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[G.R. No. 125680 & 126313.September 4, 2001]
ANDRES SARMIENTO et al. vs. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen :
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated SEPT 4 2001
G.R. No. 125680 & 126313(Andres Sarmiento, et al. vs. The Treasurer of the Philippines and the Secretary of Budget and Management & Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon B. Gonzales vs. Hon. Celso Gangan, Chairman, Commission on Audit and Hon. Salvador Enriquez, Secretary of Budget & Management.)
In these consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners, as taxpayers, are assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8174, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1996 on the following:
1. Increases made by Congress in the budget proposal of the President;
2. Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA);
3. Countrywide Development Fund (CDF); and
4. Realignment of Operational Expenses.
The Solicitor General maintains that the present petitions are moot and academic since they raise issues concerning the 1996 budget which had long been disbursed. Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that the instant cases are not moot and academic since the alleged constitutional infractions still appear in the GAA of 1997 and 1998 and that the incorporation of similar provisions in future GAAs is far from remote.
Suffice it to say that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 1 Salva vs. Makalintal, G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000, citing Alunan vs. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501 (1997) and Viola vs. Alunan, 277 SCRA 409 (1997).Undoubtedly, the issues posed by the instant petitions are likely to arise every time Congress passes an Appropriations Act for the incoming fiscal year.
I. INCREASES IN THE BUDGET PROPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENT
Petitioners contend that Congress, in the GAA of 1996, increased the budget proposals of the President, in violation of Sec. 25 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 25 (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall, be prescribed by law."
They stress that the phrase "appropriations" "as specified in the budget" refers to individual items of appropriations which Congress may not increase.
For his part, the Solicitor General claims that the phrase "for the operation of the government" means that Congress is enjoined from increasing the total budget for the operation of the government as recommended by the President, not the individual items of appropriations.
We agree. Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 2 Pp. 107-108; 170-171.reveals that the purpose of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the possibility of a big budget deficit if Congress were given an unbridled hand in passing upon the appropriations recommended by the President as specified in the budget. The constitutional prohibition against such increase is an assurance that the expected income of the government will be sufficient for the operational expenses of its different agencies and projects specified in the appropriations law.
An appropriation bill has been defined as a measure before the legislative body authorizing the expenditure of public money and specifying the amount, manner and purpose of the various items of expenditure. Words and Phrases, 3 Words and Phrases, Vol. 3A, p. 479.Thus, Congress has the prerogative to appropriate for certain items of expenditure, specified by the President in the budget, as long as the entire appropriation does not exceed the proposed total amount of the budget.
Here, Congress merely
exercised its prerogative of allocating the obtainable budget of the government
to its different agencies and projects. It increased the proposed budget for
some items, but decreased the proposed budget for others. It bears to emphasize
that Congress did not increase the overall recommended appropriations of the
President. The law itself (GAA of 1996) reduced the proposed total amount from P
415,557,000.00 to only P 415,555,560.00.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE ALLOCATIONS
Petitioners challenge the
validity of the Congressional Initiative Allocations (CIA) where individual
members of the House of the Representatives are allocated a minimum of P
1.5 million to a maximum of P 3.6 billion, and in the Senate, a minimum
of P 140 million to a maximum of P 5.4 billion each. Petitioners
insist that these allocations are not authorized by the Constitution or any
law.
The Constitution mandates that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 4 Sec. 29(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.Hence, the CIA, in so far as it allocates, millions to billions of pesos to our Senators and Congressmen, must be pursuant to a law. 5 Sec. 29(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.However, petitioners failed to point out any specific law, or even a provision of law, which contains the CIA. Neither did the Solicitor General shed light on his assertion that the CIA is an "insertion in an item as a result of realignment made by Congress" in the GAA of 1996.
The only instance when judicial intervention may be lawfully invoked is when there has been an arbitrary exercise of legislative discretion. 6 Arnault vs. Balagtas ,97 Phil. 358.Thus, in the absence of an assailed legislation, we cannot exercise the power of judicial review, or "the power of the courts to test the validity of x x x legislative acts in light of their conformity with the constitution." Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139. 7 Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139.
Accordingly, for petitioners' failure to specify any provision in R.A. 8174 containing the CIA, their attempt to raise a justiciable issue must fail.
III. COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Article XLII of R.A. 8174 (GAA of 1996) on the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Seeking the reversal of this Court's ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez 8 235 SCRA 507(1994).upholding the constitutionality of the CDF in the GAA of 1994, they contend that nowhere in GAA of 1996 is it provided that the President shall implement the projects proposed and identified by members of Congress. Moreover, they allege that the proposal and identification of projects by members of Congress are not merely recommendatory considering that requests for releases of funds under the CDF are automatically granted by the Budget Secretary. Memorandum of Petitioners, G.R. 126313, p. 9 9 Memorandum of Petitioners, G.R. 126313, p. 9.
The Solicitor General argues that since the questioned provision in the 1996 GAA on CDF is basically the same provision in the 1994 GAA held as constitutional by this Court in Philconsa, the instant case should be resolved in the same manner, following the principle of stare decisis.
We sustain the Solicitor General's argument.
In sustaining, in Philconsa, the constitutionality of the CDF under the GAA of 1994, this Court ruled:
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used for "infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries x x x." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
x x x
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."
We observe that petitioners merely reiterate their arguments in Philconsa. We thus find no compelling justification to review, much less reverse, this Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the CDF.
IV. REALIGNMENT OF OPERATIONAL EXPENSES
Petitioners impugn the validity of Paragraph 4 of the Special Provisions of R.A. 8174 (1996 GAA) which provides:
"4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of Congress may realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category provided the total of said allocation is not exceeded." 10 GAA of 1996, p. 12.
According to them, said provision contravenes Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
The validity of a provision in a general appropriations act authorizing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses has likewise been settled by this Court in Philconsa, thus:
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made." (emphasis ours)
Clearly, therefore, on the basis of the principle of stare decisis, petitioner's case must fail.
In fine, jurisprudence is replete with cases that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and 'to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 11 Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 (1999).
A statute, or a part thereof, will be sustained unless it is plainly, obviously, palpably and manifestly in conflict with some provisions of the fundamental law.. 12 C.J.S. 250-257.
These situations do not obtain in the present cases.
We thus find that Congress has not overstepped the bounds of its constitutional power.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) FELIPA B. ANAMA
Acting Asst. Clerk of Court
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