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[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1191. November 21, 2000]
FEDERICO S. CALILUNG vs. JUDGE WILFREDO S. SURIAGA
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated NOV 21 2000.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1191 (Federico S. Calilung vs. Judge Wilfredo S. Suriaga, MTC, Angeles City.) and
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1437 (Federico S. Calilung vs. Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, RTG, Branch 58, Angeles City.)
On August 31, 2000, a unanimous Court dismissed respondent Judge Wilfredo S. Suriaga from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations, and referred back to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for further investigation the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Philbert I. Iturralde.
On September 15, 2000, respondent Judge Suriaga filed a motion seeking a reconsideration of his dismissal or at the very least, that his case be referred back to Office of the Court Administrator for further study and evaluation, insisting that the evidence against him is not sufficient because: 1.] there is no taped conversation adverted to in the judgment; 2.] the alleged entrapment was scripted; and 3.] he should be afforded the same treatment given to his co-respondent Judge Philbert I. Iturralde.
Respondent Judge Iturralde, likewise filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification of Judgment seeking a: 1.] partial reconsideration insofar as the administrative complaint against him was referred back to the OCA for further investigation; 2. ]clarification of the judgment lifting his preventive suspension insofar as his entitlement to receive at this point his backwages and other benefits accruing which were withheld during the period of such suspension.
In a Resolution dated October 17, 2000, the Court noted both motions of respondent judges and required complainant Federico S. Calilung to file a comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. No such comment having been filed to date, the Court deemed it proper to dispense with the filing of said pleading and forthwith proceed to resolve both motions.
The Court sees no cogent reason to depart from its ruling with regard to respondent Suriaga. Even without the taped conversation respondent judge makes so much capital of, there still is more than ample evidence pointing to his malfeasance. The Investigating Justice observed that the testimonies of the Calilung spouses were replete with important details that could not be ignored. He pointed out that mere denials and an unsatisfactory refutation on the part of Judge Suriaga to prove his innocence do not persuade to establish the falsity of complainant's testimony and that of his wife. 1 Citing NISA v. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766 [1991].It was no less than a bribe for Judge Suriaga to demand and receive money from a party in a case before him for which act he has no place in the judiciary. 2 Ortigas & Co., Ltd v. Velasco, 277 SCRA34 [1997].Neither is respondent judge's improper and illegal act of asking from complainant the amount of P250,000.00 to be given to Judge Iturralde who was to decide the case on appeal to be condoned.
The culpability of respondent Judge Suriaga for serious misconduct has been established not just by substantial evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation 3 Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court but by an overwhelming preponderance thereof. The testimony of Supervising Agent Julma Dizon-Dapilos who posed as yaya of complainant's two-year old son during the entrapment operation demolishes whatever credibility respondent's proffered defense has. Dizon-Dapilos, a disinterested observer in addition to being a law enforcement officer, corroborated the testimony of the complainant and his wife. She was a direct witness to the entrapment operation and, equally important, respondent judge failed to present any reason why her testimony should be disbelieved.
To reiterate, the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 2- A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that "[j]udicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. 4 Apiag v. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997].The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 5 Panganiban v. Guerrero, Jr., 242 SCRA 11 [1995].It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary." 6 Benalfre J. Galang v. Judge Abelardo H. Santos, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1 197, 26 May 1999, 307 SCRA 582, citing Nazareno v. Almario, 268 SCRA 657 [1997].
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. 7 Dawa v. Judge De Asa, 292 SCRA 703 [1998].They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. 8 Marces, Jr. v. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 503 [1996].Thus, their official conduct should remain "free from any appearance of impropriety" and should be beyond reproach." 9 Abundo v. Judge Giegorio E Manio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416, 6 August 1999, 312 SCRA 1.
Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court remains convinced that "respondent Judge tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust 10 Garcia v. Dela Pena, 229 SCRA 766 [1994].A judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people for he is the visible representation of the law. 11 Chan v. Agcaoili, 233 SCRA 331 [1994].Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary." 12 Magdalena M. Huggland v. Judge Jose C. Lantin, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1-153. 29 February 2000, p. 16.As pointed out in National Bureau of Investigation v. Judge Ramon B. Reyes: 13 A.M. No. MTJ-97-1 120, 21 February 2000, pp. 10-11.
Bribery is a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. 14 Section 3 in relation to Section 10A, Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court.In the case at bench, we find sufficient bases in the charge of malfeasance in office against respondent. On past occasions where we had the disagreeable task of disciplining mulcting magistrates, 15 E.g. Quiz v. Castano, 107 SCRA 196 1981; OCA v. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 1992; OCA v. Antonio, 241 SCRA 331 [1995]; Zarate v. Romanillos, 242 SCRA 593 [1995].we did not hesitate to impose the penalty of dismissal. Conformably, as he has demonstrated his unsuitability to remain a member of the bench, respondent is deservingly dismissed from service with all its attendant consequences. For as we held in Haw Tay v. Singayao 16 154 SCRA 107 [1987].
x x x The acts of respondent Judge in demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court constitutes serious misconduct in office. This court condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent Judge. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for the law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity.
