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[ G.R. No. 145825. December 11, 2000]
PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORP. et al. vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARRA.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated DEC 11 2000.
G.R. No. 145825 (Philsec Investment Corporation, Bank of the Philippines Islands Internation Finance Limited and Athona Holdings, N.M. vs. Edgardo V. Guevarra.)
Petitioners assail the order by the regional trial court dismissing their amended complaint as against private respondent on the ground of prescription of action.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On January 15, 1983, Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioner Ayala International Finance Limited in the sum of US$2,500,000.00 secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat with a market value of P14,088,995.00. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, a certain 1488, Inc., through its president, Drago Daic, assumed Ducat's obligation under an Agreement, dated January 27, 1983, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Harris County, Texas, U.S.A., for US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000.00 as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. On October 17, 1985, 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance of US$307,209.02 and for damages due to breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement. Originally instituted in the United States District Court of Texas, 165th Judicial District, where it was docketed as Case No. 85-57746, the venue of the action was later transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where 1488, Inc. filed an amended complaint, reiterating its allegations in the original complaint. ATHONA filed an answer with counterclaim, impleading 1488, Inc., Drago Daic, Ventura O. Ducat, Precioso R. Perlas, and William H. Craig, as counterdefendants, for allegedly conspiring in selling the property at a price over its market value. Perlas who allegedly appraised the property, was later dropped as counterdefendant. ATHONA sought the recovery of damages and excess payment allegedly made to 1488, Inc. and, in the alternative, the rescission of sale of the property. For their part, PHILSEC and AYALA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their person, but, as their motion was denied, they later filed a joint answer with counterclaim against 1488, Inc. and the others, including private respondent Edgardo V. Guevarra, PHILSEC's own former president, for the rescission of the sale on the ground that the property had been overvalued. On March 13, 1990, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the counterclaim against private respondent on the ground that it was frivolous and brought simply to humiliate and embarrass the latter. For this reason, the US court imposed so-called Rule 11 sanctions on PHILSEC and AYALA and ordered them to pay damages to private respondent.
On April 10, 1987, while Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment" against 1488, Inc., Daic, Ducat, Perlas and Craig in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 16563. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil Action No. H-86-440 of the United States District Court of Southern Texas that 1488, Inc. and others committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value of US$800,000.00 and that, as a result of their fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and AYALA were induced to enter the Agreement and to purchase the Houston property. Petitioners prayed that 1488, Inc. and the others be ordered to return to ATHONA the excess of US$1,700,000.00 and to pay damages. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real and personal property of private respondent.
1488, Inc., Ducat, Perlas and Craig succeeded in having the cases against them before the lower court dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Upon being elevated to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and Civil Case No. 16563 was ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and for consolidation with Civil Case No. 92-1070.
On May 26, 1998, summons to answer petitioner's amended complaint, which impleaded private respondent as an additional party defendant, was served upon the latter. In his answer, private respondent raised prescription of action as one of his defenses.
On April 27, 1999, while the case was already on its pre-trial stage, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground of prescription of action which the trial court granted in the order dated May 15, 2000 dismissing the amended complaint impleading private respondent on the ground that petitioners' action has prescribed. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Thus, the instant petition which we find to be unavailing.
Petitioners' contention that the answer with counterclaim and counter complaint they filed in the Houston case should have been treated as an extrajudicial demand within the contemplation of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, thus giving them a new lease on the prescriptive period holds no water.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1155. The prescription of action is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
The provision resorted to by petitioners cannot be more inapplicable primarily because this Court has ruled that Article 1155 refers to actions to collect a debt under contract or upon the law and not to one confirmed by judgment of court (Philippine National Bank vs. Osete, et al., 24 SCRA 63 [1968]). It is worthy to note that the counter complaint against private respondent in the Houston case, which was dismissed by the United States District Court for being frivolous and brought simply to embarrass and humiliate private respondent, did not refer to any debt or contract between the parties. Hence, no amount of fancy manipulation of words can make this Court accept petitioners' counterclaim as a "written extrajudicial demand by the creditors."
As correctly ruled, the applicable provision is Article 1146 of the Civil Code considering that the attendant facts alleged by petitioners relate to an action based on the injury caused to private respondent in favoring his co-defendants over their rights. Article 1146 of Civil Code provides for four a 4-year prescriptive period from the time the cause of action arises. If the act committed is coupled with fraud, the period commences from discovery of fraud (Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 353 [1987]). In the case at bar, the amended complaint alleged that petitioners discovered the fraudulent transaction on September 24, 1986. Thus, from that day on and not later than September 24, 1990, petitioners should have filed the instant action. Although the original complaint was filed on April 10, 1987, private respondent was impleaded as additional defendant through the filing of the amended complaint only on April 8, 1992. It was held that prescription is interrupted as to the additional defendant only from the time of the admission of the amended complaint, not from the filing of the original complaint (Aetna Insurance vs. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 62 SCRA 11 [1975]).
Prescription may be effectively pleaded in a motion to dismiss if the complaint shows on its face that the action had already prescribed at the time the action was filed - and the trial court could dismiss the case motu propio on this ground even though the defendants do not present a motion for the dismissal of the complaint (Heirs of Placido Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 [1996]).
WHEREFORE, petition is denied due course.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
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