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[ G.R. No. 133830. March 22, 2000]
MARIETTA FORNOLLES vs. CA, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 22 2000.
G.R. No. 133830 (Marietta Fornolles vs. Court of Appeals and Foramen Products Corporation).
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the 25 November 1997 and 16 April 1998 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Marietta Fornolles was sued by private respondent Foramen Products Corporation for a sum of money representing the value of certain pharmaceutical products delivered to her.1Civil Case No. Q-95-23848. Summons was served on her on 3 August 1995 thru substituted service. On 11 August 1995 petitioner sent a registered letter to the trial court asking for a sixty (60)-day extension for filing answer for the reason that she was still reviewing her records.
On 15 September 1995, private respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default. The trial court set the hearing of the motion on 29 September 1995. On that date, petitioner was declared in default inspite of her telegram requesting a resetting as she would file an opposition and/or answer with counterclaim.
On 2 October 1995, petitioner filed an opposition to private respondent's motion along with a motion to admit answer with attached answer and counterclaim. On 11 October 1995, private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The trial court denied petitioner's motion in its 23 October 1995 Order. The motion for reconsideration thereof was also denied.
On 9 February 1996, the trial
court rendered a judgment by default against petitioner and ordered her to pay
private respondent P623,123.55 with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum,
fifteen percent (15%) of the principal obligation as attorney's fees as well as
the costs of suit.2Decision
penned by Judge Marcelino F. Bautista, Jr., RTC-Br. 215, Quezon City; Rollo,
pp. 28-29. A notice of appeal was
timely filed with the Court of Appeals.
On 25 April 1997 the appellate court required petitioner to file an appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt. Petitioner failed to file an appellant's brief and on 25 November 1997 the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution considering the appeal "abandoned and dismissed." Petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the appellant's brief attached was denied on 16 April 1998.3CA-G.R. CV No. 53850 with Justice Eduardo C. Montenegro as ponente and Justices Salvador Valdez, Jr. and Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurring; Rollo, pp. 14, 17-17-A.
Hence, this petition which
alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal as there is an
obvious and manifest merit petitioner's case, to wit: lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court, the case being a corporate matter between stockholders;
petitioner's patent interest in the case which has been hampered by the
distance between Cagayan de Oro City and Manila; meritorious counterclaim of
petitioner as she owes P300,000.00 only and lack of authority of the
officer who filed the complaint; and the trial court, by the default judgment,
has denied petitioner any chance to present her side.
The petition must be denied. Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that -
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
It is undisputed that petitioner was given forty-five (45) days from 25 April 1997 or until 9 June 1997 to file the appellant's brief. It cannot also be denied that by the time the Court of Appeals passed the questioned Resolution on 25 November 1997, a period of more than five (5) months had passed from the expiration of the reglementary period and still petitioner had not filed the required pleading. It was only on 10 December 1997, or more than six (6) months after 9 June 1997, that the brief was attached as part of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution of 25 November 1997.
The delay in the filing of the appellant's brief for an inordinately long period of time connotes the lack of interest of petitioner in the prosecution of the case and must be dismissed under the above rule.4Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639. In Sajot v. CA, we elucidated on the reason behind the strict observance of procedural rules, thus:5G.R. No. 109721, 11 March 1999, 304 SCRA 534, 537-538..
True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice. The appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
In Garbo v. Court of Appeals (258 SCRA 159), we ruled that: Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner's contentions of evident merit in her case and of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process do not persuade us to relax the rules in her favor.
There was no perceived merit in her defenses and reasoning that was not taken up by the trial court and judiciously considered. The judgment of default was the trial court's response to petitioner's cavalier attitude towards the procedural rules in the judicial system which manifested itself in her continued requests by mere telegrams for resettings and extensions based on her own convenience, and when the requests were granted, were simply allowed to lapse without any attempt at compliance. Nowhere is the attitude more pronounced as when petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 25 November 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the trivial reason that she had been out of Cagayan de Oro City most of the time during the last several months in order to find means to save her business operations from ultimate closure and that her counsel was also saddled with professional commitments thereby making communication between them difficult.
We have encountered the same excuses in Macapagal v. Court of Appeals6G.R. Nos. 110610 and 113851, 18 April 1997, 271 SCRA 491. and have dismissed them as flimsy since equally busy people have learned in one way or another to cope with the said problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in issuing the questioned Resolutions of 25 November 1997 and 16 April 1998.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court
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