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[G.R. No. 148442.February 18, 2002]
PEZ vs. IOLCOS MARITIME AGENCIES FAR EAST INC.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 18 FEB 2002.
G.R. No. 148442(Salvador R. Pez vs. lolcos Maritime Agencies Far East Incorporated.)
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, appealing the decision dated February 20, 2001 and the Resolution dated June 5, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Salvador R. Pez was hired as Chief Engineer on a vessel for a six-month period by the private respondent lolcos Maritime Agencies Far East, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Iolcos Hellenic Maritime Enterprises Co., Ltd. Petitioner boarded the vessel on March 13. 1996. Within three (3) months after boarding the vessel, however, or on June 24, 1996, he was repatriated after being diagnosed to be suffering from chronic coronary artery disease. Claiming that his ailment was work-related and, therefore, compensable, he thereafter filed a claim for disability benefits against the private respondent in the NLRC Arbitration Branch. Petitioner claimed that he was in good health prior to his employment on board the vessel; that he suffered severe stress due to extreme heat, humidity, noise and air pollution while working at the ship's engine room; that in late May 1996, he suddenly suffered from severe headache, shortness of breath, general body weakness, cramps and chest pains; that upon medical examination, he was found to have diabetes mellitus and hypertension, putting him at 70% risk of suffering from coronary artery disease; that after treatment at a hospital in Australia, he was repatriated for medical reasons; and that as per the medical certificate issued by Dr. Lourdes Mabanta on November 25, 1997, he was found to have permanent total disability impediment Grade 1 under Appendix 1 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. [1] cralaw
Denying liability, the private respondent asserted that petitioner had been suffering from diabetes mellitus and hypertension even before his employment with the former; that petitioner's illness could not have possibly developed within the short period of forty-five (45) days of employment, which is the total number of days in which he actually worked on the job; that the pre-employment medical certificate giving petitioner a clean bill of health is not conclusive of his medical history since the standard examination does not cover diseases requiring special procedure and testing for their detection; and that only a Thallium Stress Test could have revealed petitioner's medical condition prior to his employment. [2] cralaw
In a decision dated June 16, 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner, and directed private respondent to pay the former the sum of US$66,000.00, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are ordered to solidarily pay complainant the following:
(1) disability benefit - US$60,000.00
(2) 10% attorney's fees - 6.000.00
US$66,000.00 [3] cralaw
On August 10, 1998, private respondent appealed the labor arbiter's decision with the NLRC, but instead of filing an Appeal Bond within the reglementary period. it filed a Motion for Reduction of the appeal bond together with a Memorandum on Appeal. On August 25, 1998, pending the NLRC's action on its motion for reduction of appeal bond, the private respondent filed a surety bond in the amount of PhP 854,000.00, which was the amount being prayed for in the said motion. On October 27, 1998, petitioner filed with the NLRC a motion to dismiss the private respondent's appeal to the NLRC for failure to post the bond within the reglementary period. On May 28, 1999, still pending the court's action on the motion to reduce the appeal bond, the private respondent filed an additional bond in the sum of P1.5M to fully cover the monetary award.
In an Order dated July 29, 1999, the NLRC dismissed the private respondent's appeal and declared the labor arbiter's decision as "final and executory." However, the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, which was granted in a subsequent NLRC decision dated February 29, 2000. This decision set aside the NLRC's July 29, 1999 Order of dismissal and reversed the decision of the labor arbiter based on the evidence presented.
The NLRC held that that the filing of a motion to reduce the appeal bond within the reglementary period to appeal may be allowed in lieu of the filing of said bond. In reversing the labor arbiter's findings and dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground that he is not entitled to permanent disability benefits, the NLRC considered the following:(i) that Dr. Mabanta's medical certificate was not a conclusive proof that petitioner previously was suffering from permanent 'total disability; (ii) that petitioner previously applied only for partial disability benefits with the Social Security System (or "SSS"); (iii) that petitioner's attending physician in Australia noted that he could be declared fit to work if his condition improves; (iv) that petitioner was subsequently employed as a seafarer in August 1997, after his repatriation. [4] cralaw
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, which was denied in an Order dated April 27, 2000. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a decision dated February 20, 2001. Petitioner is now before this Court arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to uphold the NLRC's previous order of dismissal over the case, which he claims was a dismissal based on jurisdictional grounds. Since the timely filing of a cash or surety bond is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal with the NLRC, he argues that the private respondent's failure to post such bond within the reglementary period had the effect of rendering the labor arbiter's judgment as final and executory. Since there was never any ruling on the motion to reduce appeal bond filed by the private respondent, he argues that the NLRC never acquired jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner also submits that his cardinal rights to procedural and administrative due process were violated when the NLRC reversed the judgment of the labor arbiter. He alleges manifest partiality on the part of the NLRC in reversing its previous order of dismissal, without first giving the petitioner the opportunity to submit counter-evidences and arguments on new issues and evidences belatedly only raised on appeal.
