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[G.R. No. 140493. November 13, 2000]

SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs. CA, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated NOV 13 2000.

G.R. No. 140493 (San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.)

In 1983-84, as part of its long-term business plan and to meet the prospect of low sales volume, petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) decided to streamline its operations by automation, merger of some functions or reorganization or closure of sales offices. Unfortunately, this meant a reduction of the workforce. On April 30, 1996, private respondent Bonifacio Asufrin, Jr., among others, was served a Notice of Termination of Employment considering that his position as warehouse checker was considered redundant by the company. Protesting such action, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the DOLE. On December 27, 1996, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit after finding that the termination of employment was for an authorized cause. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled in favor of the private respondent.

Consequently, petitioner SMC elevated its case to the Court of Appeals. Its petition for certiorari was however, dismissed for having been filed 11 days late pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 as amended by Circular No. 39-98, which reads:

xxx. If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Hence, petitioner now comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in dismissing its petition on this technicality.

This Court is not unmindful of the tremendous confusion brought about by Circular 39-98 in computing the 60 day period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which resulted in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing including the case at bar. In order to rectify the situation, the Court deemed it necessary to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh period of 60 days from the receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration within which to file a petition for certiorari. This was embodied in our Resolution in AM No. 00-2-03-SC, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 which took effect on September 1, 2000 which read as follows:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

xxx

in Narzoles, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, September 29, 2000, we have sufficiently, explained that:

xxx. The resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.

Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in two newspapers of general circulation," its retroactive application cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that the substantive aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood of petitioner-employees.

The foregoing ruling definitely finds application in the case at bar.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for a proper disposition on the merits.

The Court further Resolves to NOTE:

(a) the comment of the Solicitor General on the petition for certiorari; and

(b) the undated letter and the letter dated August 19, 2000 of private respondent Bonifacio B. Asurin, Jr., requesting information on the status of this case.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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