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[G.R. No. 123788.August 7, 2002]
DE GUZMAN vs. THE HON. CA, et al.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 07 AUG 2002.
G.R. No. 123788(Dominador De Guzman vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, and the Spouses Rolando G. Perez and Milagros V. Perez.)
Petitioner seeks a reconsideration of this Court's Decision affirming the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He contends:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY [sic] ERRED IN LIFTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD.
B.
THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR RESPONDENT IS AN EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT UNDER SECTION 19, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT OVER WHICH INCIDENT THE CA HAS NO JURISDICTION.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY [sic] ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ITS PRIMARY REASON FOR ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION WAS TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO PETITIONER WHO HAD FISH PRODUCTS TO GATHER IN THE FISHPOND, WHEN THE ACTUAL LEGAL BASIS OF ITS ISSUANCE IS THAT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE MTC WAS ERRONEOUSLY ISSUED WHEN ITS JUDGMENT HAD NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND PETITIONER STILL HAD THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.
D.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (CA) IN EFFECT VALIDATED THE WRIT OF EXECUTION THAT IT FOUND TO BE UNLAWFUL.
E.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY [sic] ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE MERIT OF THE APPEAL AS AN EQUITABLE GROUND TO RESTORE POSSESSION TO RESPONDENT THUS DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. [1] cralaw
To recall, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, alleging that they were the vendees of the subject property. Petitioner was a lessee of the former owners but the lease had expired without being renewed or extended. Despite demands, petitioner had refused to vacate the premises.
The MCTC then issued an order stating that the Rule on Summary Procedure shall apply in the adjudication of the case. After the pre-trial conference, however, the MCTC set aside its previous order and directed that the case be tried under ordinary procedure instead.
Subsequently, the MCTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents. The court ordered petitioner to vacate the property and to pay damages to respondents.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision of the MCTC. Respondents, on the other hand, moved for the execution of the judgment.
The MCTC, now presided by a different judge, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and granted respondents' motion for execution. The court held that the case fell under the Rule on Summary Procedure, which prohibits a motion for reconsideration, and petitioner's failure to avail of the remedy of appeal within the reglementary period rendered the case final.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal but the MCTC denied due course, reiterating that the judgment was already final and executory.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with damages and temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC granted petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, the court issued an order granting a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, directing, among others, the restoration of the possession of the fishpond to petitioner.
Private respondents sought to annul the above order and enjoin its enforcement by filing before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA rendered its decision initially upholding the order of the RTC.
xxx.����� It was the agreement of the parties that while the case was still with the MCTC, the case should be tried in accordance with the Rules on Ordinary Procedure, and not under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. As a matter of fact, herein petitioners participated in the trial (Exhs. C, SPA No. 6324). To recall, the private respondent, in his answer before the MCTC, asserted not only the element of ownership but also that rentals and damages being sought exceeded P20,000.00. Even during the preliminary conference (March 6, 1994), non applicability of summary procedure was reiterated by the private respondent. There was[,] on the other hand, conformity by counsel of the petitioners that the case instead should be tried under ordinary procedure. Precisely, the January 24, 1991 Order was set aside and the case was set in the calendar for trial on March 25 and April 17, 1991. Trial on the merits was then conducted in accordance with ordinary procedure. No affidavits were submitted, as a matter of fact. Even after the trial, the Court directed the issuance of their respective memoranda, an indication that it was a trial under ordinary procedure, since submission of memoranda is a prohibited pleading.
Precisely because it was a proceeding under ordinary procedure, the respondent filed the Motion for Reconsideration. The point is, when the October 28 Order was issued, a new presiding judge of the MCTC took over, then ruled on the basis of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
x x x.
We do not agree that the writ of execution was already fait accompli, as asserted by herein petitioner. Even assuming that the caretaker of the respondent was forcibly ejected from the fishpond, still there was fish produce of the petitioner worth about P150,000.00 and the possibility that they will be appropriated by herein petitioner, unless enjoined. x x x. Also, the writ of preliminary injunction was still a proper remedy if only to stop the petitioner from appropriating the fish produce xxx.
Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the above decision. Subsequently, they also filed a Manifestation stating, among others, that petitioner had already harvested the fish produce from the fishpond.Thus, the basis for the injunction has become functus oficio. Private respondents further claimed that the subject fishpond had dried up by then.
Thereafter, the CA issued a Resolution modifying its Decision by ordering the restoration of the disputed fishpond to respondents' possession. The Court of Appeals held:
The primary purpose in restoring possession to the private respondent had already been accomplished. On top of that, to consider the unrebutted manifestation, is that the fishpond was totally neglected; and this could be the logical result of the fact that the ejectment case was decided, by reason of the expiration of the lease as early as February 1, 1990, or five years have elapsed since then.
