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[G.R. No. 134339. February 5, 2001]

VICARVILLE REALTY & DEV'T CORP. vs. CA, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 5 2001.

G.R. No. 134339 (Vicarville Realty & Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Benjamin T. Vianzon, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Josefina Orevilloand Pablo Orevillo.)

For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29, 1997, in CA GR SP No. 44036, and its resolution dated June 25, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of development and sale of real estate properties. Sometime in 1992, it offered to sell to private respondents two parcels of land in its residential subdivision project in Balanga, Bataan. According to private respondents, petitioner assured them that the titles to the said properties were ready to be transferred to and registered in their names as soon as payment for the purchase price is made. Relying on such assurance, private respondents agreed to buy the subject properties and consequently paid in full the purchase price of P574,926.00.

Shortly after making such payment, private respondents demanded the delivery to them of the corresponding certificates of title but what they got from petitioner were promises to deliver such titles. Private respondents repeatedly asked for the titles but still petitioner was unable to deliver the same. On account of the failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to transfer ownership of the subject properties, private respondents on November 6, 1993, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for rescission of sale with damages against petitioner.

Petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim. It also sought the dismissal of private respondents' complaint and payment of attorney's fees. After private respondents presented evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the Regional Trial Court denied. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, which said court also denied. After the denial order of the appellate court became final, the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court resumed.

On March 27, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. Private respondents filed a motion for clarification of judgment claiming that they were entitled to compensatory and moral damages. For its part, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Before the trial court could resolve private respondents' motion for clarification, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to vacate judgment, claiming that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the Regional Trial Court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

On January 22, 1997, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to vacate judgment and private respondents' motion for clarification. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

On April 30, 1997, petitioner filed its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and held that the Regional Trial Court lacks jurisdiction over the action of the private respondents against petitioner. It declared that suits for rescission of contracts to sell or of sale involving residential subdivision lots as well as for refund of deposits, advance payments or installment payments made by a lot buyer are within the exclusive competence of the HLURB. Nonetheless, the appellate court declared that petitioner is estopped from assailing the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the action for it had sought affirmative relief from the trial court and actively participated in the proceedings. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that public respondent erred in applying the doctrine of estoppel as it is a departure from the established jurisprudence on the matter.

The contention is bereft of merit.

As noted by the appellate court, petitioner filed its answer to the complaint filed by private respondents but did not invoke lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the action as an affirmative or special defense. Neither did petitioner file a motion to dismiss said complaint on jurisdictional ground. On the contrary, petitioner even interposed counterclaim against private respondents. During the pre-trial, the parties entered into stipulations. Petitioner never questioned, during the pre-trial, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the aforesaid case. The parties even agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. After the private respondents rested their case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence but still did not invoke lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Then, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which did not even cite as ground the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over private respondents' complaint. When the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court resumed, petitioner presented evidence and submitted the case for decision on the merits pleading for relief on its counterclaim, again without questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. After the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Then, petitioner filed its motion to vacate judgment assailing, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the action of the private respondents. Notably, this was done after three (3) years since private respondents filed their complaint and eight (8) months after the Regional Trial Court promulgated its decision.

Petitioner did not offer any explanation for its silence from the time the complaint was filed up to the time the trial court promulgated its decision. At no time before then did petitioner assail the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action of private respondents. It is thus estopped from asserting that the Regional Trial Court lacks jurisdiction over private respondents' suit. It would be unjust to private respondents to allow petitioner to put at issue at this late stage the jurisdiction of the court. While it is a rule that jurisdictional questions may be raised at any time, this however admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. This Court has repeatedly frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. ¹ Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. vs. CA, 319 SCRA 444, 453 (1999); Celendro vs. CA, 310 SCRA 835, 845 (1999); National Steel Corporation vs. CA, 302 SCRA 522, 532 (1999); PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 402, 427 (1998); Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 208 SCRA 517, 523 (1998); Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 36 (1968). Certainly, the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals is in accordance with settled jurisprudence. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the appellate court committed reversible error in dismissing petitioner's suit.

Moreover, there is another reason to dismiss this petition. Every party filing any initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit forum shopping. The certification in this petition was executed by the legal counsel of petitioner, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or any of the principal parties and not the counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. ² Condo Suite Club Travel Inc. vs. NLRC, GR-125671, January 28, 2000, p.6. The reason is that only the petitioner has actual knowledge if he has initiated similar actions in other courts or agencies. Petitioner might have engaged the services of other lawyers and so the legal counsel in this case may not know if similar cases were filed elsewhere. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner warrants the outright dismissal of its petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court

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