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[ G.R. No. 141397. March 22, 2000]

SPS. EMILIO P. CASIMIRO, et al. vs. JOCELYN I. PEPITO, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 22 2000.

G.R. No. 141397 (Spouses Emilio P. Casimiro, and Amelia Rosanes-Casimiro, et al. vs. Jocelyn I. Pepito, in behalf of Her Minor Sons, Leonard Pepito and Adrian Pepito).

For resolution by this Court are: (a) the petition for review of the decision, dated November 10, 1999, of the Court of Appeals; and (b) the Motion to Substitute Annexed Pleading filed by petitioners. The facts are as follows:

Respondent Jocelyn I. Pepito filed on behalf of her minor sons, Leonard and Adrian, a petition for issuance of letters of administration of the state of the late Papa P. Casimiro with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City. Respondent alleged that she was the common-law wife of the deceased and that Leonard and Adrian are their illegitimate children. Subsequently, she filed two amended petitions and a motion to be allowed to litigate as a pauper.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the petition for issuance of letters of administration on the ground that respondent was not the common-law wife and Leonard and Adrian the illegitimate children of the deceased. In its order, dated January 25, 1999, the trial court denied petitioner's motion, holding that the issues raised were matters of defense which should be raised in the hearing of the petition.

On certiorari, to the Court of Appeals, the trial court was sustained. In its decision, dated November 10, 1999, the Court of Appeals held:

JOCELYN does not purport to bring suit under any capacity other than as a representative of her minor sons, LEONARD and ADRIAN, who are allegedly the children of the deceased. This is permissible under Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which allows a representatives to bring or defend an action for and in behalf of the real party-in-interest. Here, the minors LEONARD and ADRIAN are alleged heirs of the deceased. This sufficiently endows them with a direct and material interest in the settlement of the estate of the late Papa P. Casimiro.

With regard to the petitioners' other arguments, namely: (1) that JOCELYN is not the common-law wife of the deceased; (2) that LEONARD and ADRIAN are not Papa Casimiro's sons; (3) that JOCELYN had waived her claim to the estate; and (4) that her children were never acknowledged by their alleged father, the trial court did not err in holding that these are matters of defense. Necessarily, evidence will have to be presented to establish the truth or falsity of these allegations. Further, these arguments have a common denominator: all are questions of fact. Consequently, they may not be taken up in a special civil action for certiorari or for prohibition, inasmuch as these remedies are meant to address questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Reconsideration having been denied, this petition for review was filed.

First. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the trial court's orders denying their motion to dismiss. Petitioners are right. The orders in question are interlocutory in character from which there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy. (Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211 (1997))

Second. However, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that since the determination of whether Leonard and Adrian are illegitimate children of the deceased requires the presentation of evidence, this issue should be raised in the hearing on the petition for issuance of letters of administration. In filing a motion to dismiss, the defendant hypothetically admits the factual allegations in the complaint. Thus, petitioners cannot question the status of Leonard and Adrian in a motion to dismiss. A defendant cannot dispute the factual allegations in the complaint through a motion to dismiss. (Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 165 (1991))

Petitioners cite the case of Saguinsin v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 (1962)), in which it was held that hearings can be conducted to resolve a motion to dismiss based on lack of legal capacity to file a petition for issuance of letters of administration. However, in that case, oppositors did not deny the allegations in the complaint, for instance, that the applicant for issuance of letters of administration was a sister of the deceased. Indeed, it was alleged in the petition that one of the oppositors was the surviving spouse of the deceased. Instead, oppositors claimed that as the surviving spouse and children of the deceased, they had a better right to the administration of her estate. In the present case, petitioners simply deny that Leonard and Adrian are illegitimate children of the deceased. This case and the case of Saguinsin are thus different.

Third. The Court of Appeals likewise correctly rejected the petitioners' contention that the petition for issuance of letters of administration should have been dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Respondent filed a motion to be allowed to litigate as a pauper which is still pending resolution by the trial court. It was, therefore, premature to rule whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in allowing the case to proceed without the payment of docket fees by respondent.

Petitioners, in their Motion to Substitute Annexed Pleading, pray that they be allowed to replace the photocopy of the order, dated August 12, 1999, of the trial court (Annex U of their petition) with a photocopy of their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which they claim they inadvertently omitted.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to GRANT the Motion to Substitute Annexed Pleading filed by petitioners and to DENY the petition for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error. (Quisumbing, J., no part)

Very truly yours,

TOMASITA M. DRIS

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG

Asst. Clerk of Court

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