[G.R. No. 134047. July 4, 2000]

AMADO S. BAGATSING, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 4 2000.

G.R. No. 134047 (Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez vs. Commission on Elections and Jose L. Atienza.)

On December 15, 1999, the court rendered a decision in this case which dispositively reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The respondent Commission on Elections is hereby directed to RESOLVE with great dispatch the pending incident relative to the preliminary investigation being conducted by its Law Department.

SO ORDERED.

On January 3, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration predicated on the following grounds, viz (a) section 3, rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure repealed COMELEC Resolution No. 2050; (b) Said Section 3, rule 25, is separate and distinct from Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6646 and can stand on its own; (c) the suspension of proclamation of a winner is not applicable exclusively in criminal cases as it may also be issued in disqualification cases; (d) an order of suspension was issued by the COMELEC rendering the premature proclamation of respondent void ab inito for having been made before the finality of the questioned resolution; and (e) the circumstances surrounding this case justify the filing of the instant petition directly with this Court without waiting for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. 1 Rollo , pp. 326, 330, 335, 337 and 340.

Contrary to petitioners contention, it cannot be said that Section 3, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure repealed COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. In fact, these two provisions are corollary, rather than contradictory to each other. While Section 3 of Rule 25 prescribes the period to file a petition for disqualification, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the disposition of disqualification 1999 citing Lazaro vs. Yorac:

xxx resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the variance in opinions of the members of respondent commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of disqualification filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the manner of disposing of the same had not been uniform. Hence, the COMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of these disqualification cases. With this purpose in mind, the commission en banc adopted Resolution No. 2050. xxx

xxx

xxx Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence, as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.

xxx. 2 203 SCRA 256, 265-267 (1991).

As similarly maintained by the Solicitor General:

Rule 25, particularly Section 3 thereof, provides the period as to when disqualification cases, in general, may be filed. This contemplates of an administrative summary proceeding. On the other hand, Resolution No. 2050 provides the specific procedure as to how disqualification cases filed by virtue of Section 68 of the COMELEC once they are filed before it.

Differently put, Rule 25 (Section 3) provides the permissive period within which disqualification cases, in general, may be filed, that is, after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy and not later than the date of proclamation.

Resolution No. 2050 provides how disqualification cases particularly those filed under Section 68 of the Election Code would be handled by the COMELEC. That is, it provides the particular manner such cases are to be treated, depending on whether they were filed before an election or after the election. 3 Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration by the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 10.

In further arguing that the Rules of Procedure repealed Resolution No. 2050, petitioners suggest that by simply looking at the chronological dates of their issuance, it is apparent that the "new" Rules issued in 1993 superseded the "old" and "ancient" Resolution promulgated in 1988. The contention is without merit.

The Solicitor General was correct to observe that at the time of the promulgation of Resolution No. 2050 on November 3, 1988, the governing Rules of Procedure were then Rules of Procedure were the then Rules of Procedure of June 20, 1988which Rule 25 has identical provisions with the present Rules save only for Section 1 thereof which was slightly modified and which section is not disputed in their case. This means that despite the existence of the identical provisions in the 1988 Rules, the COMELEC still found it apt and necessary to adopt and promulgate a definite policy and a specific procedure to handle and dispose of the numerous disqualification cases filed before it. Clearly then, the 1993 Rules were not intended to repeal or abolish Resolution No. 2050.

Petitioners, likewise, maintain that private respondent's proclamation on June 4, 1998 was "premature" and void ab initio because the COMELEC issued an order of suspension of proclamation in its Order dated May 20, 1998. While it may be true that it's the COMELEC directed the suspension of the proclamation of private respondent in its Order dated May 20, 1998, 4 Signed by Presiding Commissioner Manolo B. Gorospe and Commissioner Evalyn I. Fetalino with Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores dissenting, as members of the COMELEC First Division. the said order was set aside and the motion of herein private respondent to lift the order was set aside and the motion of herein private respondent to lift the order of suspension of his proclamation was granted in the unanimous Resolution dated June 4, 1998 5 Signed by COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and Commissioner Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, as members of the COMELEC First Division).Consequently, there was no order of suspension to speak of at the time of private respondent's proclamation.

We find no reason to discuss the other issues raised as they were already resolved in our Decision dated December 15, 1999.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court


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