We thus find here a situation in which in spite of our affirmance of respondents' right to appeal his ejectment, coupled with x x x an urgent necessity x x x justifying an order of restoration, there are supervening special and compelling reasons that would now validate execution of the judgment of ejectment (Felizardo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 220, citing the case of City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 98). After all, the right to appeal does not prevent execution in ejectment cases xxx.
x x x
We find therefore that while petitioner's principal objective of restoring private respondents' possession on the contested property have been realized, just as importantly, they lost their right to remain in possession thereof when they kept the fishpond unused and unrepaired leading to deterioration (Rollo, p. 207). Respondents even acknowleged [sic] the fact of the expiration of the lease. The state of disuse of the fishpond leads to the conclusion that they have not been paying the corresponding compensation for the continued possession thereof. Petitioners are therefore now entitled to an immediate restoration of possession. There are also reasons of equity. Petitioners are admittedly owners of the property. Eventually, respondents' right of possession, even if they prevail in the appeal, will terminate sooner or later. Ultimately, it will be the petitioners who will suffer damages resulting from the continuing deterioration of the fishpond. [2] cralaw
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the CA denied said motion, ruling that:
xxx more than the presence of actual and legal basis, there are compelling considerations of equity, calling for the restoration of physical possession in favor of the petitioners.
The point we would like to emphasize is that the case for unlawful detainer which eventually was filed by the petitioners was based on the expiration of the lease then granted to the respondent by the previous owners of the fishpond. At the very least, it was established that the petitioners eventually became the vendees of the contested property. In fact, they are now the registered owners (TCT No. 136950). The lease in favor of the private respondent expired sometime on February 1, 1990; precisely, demands were made to vacate the premises but were refused, hence petitioners went to Court on a complaint for unlawful detainer.
xxx
There are similar compelling reasons why in spite of the appeal, herein petitioners should be allowed to continue possessing the premises. The fact is that the lease has already expired, and the petitioners are already the titled owners even if admittedly the ownership is still being litigated in a separate proceeding, although this cannot affect the disposition of the ejectment case (CSY vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991). Petitioners are holders of a valid title, which in the ejectment proceeding, must be respected. That the lease has already expired, was even accepted by private respondent who claimed before the MTC payment of advance rentals, incidentally not received by petitioners, but by some other party. While that issue was already settled at the first instance in favor of the petitioners, it still has to be litigated on appeal xxx. [3] cralaw
Petitioner sought relief before this Court but, as stated earlier, the Court affirmed the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner now moves for a reconsideration of this Court's decision.
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals considered ex parte private respondents' "Manifestation." It is undisputed, however, that petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. [4] cralaw Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. [5] cralaw
It is also submitted that the remedy of private respondents is execution of judgment pending appeal so they should not have filed their "Manifestation" in the Court of Appeals. This argument loses sight of the fact that the MCTC had denied due course to the notice of appeal filed by petitioner. As there is no appeal, there is no execution pending appeal to speak of. Moreover, the decision of the MCTC was already partially executed but petitioner sought the enjoinment of said execution before the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to undo the consequences of the execution. It is absurd to hold that execution pending appeal was still available to private respondents when a mandatory injunction had been issued to enjoin the execution.
Next, petitioner asserts that the real reason for upholding the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as the Court of Appeals itself stated in its decision, was the unlawful execution of the MTC decision on account of the erroneous denial of the notice of appeals. Thus, it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to reverse itself on the ground that petitioner's fish produce had already been harvested. In effect, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals "violated the writ of execution that it found to be unlawful" in the first place.
The Court disagrees. One of the requisites for the grant of a mandatory injunction is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. [6] cralaw The Court of Appeals found that petitioner would no longer suffer any damage as a result of the restoration of the property to private respondents because the fish produce had already been harvested. Thus, respondent Court cannot be faulted for modifying its decision.
Lastly, there is no merit in the argument that the Court of Appeals deprived petitioner of due process when it touched upon the merits of the case pending before the RTC. The resolution of the Court of Appeals should not be construed as an adjudication on the merits but should be considered only for purposes of determining whether the writ of mandatory preliminary injunction should be maintained. The RTC is not precluded from making a contrary finding in light of other evidence the parties may present.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw RoIlo, pp. 204-205.
[2] cralaw Id., at 34-36 .
[3] cralaw Id., at 47-49.
[4] cralaw Busuego vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 473 (1999).
[5] cralaw Vda. De Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33 (1998).
[6] cralaw Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 52 (1999).
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