[ G.R. No. 140771. January 31, 2000]

PONCIANO COMON, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 31, 2000.

G.R. No. 140771 (Ponciano Comon, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Mindanao Lumber Development Co., Inc., et al.)

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission and reinstating the decision of the labor arbiter which held that petitioners are barred form filing a complaint to revive judgment under the statute of limitations.

The present controversy stemmed from a decision rendered on August 15, 1975 by then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople in NLRC Case No. ROX1-GS-732-73, which ordered the reinstatement of petitioners with 3 months backwages altogether amounting to a total of P31,200.00.

However, when execution was attempted on November 3, 1975, the same could not be effected due to alleged improper venue.

On March 9, 1981, a certain Elison Ehila, representing himself as a labor leader, entered his appearance for petitioners without their knowledge, much more consent, and was able to secure a compromise agreement based on a special power of attorney which he falsely represented to have been signed by petitioners. The compromise agreement which was subsequently approved by the Assistant Regional Director for Arbitration stated that the parties consented to terminate and close NLRC Case No. ROX1-GS-732-73 in consideration of P31,200.00 representing petitioners' 3 months backwages with reinstatement waived.

Petitioners were able to set aside the compromise agreement in 1989.

Petitioners then attempted to negotiate the settlement of the award rendered in the August 15, 1975 decision. But negotiations failed when private respondent contended that it was already under "negative equity". Petitioners then took no other step until March 4, 1995 when they filed an action for revival and enforcement of the said decision. The action was dismissed by the labor arbiter.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and revived NLRC Case No. ROX1-GS-732-73, ordering private respondent to pay the monetary award in the revived judgment. The Court of Appeals, upon elevation of the issue, reversed.

Thus, the instant petition which must regrettably fail.

A perusal of the pertinent dates reveals that the right of petitioners to seek revival and enforcement of the subject decision prescribed in 1986. Sadly, petitioners' allegation that the fraudulent compromise agreement prevented the execution of judgment deserves scant consideration for it is to be noted that they came to know of and questioned the compromise agreement only in 1989, whereas their right to demand revival and enforcement prescribed as early as 1986. Hence, there was no impediment which could have prevented them from enforcing their right well within the prescriptive period in accordance with Section 5 of Rule III of the NLRC Manual of Execution of Judgment in connection with Article 1144 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Section 5. Rule III of the NLRC Manual of Execution of Judgment. - A judgment, after the lapse of five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory and before it barred by prescription may only be enforced by action.

Article 1144 (New Civil Code). - An action based upon a judgment must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.

Simply put, the execution of judgment or final order may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by ordinary action. In the latter case, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final and executory (Salienes vs. intermediate Appellate Court, 246 SCRA 150 [1995]).

A person who has slept on his rights, as in the case of petitioners who filed the complaint to revive judgment twenty (20) years after the same become final and executory, is not only barred from pursuing the action under the rules on prescription of actions but also under the principle of laches (Garbin vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCR 187 [1997]).

WHEREFORE, petition is denied due course.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court


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