The petition is denied.
Although the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, we have relaxed the stringent application of the rule concerning the posting of an appeal bond within the 1 0-day period in a growing number of cases. [5] cralaw In Quiambao vs. NLRC, this Court ruled that a relaxation of the appeal bond requirement could be justified by a substantial compliance with the rule. [6] cralaw In Star Angel Handicraft vs. NLRC, [7] cralaw we made a clear distinction between the filing of an appeal and its perfection, the latter of which may transpire after the end of the reglementary period for filing the appeal. In this case we held:
Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond. Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC. [8] cralaw
In the case at bar, it is not contested that the private respondent filed a motion to reduce appeal bond together with a memorandum of appeal within the 10-day reglementary period. Although the NLRC never acted on the private respondent's motion to reduce appeal bond prior to rendering a decision on the merits, an action was no longer necessary in order for the NLRC to acquire jurisdiction over the case. This is because the appeal was already perfected when the private respondent subsequently posted a bond equivalent to the full monetary award, [9] cralaw prior to and pending any ruling by the commission with regard to its motion to reduce appeal bond. The private respondent's posting of a bond in the reduced amount being prayed for, and then, posting an additional sum to fully cover the value of the monetary award, therefore shows its intent to comply with the rules governing perfection of appeals before the commission. [10] cralaw We agree with the NLRC in holding that: "Such recourse cannot be taken as less than substantial compliance with the rules and for which, resolving the appeal on the merits must now pursue, as a matter of course. [11] cralaw
As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, this Court has previously held that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal, as the technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. [12] cralaw Furthermore, the findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence. [13] cralaw
This Court has construed permanent total disability as the
xxxdisablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of, work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or profit in substantially customary and usual manner. Permanent total disability is the lack of ability to follow continue some substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life. [14] cralaw
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in upholding the findings of the NLRC, and in concluding that the evidence belied the petitioner's allegation of permanent total disability. The finding that the petitioner was hired by the Korphil Ship Management and Manning Corporation for assignment at sea for a 12-month period merely fourteen (14) months after his repatriation by the private respondent, was a strong indication that he was not suffering from permanent total disability. [15] cralaw The fact that he was out of a job for more than 120 days after his repatriation was not attributed to any physical disability, but rather to his inability to land another job until he was hired by Korphil. [16] cralaw A medical examination conducted on the petitioner last August 11, 1997 prior to his subsequent assignment at sea also disclosed that he had no cardiovascular disease but only diabetes mellitus, Class B- controlled with medication. In other words, the 70% risk of suffering from chronic artery disease that he had been diagnosed with prior to his repatriation had totally disappeared, again proving that his ailment was not permanent and total in character. [17] cralaw
The Court also took note of the petitioner's claim with the SSS for permanent partial disability. Overall, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish that his ailment was work-connected. The findings of a non-POEA accredited doctor such as Dr. Mabanta was also not given any credence as to the petitioner's actual state of health, given that he failed to submit himself for examination with a POEA-accredited doctor within the appropriate period for the filing of his claim. [18] cralaw
Given the petitioner's failure to prove that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error both as to the procedural and substantive aspects of this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb their findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo, p. 50.
[2] cralaw Id.
[3] cralaw Id.
[4] cralaw Id., at 52.
[5] cralaw Globe General Services and Security Agency vs. NLRC, 249 SCRA 408 (1995); Rosewood Processing, Inc. vs. NLRC, 290 SCRA 408 (1998).
[6] cralaw 254 SCRA 211, 216-217 (1996).
[7] cralaw 236 SCRA 580, 584 (1994).
[8] cralaw 236 SCRA 580 (1994).
[9] cralaw Alcosero vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 140 (1998).
[10] cralaw Rollo, pp. 230-231.
[11] cralaw Id., at 231.
[12] cralaw Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corp. vs. Dapitan, 320 SCRA 124 (1999).
[13] cralaw C. Planas Commercial vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 49 (1999).
[14] cralaw Berjerano vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 205 SCRA 598 (1992).
[15] cralaw Rollo, p. 54.
[16] cralaw Id. at 55.
[17] cralaw Id .
[18] cralaw Id., at 54-55.
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