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[OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J.February 13, 2002]
IN THE MATTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. ABESAMIS, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 13 2002.
OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J(In the matter of Administrative Complaint against Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Hon. Eugenio S. Labitoria and Hon. Elvi John S. Asuncion, Associate Justices and members of the Former Special Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals.)
Petitioners, employees of Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. and members of the Year Jan Industries of Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-KMU), charge respondent Court of Appeals Justices Abesamis, Labitoria and Asuncion, with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
The case arose from a labor dispute between petitioners and their employer, Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. (Company, for brevity), for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring their dismissal illegal and ordering them to be reinstated to their former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with backwages, 13th month pay and sick and vacation leave. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the aforesaid decision but deleted the money claims. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision.
The Company assailed the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 54598 and raffled to the Special Twelfth Division, composed of respondent justices.
On August 30, 1999, an alias writ of execution was issued against the Company to collect P5,437,992.00 constituting the computed backwages, 13th month pay and sick and vacation leave pay of the petitioners. A notice of garnishment was issued against the Company's account in the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).
On September 21, 1999, the Company filed a "Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction" to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the order of garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to restrain RCBC from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC Sheriff, or if the garnished amount has already been transferred, to enjoin the NLRC from releasing the same to the petitioners.
On September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining order. On February 29, 2000, the Company's application for preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,437,992.02. The Company, however, failed to post the bond required.
On March 20, 2000, the Company filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to modify the February 29, 2000 Resolution which was denied on August 10, 2000.
On October 6, 2000, the Company filed another Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor Arbiter from implementing the alias writ of execution dated September 19, 2000, for the collection of P8,401,103.36 representing additional backwages/salaries of the petitioners. This was granted by respondents per Resolution dated October 11, 2000.
Aggrieved by issuance of the said Resolution, petitioners moved to inhibit the respondents but was denied on January 30, 2000.
Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals deprived them of their right to be reinstated and to be paid their lost income. They also assert that the issuance of the TRO without requiring the posting of the required surety bond and without defining the period of its effectivity or duration transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and the Canon of Judicial Ethics.
Respondents, upon the other hand maintain, viz: (1) that the TROs never enjoined nor restrained the reinstatement of the complainants; (2) that under Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the bond is posted only when required by court; (3) that the phrase "until further orders of this Court" did not make the period of the TROs indefinite; and (4) that the charges averred in the complaint have already been passed upon and considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388.
The complaint should be dismissed.
The respondents, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted within the confines and limits of the law and their authority.
I. Petitioners, in their motion for writ of execution, moved only for the execution of the money judgment. In the restraining orders issued by respondents, what was restrained and enjoined is the payment of the monetary claims adjudged by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and not the reinstatement of the petitioners to their former positions. Thus, with or without the restraining orders, the judgment of the NLRC reinstating the petitioners is immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code. [1] cralaw
II. The failure of the respondents to require the Company to post a bond did not violate the Rules of Court. Paragraph (b) of Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond. [2] cralaw The court may, in proper cases, exempt the applicant from filing the bond normally required. [3] cralaw In issuing the October 11, 2000 Resolution, respondents were merely exercising a discretion granted them by law. Certainly, we find no abuse of discretion, much less a grave or patent abuse of judgment when they issued the assailed Order. It must be stressed however, that respondents in their Resolution dated February 29, 2000, required the Company to post a bond for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Unfortunately, the Company failed to comply, hence, the writ was never issued.
III. The TRO dated October 11, 2000 was not issued for an indefinite time. Under Section 5, Paragraph 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. It automatically terminates upon the expiration of the 60 day period without need of any judicial declaration to that effect.
In the assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered, among others, that "the public respondent NLRC is also restrained and enjoined from surrendering or releasing the garnished amount to the private respondents, until further orders of this Court ." As it is clear under the Rules that the effectivity of a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days, it must be stressed that the phrase "until further orders of this Court" embodied in said resolution should be understood in such manner that the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of its discretion, shorten the lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so warrant. Applying the foregoing, we find petitioners' allegation that the questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules erroneous.
Lastly, the charges alleged in the complaint have already been passed upon and considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388. It must be recalled that after the issuance of the October 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioners filed a motion for inhibition grounded mainly on the issuance of the aforesaid resolution and contending that the judicial action of respondents in issuing the assailed Resolution impelled them "to believe that they could no longer obtain labor justice." The motion was denied by respondents on January 30, 2001, hence, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court. On June 27, 2001, we issued a Resolution denying the petition "for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." [4] cralaw The dismissal of the petition, in effect, upholds the correctness of respondents' acts in issuing the restraining orders. The present administrative complaint is nothing but an attempt on the part of the petitioners to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and definitively resolved by this Court. [5] cralaw
WHEREFORE , the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Article 223. Appeal.-
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In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
[2] cralaw Sec. 4 Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.-
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(b)Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. See also Annotations by Justice Feria, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[3] cralaw Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1997 Edition, p. 651.
[4] cralaw Annex "9."
[5] cralaw Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302, 306 [1997].
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