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[G.R. No. 152747.May 29, 2002]
RUEDAS vs. IBA�EZ
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 29 MAY 2002.
G.R. No. 152747(Florencio Ruedas vs. Leonila Iba�ez joined by her husband Joel F. Quinones.)
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 20, 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No. 55839 be nullified and set aside. [1] cralaw The assailed Decision affirmed the Order dated December 23, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, Branch XVIII, denying petitioner's petition for relief from judgment.
Antecedent facts:
Respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, Branch III, an action for Repurchase of a Homestead with Damages and Conventional Redemption. Judgment was rendered therein in favor of petitioner on June 5, 1975. On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66899, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and directed petitioner "to reconvey to respondents the disputed parcel of land after payment of purchase price and the value of improvements, after a complete and accurate accounting thereof." [2] cralaw The Supreme Court, per Resolution dated May 8, 1991 in G.R. No. 93228, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. [3] cralaw Entry of Judgment was issued on September 16, 1991. Subsequently, or on June 23, 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution.
During the hearing on the accounting report of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff executing the final decision, the parties agreed as follows:
"a) of the 723 coconut trees planted by the defendant on the land under dispute, 587 shall be priced at P4.00 each or a total amount of P2,348.00 while the remaining 136 coconut trees will be evaluated and priced by a commissioner to be designated by the Court;
"b) the Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Pikit, Cotabato would be appointed to determine the fair market value of the following improvements on the land as of July 24, 1992: 136 coconut trees, 18 cocoa trees, 223 fruit-bearing coffee trees, 223 fruit-bearing coffee trees, 223 non-fruit-bearing coffee trees, 94 banana clumps, 2 tambis trees, 12 lanzones trees, 10 jackfruit trees, and 1 narra tree." [4] cralaw
Accordingly, with due notice to the parties, the trial court issued an Order on October 26, 1992, commissioning the Municipal Assessor to appraise the improvements introduced by petitioner on the property.
On December 24, 1992, petitioner filed with the same trial court a petition for relief from the said Order dated October 26, 1992, arguing that a mistake has been committed, and that the mechanics of respondents' offer of repurchase of the disputed property was not in accordance with Articles 1616, 546 and 547 of the Civil Code and the case of Gargollo vs. Duero, 1 SCRA 1311. [5] cralaw
On December 23, 1996, the trial court denied the petition for relief.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter affirmed the trial court.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition should be denied.
First, the petition failed to comply with the requirement set forth in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in that it is not accompanied by pertinent documents such as the Order dated December 23, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, Branch 18 denying the petition for relief; [6] cralaw and the RTC Order dated October 26, 1992, commissioning the Municipal Assessor of Pikit, Cotabato to appraise the disputed property [7] cralaw which petitioner failed to attach to the petition. Under Section 5 of the same Rule, failure to attach the same is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Second, petitioner failed to advance substantial grounds to warrant a review, much more a reversal, of the appellate court's decision.
a)�� The issues raised by herein petitioner regarding respondents' right of redemption and the applicability of Articles 1616, 546 and 547 of the Civil Code and the case of GargoIlo vs. Duero, et aI., L-15973, April 29, 1961, were already passed upon, by the Court of Appeals in its Decision that was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated May 8, 1991 in G.R. No. 93228 which had already become final and executory.
b)�� Petitioner's claim that the filing of a petition for relief beyond the 60-day period may be allowed, citing PHHC vs. Tiongco, et al., L-18891, November 28, 1964, is not plausible. The appellate court dismissed petitioner's appeal, not because The petition for relief was filed beyond the reglementary period, but because it was not the proper remedy to assail the RTC Order dated December 23, 1996. [8] cralaw The appellate court is correct in ruling that the remedy of petition for relief is not available to petitioner as the order assailed is merely an interlocutory order. Rule 38 of the Rules of Court governing petitions for relief presupposes that the judgment, order or resolution sought to be set aside is final in that it finally disposes of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court relative to its merits, as opposed to an interlocutory order. In the present case, the Order dated October 26, 1992 sought to be set aside in the petition for relief is an interlocutory order from which petitioner could have availed of the remedies of certiorari, prohibition or motion for reconsideration which he failed to do.
The Court however has to rectify the appellate court's statement in its assailed decision that even if the court were to consider the petition for relief as a motion for reconsideration, the same would be denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. [9] cralaw The assailed Order dated October 26, 1992 is interlocutory in character.As such, it cannot become final in the sense that final judgments become "final and executory", and neither would a motion for reconsideration thereof be subject to the limiting fifteen-day (15) period of appeal prescribed for in final judgments or orders. [10] cralaw
Nevertheless, the said erroneous declaration of the appellate court is not sufficient to reverse the assailed decision for reasons herein-before discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for not being sufficient in form and substance.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Annex "A", p. 18, Rollo.
[2] cralaw p. 19, Rollo.
[3] cralaw Ibid.
[4] cralaw p. 20, RoIlo.
[5] cralaw Ibid.
[6] cralaw p. 2, Petition; p. 5, RoIlo.
[7] cralaw Ibid.
[8] cralaw See Annex "A", pp. 22-23, Rollo.
[9] cralaw p. 6, Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 55839; p. 23, Rollo.
[10] cralaw Denso (Phils.), Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280 [1987], at page 287.
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