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[G.R. Nos. 146164-69.January 15, 2001]

BILLOTE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 15 2001.

G.R. Nos. 146164-69(Romeo A. Billote vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People of the Philippines.)

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated September 12, 2000, of respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division), ordering the suspension of petitioner from office pendente lite as well as its resolution, dated December 4, 2000, denying reconsideration.

Petitioner Romeo A. Billote is the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Roseller T. Lim, Zamboanga del Sur. He is charged with violation of �3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for having allegedly, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, dismissed six employees of the municipal government of Roseller T. Lim, Zamboanga del Sur, without valid cause and observance of due process. He contends that respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion because the rationale for his suspension pendente lite in the present case had ceased to exist as the hearings in the criminal cases against him are almost over, i.e., the prosecution in Criminal Case Nos. 25304 and 25305 having already presented its evidence and announced that it will not present other witnesses, while in Criminal Case Nos. 25301, 25303, 25755, and 25360, the complainants never attended the hearings but instead executed affidavits of desistance, as some of them had in fact been reinstated and paid backwages.

This contention is without merit. In Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, 235 SCRA 103 (1994), a similar contention was rejected. This Court said:

Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.

..

The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, as already stated, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in the office.

Petitioner argues that none of the complainants in the criminal cases have suffered injury as they have been paid backwages. He draws attention to the fact that under �3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the accused must have caused "undue injury to any party" in the "discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence." Petitioner avers that the suspension does not serve any practical or just purpose but may be considered a political harassment on petitioner as the election period commences on January 2, 2001.

This, too, is error. As explained in Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996):

Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused.

Finally, petitioner states that the suspension will deprive his constituents of his representation.

This is untenable. Precisely, there is the Vice-Mayor who will act as mayor and thus prevent any hiatus in the governance of the municipality. Like petitioner, he was also elected by the people.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for failure of petitioner Romeo A. Billote to show that respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court

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