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[G.R. Nos. 140218-23.July 2, 2002]
PEOPLE vs. ESCA�O
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 2 2002.
G.R. Nos. 140218-23(People of the Philippines vs. Carlos Esca�o.)
Accused-appellant seeks a reconsideration of the decision in these cases, insofar as it finds him guilty of four (4) counts of qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 5830, 5831, 5832, and 5835 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and sentences him in each of the cases to death.
Reiterating previous contentions, accused-appellant argues that because the informations in criminal Case Nos. 5830, 5831, 5832, and 5835 fail to allege properly the relationship between, him and the complainant Mergie Raoet Macam, the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua; that the evidence is insufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses and, therefore, there is no warrant for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; and that even if the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua to death because the use of a deadly weapon is shown on the evidence, the minority of the complainant Mergie Raoet Macam cannot be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty on him.
First . Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the crime of rape is committed with the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances, i.e., the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the penalty shall be death. These circumstances - the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender - must be alleged in the information and duly proven during the trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, otherwise the crime shall be considered simple rape and the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. Hence, if, as in these cases, the accused is alleged to be the stepfather of the victim but the evidence shows that he is not legally married to the victim's mother, then there is a failure to allege and prove relationship as a qualifying circumstance. The crime, therefore, remains simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, the remaining circumstance, for example, of minority as in these cases, which was pleaded and proven, may be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance for fixing the period of the penalty. This is the doctrine laid down in at least two cases, People vs. Bayya, 327 SCRA .771 (2000) and People vs. Navida, 346 SCRA 821 (2000). Accused-appellant's contention to the contrary is without any merit. Indeed, why should minority be not considered at least an aggravating circumstance since it was alleged and proved?
Now, in Criminal Case Nos. 5830, 5831, 5832 and 5835, the information against accused-appellant charge the commission of rape not only with the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship, but also the use of a deadly weapon. The use of a deadly weapon was both alleged and proved, so that', in accordance with Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua to death. As there is one aggravating circumstance (minority) and no mitigating circumstance, then, following Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the greater penalty (death) should be imposed.
It is contended that the use of a deadly weapon by accused-appellant in the commission of the rapes was not sufficiently proven. But the trial court found that this aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the rape in these cases. Such factual finding is entitled to great respect and will not be set aside unless contrary to the evidence on record. Here, the evidence shows the presence of this aggravating circumstance.
Complainant Mergie Raoet Macam testified that on the four occasions of rape, i.e., January 14, 1998, February 12, 1998, February 16, 1998, and March 1997, accused-appellant threatened her with a deadly weapon to make her submit to his will. She said that at about 1:00 p.m. of March 1997 (subject of Crim. Case No. 5835), her mother called her and told her to go upstairs because accused-appellant had something to tell her.When she went to see accused-appellant, the latter pulled her towards him and, at the point of a knife, which had a six-inch blade, succeeded in abusing her. At about 2:00 p.m. of January 14, 1998 (subject of Crim. Case No. 5830), while she was alone in the house cooking food, accused-appellant, armed with a fan knife, came and threatened her with harm if she did not yield to him. At about 11:00 a.m. of February 12, 1998 (subject of Crim. Case No. 5831), complainant testified that while alone in their house, accused-appellant again was able to rape her at knifepoint. At about 12:00 noon of February 16, 1998 (subject of Crim. Case No. 5832), while she was alone in the house taking a nap, complainant said she was awakened by accused-appellant who, at the point of a knife, raped her. [1] cralaw Complainant did not waver from these allegations under cross-examination. [2] cralaw
Second . Accused-appellant claims that this Court failed to consider material the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of Mergie Raoet Macam.
These alleged inconsistencies, however, were earlier pointed out in his appellant's brief and thoroughly discussed in the decision in these cases. Thus:
(a)������ As to the variance in Mergie's testimony in court as to the dates the rapes were committed, allegations concerning the exact time and date of the commission of the crime, being details of minor significance, are not decisive in a prosecution for rape. The precise time of the commission of the rape is not even an element of the crime and the same has no bearing on its commission. Indeed, it has been held that errors or inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of the declaration, its weight, or its veracity as long as there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant (People vs. San Agustin, 350 SCRA 216 (2001); People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 (1998)).
(b) As to the discrepancy between Mergie's testimony that, in March 1997, she was a first year high school student, and her testimony on cross-examination that she was then in Grade VI, the same is of no consequence. After all, there is little difference between being a Grade VI pupil and a high school freshman. What is important is that the prosecution was able to prove that accused-appellant raped complainant five times. The spontaneity of her testimony is enhanced by minor discrepancies which, in fact, add credence and veracity to her narration (People vs. Mirafuentes, 349 SCRA 204 (2001)).
(c) Neither does Mergie's failure to immediately disclose her ordeal to the authorities and to her mother affect her credibility. The fact that it was only after she had been raped again On January 14, 1998 that she told her guidance counselor about her misfortune does not put in doubt the veracity of her narration. As has been observed, it is not uncommon for young and immature girls not to reveal the crime committed against them, either because of the rapist's threats, or the fear of public humiliation, or simply of lack of courage (People vs. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 (1997)).
(d) Accused-appellant contends that it is contrary to human nature for Mergie not to heed the advice of the guidance counselor to leave the house where she was staying. There are many reasons for a young girl like Mergie Raoet Macam not to leave home despite the abuse committed against her. One is security. We can speculate on a number of other reasons, but, the point is, accused-appellant's counsel should have asked complainant this question on cross-examination, instead of raising it in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of accused-appellant Carlos Esca�o is DENIED with finality for lack of merit.(Quisumbing, J., is on leave.)
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw TSN, Aug. 24, 1998, pp. 4-10; Sworn Statement of Mergie Raoet Macam dated February 24, 1998 (Exh. "B"), RTC Records (Crim. Case No. 5831), pp. 4-5.
[2] cralaw Sept. 8, 1998, pp. 10-13; Sept. 14, 1998, pp. 3, 11-15.
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