.
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration on November 6, 1995, petitioners found their way to this court via the present petition for review; contending that: 8 Petition, Rollo, pp. 74-75.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE LLOWER COURTS ON THE GROUND THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THESE EJECTMENT CASES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING THE EJECTMENT CASES TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE FOR RECONVEYANCE PENDING BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 51.
THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES, AND WHICH, WHEN CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN SIMPLY RELYING UPON, ADOPTING AND QUOTING THE FINDINGS IN THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CONFLICTING, CONTRARY TO OR ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, WHILE DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONERS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE VIOLATION BY THE LOWER COURTS OF THE RULES OF COURT AND RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE THEREBY DEPRIVING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the findings of the lower courts based on the position paper, affidavits and evidence of DLDC without a copy thereof having been served on petitioners.
The Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 44, which was not personally and directly prepared by the presiding judge.
The Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the void decision of the Regional Trial Court for not having been issued by an impartial judge.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF DLDC NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLEAR CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF ATTY. JOSE S. SANTOS, JR., THE COUNSEL FOR DLDC, IN BRINGING THESE EJECTMENT SUITS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
Pivotal to the controversy at bar is petitioners' contention that their assertion (as defendants below) of ownership over the property in litigation divested the Metropolitan Trial Court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases in the first instance. 9 Rollo, p. 74.
The issues posed requires no extended disquisition. Suffice it to state that Batas Pambansa Blg. 29, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, 10 B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R. A. No. 7691 provides:
"SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuits Trial Courts in civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx���������� xxx���������� xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
xxx���������� xxx���������� xxx clearly provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, 11 260 SCRA 420, 426 citing: Refugia, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. G.R. No. 118284, July 5, 1996, and cases cited thereunder. it was held that as the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the caveat that the issue raised as to ownership be resolved by the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, even where the defendant asserts in his/her Answer, ownership of or title to, the property, the inferior court is not deprived of its jurisdiction. 12 Buazon vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 182, 188. A contrary rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting ownership. 13 Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 428.
Similarly, the second issue requires no further explanation other than to retaliate the settled rule than an action for reconveyance pending before another court can not be pleaded to abate an ejectment case involving the same property. An action for reconveyance cannot be regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment suit. 14 Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, 116 citing: Del Rosario vs. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549; Salinas vs. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz vs. C.A., 133 SCRA 520; Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352; Ching vs. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412; Philippine Feed Milling Co., Inc. vs. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante vs. Sison, 174 SCRA 517; Guzman vs. C.A., (annulment of sale and reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604; Demamay vs. C.A., 186 SCRA 608; Leopoldo Sy vs. C.A., et. al. (annulment of sale and reconveyance), G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991.
The third issue involves questions of fact and thus not proper for resolution here following the general rule that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court's are accorded great respect, even finality, by the Supreme Court. 15 De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 299, 306.
The fourth issue raised by petitioners is misplaced. Petitioners need only refer to Section 40 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 16 B. P. Blg. 129. which provides that every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the law on which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference to those set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from. 17 Now also made part of the Rules of Court under Rule 51, Section 5.
The next issue attacks the court a quo's findings for allegedly being based on position papers, affidavits and evidence of DLDC which have not been served on the petitioners, in violation of their right to due process.
The foregoing submissions are unfounded. The facts and circumstances obtaining in the present case do not point to a reversible error on the part of the lower court as to violate petitioner's right to due process. The omission of service of the position papers, affidavits and other evidence on factual issues did not necessarily prejudice petitioner's right, considering that the requirement under Section 9 of the said Rule 18 The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides:
SEC. 9. - Submission of affidavits and position papers. - Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. is in view of the rendition of judgment by the lower court within the contemplation of the succeeding section 19 SEC. 10. - Rendition of Judgment. - Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may during the aid period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from the receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. and not principally to notify the parties so that they may respond accordingly. As a matter of fact, a reply is a prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary Procedure. The only significant pleadings allowed under the rules after the Answer are the position papers, affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues, which shall be defined in the order subsequent to the preliminary conference. The fact that the parties are required to simultaneously submit their position papers, affidavits and other evidence only shows that there was no requirement for each of them to submit additional and controverting affidavits or evidence. Under Section 10 of the same Rule, the court may deem it necessary to clarify certain material facts and order the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within (10) days from receipt of the order. The Court shall then render judgment within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits or the expiration of the period for filing the same. Even then, the rule allows the court to resort to the clarificatory procedure only when there is a necessity therefor, disallowing the court from resorting to the same procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. As correctly pointed out by the respondent corporation, resort to the clarificatory procedure is not a matter of right of the parties but depends upon the sound discretion of the court.
As regards the allegation that the Regional Trial Court judge did not personally and directly prepare subject decision, there is no sufficient evidence on record to prove the same.
Neither is there merit in the assigned error questioning the entitlement of the respondent corporation to attorney's fees. It is settled that attorney's fees may be awarded when claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought. 20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 44; 50-51 citing: Solid Homes, Inc. vs. C.A., 235 SCRA 299.
Parenthetically, it appears that after the submission of the memoranda 21 Petitioners' and Respondents' Memoranda were dated November 6, 1996 and November 13, 1996 respectively, Rollo, pp. 434-618. which was required by the resolution dated September 9, 1996, the Court received several Motions for Judgment and/or Motions to Dismiss based upon Compromise Agreements entered into by some of the petitioners herein and the private corporation, with the following particulars:
1. Motion for Judgment Based Upon Compromise dated July 11, 1997 and signed and filed by To Siok Keng, also known as Rosalinda Pilares. Annexed thereto was the corresponding Compromise Agreement also dated July 11, 1997, with respondent Divisoria Land Development Corporation and Spouses Manuel Tiu and To Siok Keng as parties. 22 Records show that this motion was filed directly before this Court by petitioner To Siok Keng also known as Rosalinda Pilares copy furnished Atty. Jose S. Santos, Jr., counsel for the respondents. In a resolution dated August 20, 1997, this Court noted this motion; Rollo. Pp. 620-634.
2. Motion to Dismiss dated January 28, 1998 filed by Atty. Marlon Alexander Cruz. 23 A notice of appearance by Atty. Marlon Alexander Cruz counsel for petitioners Chan Sook Ching and Jimmy Lao was entered in replacement of King & Adorio Law Offices; Rollo, pp. 635-638. Annexed thereto were the corresponding (1) Compromise Agreement dated January 16, 1998, with respondent Divisoria Land Development Corporation and petitioners Spouses Chan Sook Ching and Kok Sing Lap, and Kok Yee Hing as parties; and (2) the Compromise Agreement also dated January 16, 1998, with respondent Divisoria land Development Corporation and petitioner Jimmy Lao as parties. 24 Rollo , pp. 639-646.
3. Motion to Dismiss dated February 13, 1998 filed by Atty. Marlon Alexander Cruz. 25 A notice of appearance was entered by Atty. Marlon Alexander Cruz as counsel for petitioners Francisco Teng in replacement of King 7 Adorio Law Offices, Rollo, pp. 649-650. Annexed thereto was the corresponding Compromise Agreement also dated February 13, 1998, with respondent Divisoria Land Development Corporation and petitioner Francisco Teng as parties. 26 Rollo , pp. 653-657.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, and subject to the Compromise Agreements aforementioned which are NOTED.
SO ORDERED. Melo, J., no part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
QUICK SEARCH
