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[G.R. No. 133115.February 5, 2001]

ECLEO vs. SPS. FELIX

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 5 2001.

G.R. No. 133115(Jose B. Ecleo, petitioner, vs. Spouses Bayani Felix and Benigna S. Felix, respondents.)

This refers to a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated February 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City granting the petition for annulment of judgment of petitioner.

On October 22, 1990, respondent spouses Bayani and Benigna Felix filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Jose B. Ecleo before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. Despite service of summons, petitioner faded to file an answer within the reglementary period. On November 20, 1990, judgment was rendered against petitioner.

On December 14, 1990, the last day of the reglementary period to file his appeal, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the corresponding docket fee, for which reason the trial court, in its Order dated December 19, 1990, denied his notice of appeal. On January 14, 1991, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion stating that on January 11, 1991 he paid the docket and legal research fees, and prayed that the denial of his notice of appeal be reconsidered and set aside. On the same date, the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the grounds that failure to pay the docket fee within the reglementary period was fatal to an appeal and that the judgment sought to be appealed was already final and executory.

On September 4, 1991, following attempts to execute the judgment rendered in favor of respondent spouses, petitioner filed an action for annulment of judgment before the RTC of Caloocan City. After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, declaring that the denial of his appeal by the MeTC was arbitrary. The decision of the MeTC and the writ of execution issued in connection therewith were also declared void on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to try the case under the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure as the amount of unpaid rentals being claimed exceeded P20,000.00. The RTC added that, since the subject property is located within a declared area for priority development, and petitioner had been in possession of the same for ten (10) years, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2016 prohibited the ejectment of petitioner therefrom.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC considering that: First, a judgment can be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; and (b) the judgment was obtained by fraud. The refusal of the MeTC to give due course to petitioner's appeal was, at worst, an error in the exercise of its discretion that should have been questioned in a petition for certiorari, It neither divested the MeTC of jurisdiction to determine the case nor amounted to denial of due process. Even assuming that the MeTC erroneously tried the case under the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure, this also did not amount to lack of jurisdiction. Second, at the time of filing of the complaint, the claim for unpaid rentals did not exceed P20,000.00 because private respondents' demand for compensation of P500.00 a month was only made in a letter dated July 30, 1990. Moreover, the MeTC merely ordered petitioner to pay rentals beginning October 22, 1990, the date of filing of the complaint. Third, petitioner could not be considered a tenant or qualified occupant as defined under Presidential Decree No. 2016. Respondent spouses alleged that petitioner was occupying the land in the concept of an owner.

In the instant petition, petitioner contends that since the RTC had already given due course to his appeal, the exercise of its discretion could no longer be passed upon on appeal. In the same vein, the finding of the RTC that his delay in paying the docket and legal research fees was excusable can no longer be disturbed. Petitioner invokes the rule that, except in the absence of supporting evidence or there was abuse of discretion, findings of fact of the lower court should be respected. Moreover, petitioner submits that his failure to pay the said fees was excusable and did not result in substantial prejudice to respondent spouses. He likewise reiterates that since the amount of unpaid rentals claimed by respondent spouses exceeded P20,000.00, the MeTC had no jurisdiction to apply the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure. Having done so, petitioner asserts that the proceedings before the MeTC were null and void.

The petition is denied.

It is well-settled that a judgment may be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) that it is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it was obtained through fraud. ¹ Salonga v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 534, 542 (1997) The alleged arbitrary denial by the MeTC of petitioner's notice of appeal as well as the alleged erroneous application by the same court of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure fails to satisfy either of these jurisdictional requirements.

As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, while dismissal of a proposed appeal for failure to pay the corresponding docket fees within the reglementary period is merely discretionary, the exercise thereof should be questioned in a timely petition for certiorari and not in a petition for annulment of judgment. Even assuming that, the Court of Appeals could no longer disturb the RTC's exercise of discretion in giving due course to his appeal and its determination that his delay in paying the appropriate fees was excusable, these circumstances do not detract from the fact that neither of the grounds for annulment of judgment were shown to exist in the case at bar.

The Court is not also convinced by the contention of petitioner that the erroneous application of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure rendered as void the judgment of the MeTC. In Sen Po Ek Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, ² 212 SCRA 154 (1992). petitioner therein contended that the municipal trial court was devoid of legal authority over the ejectment case as the amount of rentals demanded by respondents therein amounted to more than P300,000.00. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that:

Sec. 33 of BP 129 vests in municipal trial courts exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. It is not the amount of rentals demanded in the complaint that determines jurisdiction of said inferior courts but the nature of the action. Whether the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure was properly applied in the Municipal Trial Court of Tacloban City will not divest it of its jurisdiction already conferred by BP l29. ³ Id. at 157.

Accordingly, in this case, even if the amount of unpaid rentals demanded by respondent spouses exceeded the P20,000.00 limit provided under Section 1(A)(1) of the then 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure, ⁴ SECTION 1. Scope. - This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

A. Civil Cases

(1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where the question of ownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) at the time of the filing of the complaint. this did not amount to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC such that the RTC is justified in exercising its power to annul Judgments of the MeTC.

The Court notes that petitioner filed his petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC months after the judgment of the MeTC had already attained finality and following proceedings for the execution thereof. It appears that the instant petition is a mere attempt on the part of petitioner to revive his claim to the subject property after having lost the opportunity to defend the same before another forum. This scheme is highly irregular and constitutes misuse of Court processes.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 6. 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court

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