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[ G.R. No. 132411. March 22, 2000]
GAMES & GARMENTS DEVELOPERS, INC. vs. CA, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 22 2000.
G.R. No. 132411 (Games & Garments Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Reynaldo Tolentino).
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43193, dismissing petitioner's special civil action for certiorari, which assailed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 96-033. The RTC ordered the reinstatement of the case for the second time, after having previously dismissed the action twice for failure of private respondent Reynaldo Tolentino to appear at pre-trial.
Briefly, the factual antecedents are as follows:
The spouses Ramon and Remedious Cosay were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Bayanan, Muntinlupa City, with Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. [316557] S-107492. They mortgaged said parcel to Miguel and Adela Lazaro as security for a loan in the sum of P2,000,000.00. In 1993, Games and Garments Developers, Inc. (GGDI) loaned the Cosay spouses P3,500,000.00, which the latter used to pay the Lazaros. The mortgage annotation at the back of the title in favor of the Lazaros was cancelled under Entry No. 67629 dated June 16, 1993. The Cosays executed a real estate mortgage, signed a promissory note, and turned over TCT No. 316577 to the GGDI. When the Cosays failed to pay their debt, GGDI extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and won as highest bidder at the auction sale of the property. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period, GGDI consolidated its title to the property.
On March 11, 1996, private respondent Tolentino filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-033, for redemption and accounting with the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa. He alleged that he bought the property from the Cosays well within the one-year redemption period and he was in possession of the lot. Tolentino prayed that the trial court recognize his right to redeem the land and for GGDI to render an accounting of the redemption price. After issues were joined, pre-trial was set for July 31, 1996. Said pre-trial conference, however, was moved to October 2, 1996 to give Tolentino sufficient time to submit his pre-trial brief. Meanwhile, Tolentino's first counsel, Atty. Demetrio C. Bolante, was replaced by Atty. Reynaldo V. Umali.
On October 1, 1996 or a day before the scheduled pre-trial, Atty. Umali moved to re-set the pre-trial again on the ground that as new counsel, he needed more time to study the case. GGDI timely opposed the motion.
On October 2, 1996, Tolentino filed another motion to re-set pre-trial. GGDI likewise opposed this motion.
In its orders dated October 2 and October 15, 1996, the trial court denied Tolentino's motions to re-schedule pre-trial, declared Tolentino as plaintiff non-suited, and dismissed the case.
Private respondent Tolentino moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The trial court granted the motion and reinstated the case in its order of November 15, 1996. This time, petitioner GGDI moved for reconsideration of this order. Meantime, Atty. Umali was replaced by Atty. Luis D. Dictado, who entered his appearance as Tolentino's counsel on December 21, 1996. On November 6, 1996, the trial court granted GGDI's motion for reconsideration of its order dated November 15, 1996 and, for the second time, dismissed the case. In turn, private respondent through Atty. Dictado moved for reconsideration of this second order of dismissal. On January 15, 1997, the trial court granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration and reinstated the case in its calendar for the second time.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner GGDI filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 43193. GGDI charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its order of January 15, 1997, which reinstated Civil Case No. 96-033, for the second time.
On October 13, 1997, the appellate court denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for its reconsideration was likewise denied. The Court of Appeals held:
"It is in the interest of substantial justice that the respondent court reinstated plaintiff's case. Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of the complaint for failure of plaintiff and counsel to appear in the scheduled pre-trial of the case cannot be granted by this Court. Said procedural lapse was committed by defendant, herein private respondent, only once, premised on his motions to reset pre-trial. Nonetheless, said procedural lapse should not override the case on its merits. We cannot advance technicality and relegate substantial justice..." 1 Rollo , p. 27.
Hence, the present recourse to this Court, with petitioner GGDI submitting as assignments of error, the following:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REINSTATING THE CASE TO (sic) ITS CALENDAR AS THE SAME IS NULL AND VOID, BEING CONTRARY TO AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE RULES OF COURT [NOW 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] AND ON THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED DECEMBER 6, 1996 OF PETITIONER WAS LEGALLY SERVED UPON PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL, CONTRARY TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT IN ITS ASSAILED ORDER. 2 Id ., at 13-14.
The principal issue now is: Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it dismissed and then reinstated Tolentino's complaint, not just once but twice?
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in upholding the trial court and the questioned order violated Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court,3 SEC. 1 Pre-trial mandatory. - In any action, after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;����������
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action." which makes the appearance of parties at the scheduled pre-trial conference mandatory. The records show that Tolentino did not appear at the scheduled October 2, 1996 pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 20 states:
"SECTION 2. Failure to appear at pre-trial conference. - A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default." (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Section 2 gives the trial court the discretion to declare the absentee at a pre-trial conference in default. This includes a motion for reconsideration. In this case, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for declaring respondent Tolentino, as plaintiff below, non-suited, not just once but twice on GGDI's motion, and then reconsidering its orders each time, on motion for reconsideration by respondent Tolentino. The flip-flopping of the trial court is not encouraged, but given the circumstances of this case, these did not constitute grave abuses of discretion. The rules governing practice and procedure were formulated to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of actions or proceedings without sacrificing substantial justice and equity considerations4 Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., 303 SCRA 127, 137 (1999). besides, default judgments are frowned upon, for its best that the parties litigate their case without resort to technicalities. They are not meant to be mechanical gadgets to accelerate litigation.5 Heirs of Jose Fuentes v. Macandog, 83 SCRA 648, 666 (1976).
Nor can it be said that private respondent was not interested in pursuing his complaint. The records show he took immediate steps to set aside the orders of the trial court declaring him non-suited. Thus, in our view, the trial court committed no error in reinstating Civil Case No. 96-033 for the second time to enable it to decide the case on the merits. Nor did respondent appellate court commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the assailed order of the court a quo.
It appearing, moreover, that counsel on record of private respondent, Atty. Luis D. Dictado, was actually served petitioner's motion for reconsideration, we need not tarry on the secondary issue as to valid service thereof. However, parties are admonished to observe Section 26, Rule 1386 "SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire any time from any action or special proceeding by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket in place of the former one and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
"A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. For the payment of such compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and execution issued in pursuant of such judgments, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client." of the Rules of Court on the requisites for the change of attorneys properly.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court
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