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[G.R. Nos. 139698-726.May 7, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILFREDO D. MATUGAS

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAY 7 2002.

G.R. Nos. 139698-726 (People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo D. Matugas.)

Accused-appellant Wilfredo D. Matugas moves for reconsideration of the decision, dated February 20, 2002, in this case affirming the death sentence imposed an him for two counts of rape (Criminal Case Nos. DU-6097 and DU-6119) and ordering him to pay complainant Aime Matugas in each case P50,000.00 as moral damages, in addition to P75,000.00 civil indemnity, while acquitting him with respect to 27 other counts of rape (Criminal Case Nos. DU-6120 to DU-6146) on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution evidence is "grossly insufficient" not only with respect to the 27 counts of rape but also with regard to the first and last one. He claims that the testimony of the complainant, even with respect to the first and last incidents of rape, is incredible and untrustworthy because it is inconsistent on material points.

Both contentions are without merit. To begin with, the Court did not rule that accused-appellant raped complainant with respect to some counts but not with regard to others. What this Court said was that although there existed no doubt that accused-appellant raped the complainant more than twice, for lack of certitude as to the exact number of times complainant had done so between the first, which happened on September 6, 1995, and the last time, which took place on October 6, 1997, the conviction of accused-appellant for the other 27 counts of rape could not be affirmed. For while the exact dates of the commission of the rape may be stated at or near the time it actually happened, the number of times the complainant was actually raped is important because each act of sexual intercourse constitutes one offense (See Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 321 (2000)).Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the 27 other alleged incidents of rape charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of complainant Aime Matugas, to wit,

(1) that Aime lied about the circumstances surrounding the first rape because she stated at one time that she had been raped upstairs, but when confronted with the fact that there was no bed there, she reversed herself;

(2) that she lied about her age about the first time that she was allegedly raped;

(3) that she lied about the presence of her sister in the room at the time of the alleged rape because she said in her affidavit that her sister was not in the same room but she allegedly reversed herself in court; and

(4) that she lied about the absence of her mother during the alleged second rape,

these alleged inconsistencies were satisfactorily explained by complainant on cross-examination. With respect to inconsistencies between sworn statements and testimonies in court, the latter is given more weight because a witness can be cross-examined on what he testified in court during the direct-examination while sworn statements are prepared by another person and are thus often incomplete and inaccurate (People v. Acala, 307 SCRA 330 (1999)).

What is more, the inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant are inconsequential and immaterial. On the whole the evidence of the prosecution establish the fact that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the complainant at least twice without her consent. Hence, discrepancies in details, which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, cannot justify the acquittal of accused-appellant (People vs. Esca�o, G.R. Nos. 140218-23, February 13, 2002; People vs. Alicante, 332 SCRA 440 (2000); People vs. Sancha, 324 SCRA 646 (2000); People vs. Villar, 322 SCRA 393 (2000); People vs. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546 (1999)).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVED to DENY with FINALITY the motion for reconsideration of accused-appellant Wilfredo D. Matugas for lack of merit. De Leon, abroad on official Business.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Asst. Clerk of Court

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