In Saphia M Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., 17 A.M. No. RTJ-99-1 448, 6 April 2000, pp. 11-12.the Court dismissed respondent judge in trenchant terms saying that -
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 18 Rule 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.A judge's conduct must be above reproach. 19 Canon 31, Canons of Judicial Ethics.Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 20 Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776, 778 [1974].A judge's private as well as official conduct must at all time be free from appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. 21 Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275, 283 [1996].
In Vedana vs. Valencia, 22 295 SCRA 1, 15 1998.the Court held:
The code of judicial ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal, experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Respondent judge miserably failed to measure up to stringent judicial standards. 23 Garciano v. Sebastian, 231 SCRA 588, 612-613 [1994].Complainant has sufficiently established the corrupt acts of respondent judge ... He received a bribe ... He has no place in the Judiciary. 24 Concerned Employees of the RTC of Dagupan City v. Judge Erma Falloran-Aliposa, A.M. No. RTC-99-1446, 9 March 2000; Ortigas & Co. Ltd v. Velasco, 277 SCRA 34 [1994].He dishonored the judicial robe he wore. His acts could even be criminal in nature. 25 Article 210, Revised Penal Code.We have unhesitatingly removed from office judges and court employees for less serious transgressions. 26 Liban v. Villacete, 237 SCRA 397 1994; Castanos v. Escano, 251 SCRA 174, 178 [1995].We removed a deputy sheriff from office for asking a bribe of only P1,500.00. 27 Chua v. Nuestro, 190 SCRA 422 [1990].We have no reason to depart from this ruling. Respondent judge's acts of corruption clearly show his unfitness to remain any minute longer in his judicial robe.
Perforce, the penalty of dismissal from the service for respondent Judge Suriaga's malfeasance in office stands.
As has been stated earlier, the Court has time and again "[a]dmonished judges to conduct themselves in a manner that is free even from the appearance of impropriety " 28 Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct.For judicial officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary that they live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by the Code of Judicial Conduct This is especially true in the case of judges who, on a daily basis, interact with the public. Their official conduct, as well as personal behavior, should always be beyond reproach." 29 Victoria P. Nabhan v. Judge Eric Calderon, MTC, Calumpit, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1164, 4 February 2000, p. 7, citing Spouses Lorena v. Judge Adolfo Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 [1999].
To build a case against Judge Iturralde, complainants capitalized on a telephone conversation that allegedly transpired in the house of Judge Suriaga on April 19, 1999, the date the latter was entrapped and arrested. A circumspect scrutiny of the record, however, discloses that other than the telephone call purportedly made by respondent Judge Suriaga to Judge Iturralde at the time of the entrapment operation, there is no scintilla of evidence directly linking Judge Iturralde to the events that transpired which led to the eventual entrapment of Judge Suriaga on April 19, 1999. Indeed, no proof was offered by complainants to establish the fact that a telephone call was actually made to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, much less that the party allegedly on the other end of the line was Judge Iturralde.
The testimonial declarations of complainants and their witnesses, in fact, even tend to show that the call was never made. Particularly revealing are the following excerpts from NBI Agent Julma Dizon-Dapilos on cross-examination:
Q And you say now that an alleged phone call was made at about 2:30, am I correct?
A Yes, more or less, sir.
Q It could not have been at 1:30?
A But I believe it is more or less 2:00 to 2:30, sir.
Q So, if you believe it is from 2:00 to 2:30, it could not have been made at 1:30?
A Yes, sir.
Q Madam witness, you said you witnessed an alleged phone call made by Judge Suriaga?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see Judge Suriaga dial the telephone?
A No, I did not, sir .
Q How far were you from this telephone?
A I could not give the exact distance, but I could give a rough estimate, sir.
Q Could you estimate how far is this Madam Witness? Come here Madam Witness, you stay here and point to me. Where is the telephone.
A Twelve (12) feet roughly, sir.
Q You said you saw him dial the telephone?
A I did not, sir .
Q It was his back that you saw, isn't it?
A Yes, sir .
Q Meaning, the telephone was in front of him and it was his back that was facing you?
A I definitely could not see him because as I have said earlier, the main door [which] was halfway opened was covering me, sir .
Q So one (1) Madam Witness, you will agree with me that you did not see Judge Suriaga dial the telephone?
A: Yes, sir .
Q Two (2), you would agree with me that you did not even see him holding the receiver of the telephone?
A Yes, sir .
Q Three (3), you will agree with me that you did not even see him talking to the telephone?
A Yes, sir .
Q Four (4), you will agree with me that all you heard during this alleged and supposed telephone conversation was supposedly the voice of Judge Suriaga, isn't it?
A Yes, it was a monologue, sir . 30 TSN, 17 September 1999, pp. 47-51; emphasis and italics supplied.
