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[ G.R. No. 144567. October 25, 2000]

ORIENTAL BUS LINES, INC., et al. vs. AVALON, et. al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated OCT 25 2000.

G.R. No. 144567 (Oriental Bus Lines, Inc., et. al. vs. L. Don Avalon and Andre L. Avalon.)

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals denying their petition for certiorari on the ground that the same cannot be treated as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

The present controversy stemmed from an action for collection of sum of money and specific performance with damages with a prayer for issuance of a writ of attachment filed by private respondents against petitioner.

The trial court found that the petitioners acquired by purchase on installments two motor vehicles from private respondents. Of the total purchase price of P800,000.00, petitioners paid only P50,000.00 as downpayment. It is further established that the balance of P750,000.00 which was payable in the following installments: (1) P75,000.00 each month for two months payable on August 30, 1995 and September 30, 1995, respectively, and (2) P50,000.00 each month for twelve months payable on October 30, 1995 and every month thereafter until September 30, 1996 - had not been paid and that private respondents would not have agreed to sell their passenger buses to petitioners had they been aware that the post-dated checks issued by petitioners were worthless. They would have insisted on a sale on a cash basis.

Consequently, the trial court decided in favor of private respondents.

However, the parties subsequently entered into a compromise agreement, the pertinent portion of which is to the effect -

1.�������� That the defendants acknowledge to be indebted to the plaintiffs in the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing the balance of the purchase price of the two (2) passenger buses and three (3) certificates of public convenience covering both buses and another one, and, for the settlement of the aforesaid indebtedness, the defendants bind and oblige themselves to deliver to the plaintiffs the two (2) passenger buses and the three (3) certificates of public convenience in the same condition as they were at the time of the delivery of the said passenger buses to the defendants, with all the registration and other fees and charges imposed by the Land Transportation and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board for 1995 and 1996 duly paid; for this purpose, the defendants shall shoulder all costs and expenses necessary for the repair and reconditioning (including general engine overhauling) of the said buses to such extent as may be necessary to bring such buses to the condition herein required.

Said compromise agreement was approved by the trial court and thus become immediately final and executory. However, petitioners filed an urgent omnibus motion alleging that they were unaware that the compromise agreement prepared by private respondents had been changed; that petitioner Go had signed the compromise agreement believing that it was what the parties had agreed upon; that they did not bother to read the Amended Decision.

The trial court denied the motion.

Displeased, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which rendered the above assailed resolution.

Thus, the instant petition which we find to be unavailing.

It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing" and "a compromise entered into a carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact" (Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647[1997]).

Moreover, a compromise agreement, once approved by final orders of the court, has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery which are not present in the case at bar (Santos vs. Dames II, 280 SCRA 13 [1997]).

Besides, as correctly ruled below, petitioners received the amended decision of the trial court dated September 2, 1996 on September 11, 1996, but it was only on November 19, 1996 or sixty-nine (69) days from receipt of the decision, that petitioners filed their "Urgent Omnibus Motion". The motion which does not even appear to be a motion for reconsideration of the judgment was, therefore, filed way out of time.

WHEREFORE, petition is denied due course.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Asst. Clerk of Court

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