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[G.R. No. 112941.February 21, 2001]

NEUGENE MKTG., INC., et al. vs. CA, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 21 2001.

G.R No. 112941(Neugene Marketing, Inc., Leoncio Tan, Nicanor Martin, Sonny Moreno, Johnson Lee and Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Court of Appeals, Arsenio Yang Jr., Charles O. Sy, Lok Chun Suen, Ban Hua A. Flores, Ban Ha U. Chua and Roger Reyes.)

Before us is petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the June 7, 2000 Resolution of this Court, which expunged from the records, inter alia, the Petition for Relief from Judgment and the Motion to transfer the said Petition to the Court en banc. In so ruling, the Court cited its February 14, 2000 Resolution, which directed that no further pleadings would be filed in this case.

It may be noted that petitioners have challenged several times the February 18, 1999 Decision penned by Justice Fidel P. Purisima, all to no avail. On November 15, 1999, their Motion for Reconsideration was denied. On January 19, 2000, the Motion, for Leave to file the incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. On February 14, 2000, their supplemental arguments to the Second Motion for Reconsideration was noted without action. In the same Resolution, the Court declared that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case and directed that entry of judgment be made in due course. Lastly, on June 7, 2000, their Petition for Relief assailing the February 18, 1999 Decision was expunged from the records.

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners contend that their Petition for Relief cannot be expunged "on a rationale of finality"; the Court "transgressed" the Constitution because "no legal basis for the denial of the Petition for Relief was ever stated"; expunging the Petition would compound the violations of their constitutional rights, arising from the February 18, 1999 Decision which was premised on inexistent findings of the Court of Appeals; and "the expungement of the Petition has deprived the Court en banc of its exclusive prerogative to decide on unavoidable constitutional questions."

Brushing aside the technicalities of the case, the Court resolved to look one last time into the substance of petitioners' challenge to the Purisima Decision.

Contending that the Decision was premised on inexistent findings of the CA, petitioners specifically point to the following portion thereof:

"In light of the foregoing and after a careful examination of the evidence on record, and a judicious study of the provisions of law and jurisprudence in point, we are with the Court of Appeals on the finding and conclusion that the certificates of stock of the private respondents were stolen and therefore not validly transferred and the transfers of stock relied upon by petitioners were fraudulently recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of NEUGENE under the column 'Certificates Cancelled'." (Decision, p. 13; underscoring supplied.)

They claim that the CA never made any finding that the respondents' certificates of stock had been "stolen" or, that the transfer thereof had been "fraudulently recorded."

The Court concedes that the CA made no such finding. Considering the Purisima Decision in its entirety and the arguments raised by the parties, however, the Court finds no reason to overturn its conclusion that private respondents were still stockholders of the corporation at the time of its dissolution.

As held in the Purisima Decision, there was no showing that respondents, the registered owners of the stocks, had approved the transfer thereof to Petitioners Johnson Lee, Leoncio Tan or Nicanor Martin. Likewise, there was no "showing of any valuable consideration for the supposed transfer of subject stocks to petitioners." (Decision, p. 15.) Indeed, like the CA, we find that said petitioners were not "bona fide transferees and for value."

Petitioners have failed to satisfactorily controvert or refute these findings. Aside from pointing to the above-quoted sweeping statement in the Purisima ponencia, they have not presented any substantial argument to warrant a reversal of the Court's ruling.

We also reject petitioners' contention that this case should he referred to the Court en bane. Under Circular No. 2-89, which took effect on March 1, 1989, "[t]he Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed." A division is not deemed inferior to the Court en banc. Its decision is the decision of the Court en banc itself. Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances cognizable by the Court en banc, which are enumerated in Resolution dated November 18, 1993.

In any event, the Third Division referred the case to the Banc en consulta on August 14, 2000. The Banc, however, in a Resolution dated September 19, 2000, returned it to the Third Division.

Accordingly, the Court RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

In view of the retirement of Justice Purisima, the Court further RESOLVES to NOTE WITHOUT ACTION, for being moot, petitioners' Motion for his inhibition and Motion for Judicial Notice In Re: Inhibition of Honorable Fidel Purisima.

No further pleadings will be entertained, on pain of contempt. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in due course.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court

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