Complaining witness Federico Calilung's testimony also on cross-examination tended to corroborate the foregoing declarations of Agent Dizon-Dapilos:
ATTY. SANIDAD:
But your basis alone of saying that it was Judge Iturralde is because he talked to the telephone and asked for Branch 58, isn't it?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. SANIDAD:
You were not of course present, Mr. Witness, when the phone in Branch 58 rang, isn't it?
WITNESS:
Wala po.
ATTY. SANIDAD:
You were not there. I have to go to it the long way, Mr. Witness since ... your lawyer understand. When you said Judge Iturralde, you also presumed it was Judge Iturralde, isn't it?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir .
ATTY. SANIDAD:
But you were not present on the other side of the line to see whether it was Judge Iturralde, were you?
WITNESS:
No, sir.
ATTY. SANIDAD:
So, again you do not know personally whether or not it was indeed Judge Iturralde on the other side of the line?
WITNESS:
No 100% assurance.
ATTY. SANIDAD:
In fact, it is not only 100%, you did not really know who was on the other side of the line because you were at the (sic) different place, isn't it?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir. 31 TSN, 27 August 1999, pp. 37-38; emphasis and italics supplied.
Equally as damaging against the cause of complainants are the following excerpts of Joselin Calilung's testimony on cross-examination:
Q: Now, let's go back Madam Witness, to April 19, 1999, you stated in your direct-examination that when you were allegedly in the house of Judge Suriaga, Judge Suriaga allegedly made a phone call to Judge Iturralde?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were present when the alleged phone call was made?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you hear what was being said on the other end of the line?
A: No, sir because I am not as close as Mr. Calilung to Judge Suriaga .
Q: So you never got to hear what was being said by the alleged person with whom Judge Suriaga was allegedly talking to because of your distance from him?
A: Yes , sir but in my belief, (kausap po niya talaga si Judge Iturralde) to my mind Judge Suriaga is really talking to Judge Iturralde because of that long conversation and it's a questions and answers.
Q: And that belief of yours, Madam Witness is anchored on the presumption that Judge Suriaga allegedly called Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court?
A: Yes, sir .
Q: And this belief of yours, Madam Witness was also anchored on the presumption that the person on the other end of the line with whom Judge Suriaga was allegedly talking with is Judge Iturralde?
A: Yes, sir because it 's very hard to pretend talking to someone with that long conversation.
Q: And you will agree with me Madam Witness that on April 19, 1999 you did not see or you never saw Judge Iturralde?
A: No, sir .
Q: Neither were you able to talk to Judge Iturralde on April 19, 1999?
A: Yes, sir. 32 TSN, 31 August 1999, pp. 4-5; emphasis and Italics supplied.
Given the foregoing testimonies, the alleged occurrence of a telephone conversation between respondents Judge Suriaga and Judge Iturralde becomes practically a conjecture and, thus, inadmissible in evidence much more so in a proceeding involving so severe a penal sanction as dismissal and its accessory penalties. While it is true that in administrative proceedings quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural dictum should not be construed as a license to disregard certain basic evidentiary rules. 33 Uichico v. NLRC, 273 SCRA 35 [1997].
Concededly, administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence. However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirements of due process. Thus, the old but still very much applicable and oft-quoted case of Ang Tibay v. CIR 34 69 Phil. 635 [1940].states that "{t}his assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force." In short, mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. 35 GSIS v. CA, 296 SCRA 514 [1998], citing Ang Tibay v. CIR, supra., citing Consolidated Edison Co.v.National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law ed. No. 4, Adv. Opp., p. 31.Indeed -
The Rules, even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. 36 Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr. 81 SCRA 235 [1978].The Judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should only be after due investigation and after the presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character. 37 OCA v. Judge Filomeno Pascual, 259 SCRA 604 [1996], citing Raquiza v. Castaneda, supra.
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. 38 Canson v. Garchitorena, SB-99-9-J, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA 268, citing Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth ed., p. 1150.It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 39 Ibid., p. 285, citing Words and Phrases, Vol. 27, p. 466, citing Sewell v. Sharp, La App., 102 So 2d 259,261.The definition, however, can hardly apply to respondent Iturralde since the record is bereft of any persuasive showing of a wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct on his part. What, in fact, appears on record is at most an indictment for an alleged illegal act yet to be performed and to be confirmed during the April 19, 1999 entrapment operation which never materialized.
In this regard the Court finds it useful to reiterate the ruling in Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr., 40 See note 196.which held that -
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply.
Succinctly stated, this Court can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. 41 Lambino V. De Vera, 275 SCRA 60 [1997].Apropos in closing is the pointed observation of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in his dissenting opinion in State Prosecutors v. Muro 42 236 SCRA 505, 544 [1994]. that -
.[w]hile this Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid the suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion - at other times tormentor - of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.] DENYING the motion for reconsideration of respondent Wilfredo S. Suriaga; and
2.] DISMISSING the administrative complaint against respondent Philbert I. Iturralde for insufficiency of evidence.
Concomitantly, respondent Judge Iturralde is entitled to backwages and other benefits which accrued during his preventive suspension, and the same are hereby ordered released to him.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court�
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
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