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[G.R. No. 146339. January 29, 2001]

ENGR. TEODOTO ABBOT, et al. vs. PEOPLE, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 29 2001.

G.R. No. 146339 (Engr. Teodoto Abbot, et al. vs. People, et al.)

The instant petition filed under Rule 65 questions the dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the Sandiganbayan for having been filed out of time.

Petitioner Teodoto Abbot is the Irrigation Superintendent of Padada River Irrigation System, National Irrigation Administration (NIA) while Nicasio Panal is the official driver of the NIA. Both were charged for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 for causing undue injury to the government by using government workers, government time and a dumptruck in the delivery of construction materials from inside the NIA compound to the residence of Engr. Abbot which was undergoing construction.

On February 21, 1995, a corresponding Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan by the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman. However, by virtue of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 6, 1995, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Digos, Davao del Sur. Petitioners moved to quash the information but was denied by the regional trial court. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari but was apparently dismissed since the CA did not have appellate jurisdiction to entertain the petition. This ruling, according to the petitioners, was affirmed by the Supreme Court. ¹ Rollo, p. 15.

Undaunted by this wrong recourse, the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the denial of their Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan. In a Resolution dated September 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time explaining that the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration was received on October 8, 1999 and the petition with the Sandiganbayan was filed on August 21, 2000, way beyond the 60-day period as prescribed by the Rules of Court. The Motion for Reconsideration was, likewise, denied.

Petitioners now come to this Court with the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan and at the same time, asserting that the Information filed with the RTC, Davao de Sur is quashable for the following reasons:

1)�������� The Information was filed by the Ombudsman who has no authority to do so pursuant to Uy v. Sandiganbayan ² 312 SCRA 77, 89-90 (1999).where it was stated "it is the prosecutor, and not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court because the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because in Vill v. Iba�ez, ³ 88 Phil. 402; Rollo, p. 16.it was held that "an information filed by a qualified and authorized officer is required for the jurisdiction of the court over the case."

2)�������� The undue injury or damage that was allegedly caused to the government by their acts was not substantial enough and to proceed with the prosecution would only be an exercise in futility.

3)�������� The information is violative of the petitioners' right to be informed because it is ambiguous. It does not specify the actual injury caused by the petitioners to the government.

Petitioners pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in order to enjoin the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 210(95)20 with the RTC, Branch 20, Digos, Davao del Sur.

There is no merit in the petition.

In the first place, petitioners' mode of appeal to this Court is erroneous considering that R.A. 7975, which was further amended by R.A. 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) clearly provides that "decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 under the Rules of Court." The instant petition which was filed under Rule 65, therefore, warrants an outright dismissal nonetheless, considering that the instant petition was filed within the 15 day reglementary period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 45, we shall then treat it as such.

The Sandiganbayan did not err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari for having been filed long after the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners' allegation, the wrong recourse to the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan did not toll the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceedings. ⁴ See Del Rosario v. Balagnot, 166 SCRA 429 (1988).Clearly, therefore, petitioners have already lost its cause when they filed their petition with the sSandiganbayanbeyond the reasonable period of time. Furthermore, in Tan v. Sandiganbayan, ⁵ 292 SCRA 452 (1998).the Court held that:

an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. In other words, it cannot be the subject of appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, got to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment." ⁶ Supra , 17 p. 458. (Underscoring ours)

Even considering the merits of the case, the petition must fail. Petitioners argue that the information must be quashed considering that it should be the prosecutor and not the Ombudsman who should filed the information with the trial court citing the case of Uy v. Sandiganbayan. It must be clarified that in Uy v Sandiganbayan, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offense and over the petitioner was being questioned from the start. Resolving this issue, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the petitioner, at the time of the filing of the informations and as now prescribed by the law which is R.A. 8249 (otherwise known as the "Sandiganbayan Law"). Both the nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, the Court ordered the dismissal of the criminal case filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Uy. Concomitant to this order, the Court stated that it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against the petitioner in the regional trial courts since the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

The case of Uy does not stand on all fours in the instant case. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the petitioners were charged for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. At that time the information was filed on February 21, 1995, it was the Sandiganbayan which had jurisdiction over the nature of the offense and over the person of the accused. R.A. 7975 then took effect on May 6, 1995 which called for the transfer of the case to the regional trial court considering that petitioners are not classified as having the rank of Grade 27. In such a case, it is the public prosecutor who shall now handle the prosecution of the case in the regular courts. By virtue of R.A. 7975 which ordered the transfer of the cases to the regular courts, the law did not perceive to dismiss all the cases which were already filed with the Sandiganbayan and to file anew the informations with the regular courts by the prosecutor. The information filed by the Ombudsman against herein petitioners on February 21, 1995 is still valid as the Ombudsman had authority to do so under the prevailing law at the time.

The other arguments of the petitioners that the undue injury allegedly caused to the government is not substantial enough and that the information is ambiguous are matters of defense which can be raised in the course of the trial.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order is, likewise, DENIED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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