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[ G.R. No. 143330. August 7, 2000]

ESTRELLITA MKTG. CORP. vs. NLRC, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder , for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 7 2000.

G.R. No. 143330 (Estrellita Marketing Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.)

This is not the first time that this case has reached the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the present petition, just like the previous one, shall suffer the same fate of dismissal for lack of merit.

Petitioner assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 23 February 2000, which dismissed its petition and upheld the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC dismissed the appeal taken by petitioner from the 24 October 1996 Order of the Labor Arbiter, denying its motion to quash and recall the alias writ of execution and public auction and commanding the Sheriff to proceed with the public auction in relation to NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-02939-91 entitled Jeffrey Salgado v. Estrellita Marketing Corporation.

Previously, the Court in a Resolution, dated 14 November 1994, dismissed the petition filed by petitioner in G.R. No. 110852, Estrellita Marketing Corporation v. NLRC and Jeffrey Salgado, and affirmed the judgment of the NLRC finding it to be supported by substantial evidence and not tainted by grave abuse of discretion. The NLRC decision upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that private respondent was illegally dismissed from employment and consequently awarded him full backwages and other benefits. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforecited resolution was denied with finality by the Court on 18 January 1995.

That private respondent has been illegally dismissed from his employment is already beyond question. However, it is petitioner's stand that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC incorrectly computed the backwages due private respondent since they failed to deduct from it whatever earnings the latter may have gained during the pendency of the case. Because of this, petitioner persistently moves to prevent the execution of the decision in view of this alleged error in computation. Thus. The only issue to be resolved in this case is the proper computation of backwages due private respondent. In this regard, petitioner makes an exception to the ruling of the Court in Bustamante v. NLRC, 1 265 SCRA 61 (1996). that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to no less than the full backwages without deduction of earnings derived elsewhere.

Petitioner's argument is unacceptable. We quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals:

Petitioner insists that earnings derived from employment elsewhere by private respondent from the date of illegal dismissal up to the date of finality of the appealed judgment, should be deducted from the latter's backwages.

It anchored its argument on the earlier cases of Gaco vs. NLRC, 230 SCRA 260; Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 103215, 06 Nov. 1992; Pines City vs. NLRC, 224 SCRA 110; and Pines City Education Center vs. NLRC, 227 SCRA 655, all of which decisions laid down the principle that "the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement if any, should be deducted therefrom."

Petitioner refused to accept that these rulings have already been abandoned in the fairly recent case of Bustamante vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61, arguing that the said jurisprudence is of general application and a strict application of the same will put the petitioner in a perilous situation.

Petitioner's argument is devoid of merit. The prevailing rule now is that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to their full backwages without deduction and qualification. As correctly invoked by public respondent, the Bustamante ruling conclusively settles the issues at hand. Thus:

"The Court deems it appropriate, however, to reconsider such earlier ruling on the computation of backwages as enunciated in said Pines City Educational Center case, by now holding that conformably with the evident legislative intent as expressed in Rep. Act No. 6715, above-quoted, backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee [sic], should not, as a general rule, be dismissed or reduced by the earning derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the "deduction of earnings elsewhere" rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est. 2 Rollo , pp. 85-86.

Indeed, Bustamante remains to be the controlling doctrine when it comes to the issue of entitlement to backwages of an illegally dismissed employee. From the time it was promulgated in 1996, it has been upheld and consistently applied in labor cases which dealt with illegal dismissals.3 See Jardin, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 119268, 23 February 2000; Times Transit Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 304 SCRA 11 (1999); Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 297 SCRA 508 (1998); Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 670 (1997). The only possible exception to the application of the Bustamante doctrine is if the termination took place before 21 March 1989, the date when Republic Act No. 6715 became effective.4 Magcalas v. National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 453 (1997). In the case at bar, the illegal dismissal of private respondent took place in March 1991, two years after the aforesaid law had taken effect. Hence, private respondent's dismissal is covered by R.A. No. 67155 Article 279 of the Labor Code as amended, provides:

Article 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. and, accordingly, the Bustamante ruling should be applied.

We are not unmindful of the obvious dilatory tactics employed by petitioner in order to deprive private respondent of what is rightfully due him under the law. However, the Court will not sanction such a move. This case should finally come to an end. Private respondent should receive what has long been denied him, full backwages and other benefits to which he is entitled under the law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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