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[G.R.No. 146961.September 18, 2001]

REYNES vs NTC et. al.

EN BANC

Gentleman :

Quoted hereunder ,for your information , is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT 18 2001.

G.R. No. 146961(Romualdo M. Reynes vs. National TelecommunicationsCommission, Congress of the Philippines, Senate of the Philippines, et al.)

On December 21, 2000, Congress sent to the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office (PLLO) an enrolled bill entitled "AN ACT GRANTING THE CLICK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, INSTALL, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN WIRE AND/OR WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE PHILIPPINES," for the President's approval or veto thereof. Under Sec. 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution, "[t]he President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it."

On February 13, 2001, petitioner chanced upon Malaya's issue of the same date wherein the enrolled bill, now denominated as Republic Act No. 9002, was published with the left bottom corner of the boxed bill as published bearing the words "Lapsed into law on January 21, 2001 without the signature of the President in accordance with Article VI, Section 27(1) of the Constitution." Petitioner, thus, filed a a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for issuance of restraining order seeking, among other things, that Republic Act No. 9002 be declared void and premature; that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the Senate and Congress to transmit afresh to the President of the Philippines the enrolled bill granting said franchise in favor of private respondent Click. The aforementioned petition was docketed as G.R. No. 146961 and was raffled off to the Third Division.

In his petition, petitioner theorized that Republic Act No. 9002 was void and premature on the ground that while it was President Estrada who received the bill on December 21, 2000, the latter was removed on January 20, 2001, hence, petitioner claims that the 30-day period within which the President shall communicate his veto had not been complied with (on the ground that the 30-day period cannot be understood to be Estrada's 29 days plus President Macapagal-Arroyo's 1 day). Petitioner therefore concluded that the enrolled bill had not yet lapsed into law on January 21, 2001 on the ground that Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution should be interpreted as also giving President Macapagal-Arroyo 30 days from her assumption of office within which to communicate her veto, if she was so minded.

For its part, the Division noted that the petition was not accompanied by the required certification on non-forum shopping. Moreover, the Third Division also pointed out that for the Court to assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question, the question of constitutionality must be raised by a proper party, or one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of (Kilosbayan. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]). The Division found that petitioner lacked legal standing to assail the validity of the subject statute, not being a real party-in-interest who possesses real interest in the outcome of the controversy (Tatad vs. Secretary of Department of Energy, 28 1 SCRA 330 [1997]). It also pointed out that petitioner had no cause of action against respondents, not having a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest in the resolution of the case. The petition was thus dismissed on March 5, 2001. Additional pleadings filed by petitioner were considered as a motion for reconsideration and denied with finality on March 21, 2001.

On August 10, 2001, petitioner wrote a letter assailing the dismissal of his petition by the Third Division on the ground that since the same involved the constitutionality of a law, it should have been referred to the Court En Banc, pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993, and Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. CA (334 SCRA 465 [2009]).

Despite petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied with finality, the Third Division took cognizance of petitioner's letter and referred the matter to the Bane for its consideration and appropriate action.

After due deliberation, the Court En Banc finds petitioner's asseverations to be without merit. Admittedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993 considers cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any law is in question as en banc cases. However, a petition does not automatically qualify as an en banc case just because it raises a constitutional question. It is hornbook doctrine that the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question and declare a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by a proper party, and that when it is raised, the constitutional question is unavoidable or is the very lis mota. If there is some other ground upon which the court may base its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable (Sotto v. COMELEC, 76 Phil. 516 [1946]). Thus, even if a case raises the constitutionality of a law, the same may be decided by a Division if the constitutional question may be sidestepped, as was properly done in this case. Were we to rule otherwise, litigants would, at every opportunity, raise the constitutionality of a law in order to obtain the ear of the Court En Banc, thereby wasting the Court's precious time to the prejudice of other litigants, as well as rendering nugatory Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution allowing the Court to sit either En Banc or in division.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court En Banc hereby AFFIRMS the action taken by the Third Division in dismissing with finality the instant petition.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

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