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[G.R. No. 143009.December 13, 2000]
AQUINO-CAHAYON et al. vs. PNB, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated DEC 13 2000.
G.R. No. 143009(Raquel Aquino-Cahayon, represented by Juliet Aquino-Cahayon as Attorney-in-fact vs. Philippine National Bank [Balayan Branch] and Leonardo Jonson.)
This is a Motion for Clarification En Banc, dated November 20, 2000, filed by petitioner Raquel Aquino-Cahayon. Petitioner prays that the Court en banc reinstate and give due course to her petition for review and rule on the issue raised by her in the trial court as to which court - whether the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court - has jurisdiction over a case for recovery of possession and title to real property, for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale, and for cancellation of certificate of title, which she had filed against respondents.
The background of this case is as follows: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari to set aside an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, at Nasugbu, Batangas. The petition was filed with this Court but was referred by it to the Court of Appeals. The petition was, however, denied by the appeals court on the ground that petitioner did not explain in writing why service of a copy of the petition on the adverse party was not made personally and that the copy of the trial court's order attached to the petition was neither a certified true copy nor a duplicate original. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. On appeal, this Court denied review finding that no reversible error have been committed by the Court of Appeals. On September 6, 2000, the Court denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration and her plea for referral of the case to the Court en banc.
Considering the foregoing, the present Motion for Clarification En Banc would have been denied outright for lack of merit. Petitioner's counsel states, however, that he, a new member of the Bar, is confused about the law on his case. Hence this rather extended resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Clarification en banc.
First. The motion prays that the petition be resolved by the Court en banc. This cannot be granted. This is a case assigned to the Second Division whose decisions cannot be referred to the Court en banc for review. SC Circular No. 2-89 provides in pertinent part:
3.The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
4.At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or resolution therein rendered becomes final and executory, the Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral, may return the case to the Division or accept the case for decision or resolution.
4a.Paragraph (f) of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 209 [formerly item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29 September 1977], enumerating the cases considered as en banc cases, states:
f.Cases assigned to a division including motions for reconsideration which in the opinion of at least three (3) members merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable by a majority vote of the actual membership of the Court en banc.
5.A resolution of the Division denying a party's motion for referral to the Court en banc of any Division case shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc.
6.When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en banc, the latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take cognizance of the same, in which case, the decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring Division.
7.No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division shall be entertained.
Second. Nor can petitioner's motion be treated as a second motion for reconsideration. Under Rule 56, �2 in relation to Rule 5., �4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, such motion cannot be filed except for compelling reasons of which there are none in this case. At any rate, the Court finds no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals in dismissing petitioner's petition for review for procedural deficiencies. Petitioner failed to give a written explanation why service of a copy of the petition on the adverse party was not personally made. This is a violation of Rule 13, �11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that, whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. As held in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort (293 SCRA 661 (1998)):
. . . Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
In this case, no good reason has been given for petitioner's failure to explain in writing why personal service of a copy of her petition on the adverse party could not be made.
Petitioner likewise failed to attach to her petition in the Court of Appeals either a duplicate original or a certified true copy of the order dated September 17, 1999 of the RTC, Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas, as required by Rule 42, �2 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 45, �3, the failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service and the documents which should accompany the petition is a ground for the dismissal of the petition either by the Court on its own motion or on motion of respondents.
Third. On the merits, the Regional Trial Court correctly ruled that it had no jurisdiction. It appears that petitioner first filed her complaint for annulment of mortgage, cancellation of mortgage sale, and recovery of possession and title in the MTC of Lian, Batangas. However, her complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The MTC held that the subject of petitioner's action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129, � 19(1), it was cognizable by the RTC. Petitioner then filed her complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Nasugbu, Batangas, but it was dismissed by the latter court on the ground that the case involved a real action, which, considering its value (P4,100.00). was cognizable by the MTC.
The ruling of the RTC is correct. B.P. Blg. 129 provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1)In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2)In all civil actions which involved the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or building, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; . . .
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial courts in civil Cases.- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise
(3)Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared, for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The complaint of petitioner alleged that respondent Leonardo Jonson had sold to her a lot in Barrio Bungahan, Lian, Batangas, promising to deliver title to her as soon as the same was obtained by him, because respondent Jonson had not yet fully paid the original owner the price of the lot; that although respondent Johnson had subsequently acquired title to the lot, he did not transfer title to petitioner but instead mortgaged the lot to the respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB); that for failure of respondent Jonson to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed and respondent PNB acquired the lot as the highest bidder; that petitioner never received either notice of the sheriff's sale or the certificate of sale issued to respondent PNB; that respondent PNB thereafter attempted to eject petitioner from the subject premises and take possession of the property; and that the assessed value of the lot was P4,100.00. Petitioner prayed that the mortgage executed by respondent Jonson in favor of respondent PNB be annulled; that respondent PNB be ordered to surrender title to the property to petitioner; that the foreclosure sale be annulled and the certificate of sale issued to respondent PNB be cancelled; and that respondents PNB and Jonson be ordered to pay damages.
Considering these allegations in the complaint, petitioner's action is a real action. As the value of property involved does not exceed P20,000.00, jurisdiction thereon is vested in the MTC of Batangas. That petitioner's action is not an action the subject of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation can be determined by reference to the following test:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the criterion ad adopted is the ascertainment of the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money like where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the subject matter of the litigation cannot be estimated in terms of money (Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623).
Examples of such actions are: (1) An action to enjoin the violation of the constitutional right to enter into a contract (cf. Republic v. Presiding Judge, CFI-Lanao del Norte, 69 SCRA 235); ..(3) An action to annul a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid (Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd., v. Llanos 14 SCRA 949; Arroz v. Alojado, 19 SCRA 711; Vda. de Cabasag v. Su, 22 SCRA 28; Ching v. Malaya 153 SCRA 412); (4) An action to annul a deed of sale of a certificate of public convenience on grounds of non-compliance with the stipulations thereof (cf. Calderon v. PSC, 38 SCRA 624); (5) An action for specific performance of contracts (Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. v. Yu Sits Liong, 16 SCRA 680; De Jesus v. Hon. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554; Chua Peng Him v. CA, 133 SCRA 572). (C. QUIAZON PHILIPPINE COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 287-288 (1993))
On the other hand, that petitioner's action is a real action is clear from the following excerpt from the decision in Fortune Motors (Phils.), inc. v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 564, 567-568 (1989):
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec. 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. I, p. 122)
����������� ..
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, [1954])
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Mu�oz. v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, [1950]).
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners' primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.. (Punzalan; Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 336 [1983].)
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Clarification en banc is DENIED for lack of merit. Notice is hereby given that no further pleadings will be entertained. Accordingly, let entry of judgment be made in due course.
Very truly yours.
(Sgd.) TOMASITA MAGAY-DRIS
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