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[ G.R. No. 122636. March 15, 2000]
MILTIADES C. SPANDONIS vs. DOJ, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 15 2000.
G.R. No. 122636 (Miltiades C. Spandonis vs. The Department of Justice Through The Honorable Regional Trial Court State Prosecutor, JESUS A. ZOZOBRADO, JR., The Honorable Asst. City Prosecutor, VICENTE B. ABUGHO, EDUARDO L. RAMA, SR., MA. ANGELICA M. AMANTE and EDELMIRO A. AMANTE, SR.)
In a Complaint1 Rollo , p. 63. dated April 18, 1995, petitioner Miltiades C. Spandonis filed two criminal cases for falsification of public documents under Article 172, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code against respondents Eduardo L. Rama, Ma. Angelica Amante and Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., for allegedly altering two "Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance" for the positions of governor and congressman during the 1995 local elections in Agusan del Norte.
On May 24, 1995, the investing prosecutor issued a Resolution2 Id., at 53-57. recommending the dismissal of the complaints for insufficiency of evidence.
On June 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice, who in turn, remanded the case to the Regional State Prosecutor pursuant to Department Order No. 223, which provides that appeals from resolutions of city prosecutors where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prision correccional (the penalty for falsification of public documents under Article 172, pars. 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods), shall be made to the Regional State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality.
On October 16, 1995, the Regional State Prosecutor issued a letter-resolution3 Id ., at 42-52. denying the petition. Undeterred, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari 4 Id ., at 3-41. with this Court.
On January 15, 1996, we required the respondents to file their Comments. In his Comment,5 Id. at 177-189. the Solicitor General contends that pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 223, appeal to the Secretary of Justice is the proper remedy, hence the present special civil action of certiorari will not lie. Further, the complaint for falsification of public documents was without legal and evidentiary basis, and therefore, was properly dismissed on the merits.
Petitioner filed his reply (denominated as Rejoinder6 Id. at 199-208.) to the Comment raising the following arguments: first, the right of appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the Regional State Prosecutor is limited to cases "where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prision correccional." In this case, where the imposable penalty is only prision mayor (should be correccional) or less, the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutors shall be deemed final, thereby rendering as unavailing appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The administrative remedy ends at the Regional State Prosecutor whose decision is deemed by operation of law as that of the Department itself or the Secretary himself. Second, DOJ Circular No. 369 (should be 359), amending DOJ Order No. 223 providing for the automatic review of the resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutor even in cases where the penalty does not exceed prision correccional by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to his residual authority to supervise the prosecutors of the Department of Justice, does not apply to the present case because DOJ Circular No. 369 took effect only after the issuance of the subject resolution by respondent Regional State Prosecutor. Further, the DOJ rule on appeal in preliminary investigation involving crimes where the penalty does not exceed prision correccional remains vague for failure to provide for the manner, time, form and grounds of appeal to the Secretary. Moreover, under the attendant circumstances, appeal to the Secretary of Justice, even if allowed, does not offer adequate remedy considering the political affiliations of the then incumbent Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice. Lastly, the principle of exhaustion of remedies does not apply to the present petition since the controverted act was patently illegal.
Based on the respective memoranda7 Id . at 333-354, 385-417, 418-433. filed by the parties, the issues, as correctly phrased by the Solicitor General, are as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY AVAIL OF THE PRESENT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, RULES OF COURT IN LIEU OF AN ADEQUATE REMEDY OF APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS PROVIDED UNDER DOJ ORDER NO. 223, DATED JUNE 30, 1993.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR ABUGHO AND REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR ZOZOBRADO IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
In this case, the propriety of the present petition for certiorari to assail a resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor affirming the decision of the City Prosecutor dismissing a complaint is far from self-evident. In our view, this petition is not the proper remedy nor is the Court the proper forum.
The rule on appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigations/reinvestigations is governed by Department Order No. 223 of the Department of Justice dated August 1, 1993. Section 1 of said Circular provides -
Section 1. What May Be Appealed. - Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice excepts as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, shall be made to the Regional State Prosecutor who shall resolve the appeals with finality, pursuant to Department Order No. 318 dated August 28, 1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated August 11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45 dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals shall also be governed by these rules."
Department Order No. 359 dated October 17, 1995, which took effect on October 17, 1995, added the following paragraph to Section 1 of DOJ Circular 223-
"THE PROVISION OF THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH ON THE FINALITY OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SHALL NOT PRECLUDE THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FROM ORDERING, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND PURSUANT TO HIS RESIDUAL AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE THE PROSECUTORS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY HIS OFFICE OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS IN THE CASES APPEALED TO THEM."
Department Order No. 359 clarified that the Secretary of Justice can review all criminal cases resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor regardless of the penalty imposed, as in this case. Petitioner, however, claims that Department Order No. 359 should not be applied to his case since it was promulgated after the Regional State Prosecutor issued the assailed resolution.
We find no merit in this argument. For, whether under D.O. No. 223 or D.O. No. 359, a resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor dismissing an appeal was still subject to further appeal to the Secretary of Justice, who has the power to review the decision of his subordinates.
Even without the aforementioned Orders, the power of supervision and control by the Secretary of Justice over all prosecutors has statutory and legal basis. As we explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,8 278 SCRA 656, 676-677 (1997). and reiterated in Dimatulac v. Villon -9 297 SCRA 679, 707-708 (1998).
"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5,8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecutor Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
"(1) Supervision and Control - Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; ...."
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
"Section 3.
x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistance Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall ... perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service."
x x x
"Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division, or service."
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows: 10 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 147-148 (1995).
"In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power of authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed."
Further, the power of review of the Secretary of Justice is recognized under Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscals. -
x x x
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information."
Necessarily, therefore, the proper recourse from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor denying the appeal should be an invocation of the power of review of the Secretary of Justice.11 See also Department of Justice Circular No. 69 dated October 12, 1998 issued by Justice Secretary Serafin R. Cuevas which provides:
"In the interest of justice and public service and effective immediately, any and all petitions for review/appeals to the Department of Justice from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial and City Prosecutors together with the Motions for Reconsideration arising therefrom, shall be referred to, resolved and acted upon only by the undersigned.
This Department Circular supersedes any and all prior orders inconsistent herewith until further orders."Petitioner cannot short circuit the appeal process by going directly to this Court via a petition for certiorari. Certiorari will only lie if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.12 Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, had the decision of the Secretary of Justice been adverse to petitioner, the correct remedy should have been a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, and not this Court, following the principle of hierarchy of courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk of Court
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