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[A.C. No. 1892.November 12, 2002]
ATTY. ARTIAGA, JR., vs. ATTY. VILLANUEVA
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 12 NOV 2002.
Adm. Case No. 1892(Atty. Luis U. Artiaga, Jr., vs. Atty. Enrique Villanueva.)
Before the Court for resolution is respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva's Motion for Leave of Court for Respondent to File Motion for Clarification dated January 9, 2002 of the Resolution of the Court dated July 7, 1989, and said Motion for Clarification.
The motion is an offshoot of the antecedental proceedings in this case, as follows:
Despite the pendency before the Court of the complaint for disbarment filed against respondent, he was appointed on February 9, 1987 as the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.
On August 11, 1988, respondent received a telegraphic transfer from the Secretary of Justice advising him to go on leave pending the outcome of the administrative complaint. Respondent complied with the directive of the Secretary of Justice and went on leave.
On July 29, 1988, the Court rendered judgment against the respondent ordering his indefinite suspension from the practice of law from date of notice thereof until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and deserved to resume the practice of law.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court and on July 7,1989, the Court issued a Resolution granting the motion of respondent and lifting respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent forthwith resumed the performance of his duties as Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Even as respondent reached the retirement age of 65, the President of the Philippines extended his term for six (6) months.
Upon his retirement from the service, respondent was not paid his basic salaries during the period of his leave from August 11, 1988 to July 1989.
By April 10, 2001, respondent was already 76 years old, suffering from asthma and bedridden. On said date, respondent pleaded to the Secretary of Justice that in view of the July 7, 1989 Resolution of the Court, coupled by his debilitating illness, he be paid his back salaries and other emoluments from August 11, 1988 to July 1989.
In a legal opinion dated October 17, 2001, the Chief State Counsel stated that the Resolution of the Court granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent and lifting his suspension from the practice of law did not exonerate him; hence, he is not entitled to the payment of his back salaries during the period of his forced leave. The Secretary of Justice concurred with the opinion of the Chief State Counsel and so informed respondent thereof.
On November 22, 2001, respondent sent a letter to the court Administrator requesting for a clarification as to whether or not, under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges filed against him. On December 4, 2001, the Court Administrator replied to the letter of respondent that he had no jurisdiction to interpret or render an opinion on decisions or resolutions of the Court.
Hence, the motion of respondent for clarification as to whether or not under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges lodged against him so as to entitle him to his back salaries and other emoluments during the period of his forced leave.
In Pedro P. Clemente vs. Commission of Audit, [1] cralaw we defined to "exonerate" thus:
"To exonerate means 'to exculpate, to relieve' (35 C.J.S., p. 227). It is 'to clear from accusation or blame' (Webster, Third New International Dictionary of the English Language). The word 'exonerate' may imply complete clearance not only from immediate charge or accusation but from suspicion or attendant denigration xxx"
It is clear from the July 7, 1989 Resolution of the Court that respondent was not exonerated from the charges in the complaint for disbarment lodged against him. Although the Court granted respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and lifted his suspension from the practice of law, it also declared that his suspension from the practice of law was sufficient disciplinary action against him:
"A careful examination of the records of the case shows that the acts of respondent may he attributed to his extreme zeal and enthusiasm in prosecuting the cause of his client. There is no proof of any dishonest motive or fraud, much less of any contemptuous act committed by him towards the courts or towards the adverse party or counsel. While the courses of action he took tended to delay the disposition of the controversy and were redundant, his suspension from the practice of law is sufficient disciplinary action against him.Moreover, there is proof that the fault cannot be attributed entirely to the respondent.Complainant and his counsel also contributed to the delay in filing Civil Case No. 183 for recovery of' possession, which is still pending appeal, and in failing to comply with the agreement to settle the dispute by arbitration. Respondent and his client Aquino were willing to settle the problem but Estolano and his counsel did not care to pursue this course, of action which could have terminated the matter once and for all.
The attestations of responsible persons in the public and private sector as to the integrity and good moral character of respondent show that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve another chance to resume the practice of law." (Underscoring supplied.)
In fine, respondent was meted the disciplinary penalty of suspension from notice of the Decision of the Court up to the issuance of the Resolution granting his Motion for Reconsideration.
It is clear from the foregoing that the issuance of the Court's Resolution dated July 11, 1989, did not exculpate respondent from the charges filed against him in the complaint for disbarment.Hence, he is not entitled to back salaries during the period of his leave of absence, in accordance with our ruling in Ricardo Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, [2] cralaw thus:
The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechem's A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:
�864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office.- An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given is "that salary and prerequisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services.
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.
x x x
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, a public school teacher who was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes. [3] cralaw
Moreover, it is evident that respondent's motion for clarification is merely an afterthought. As aforesaid, we issued our resolution granting the motion for reconsideration of the respondent as early as July 11, 1989. Respondent retired from government service sometime in 1991 and failed to receive any back salaries from the Department of Justice during the period of his leave of absence. And yet, respondent filed his motion for clarification, with the Court only on January 17, 2002, or after the lapse of well-nigh more than eleven (11) years after his retirement from the government service.
WHEREFORE , respondent's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Clarification is GRANTED and his Motion for Clarification is ADMITTED. However, the Court hereby declares that its Resolution dated July 7, 1989 granting the respondent's motion for reconsideration and lifting respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law did not exonerate him from the charges of engaging in unethical acts in the practice of his profession, but merely shortened the penalty of suspension meted on him under the Decision of the Court dated July 29, 1988. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to back salaries and other emoluments corresponding to the period of his suspension.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw 128 SCRA 297 (1984).
[2] cralaw 306 SCRA 287 (1999).
[3] cralaw Id., pp. 301, 306.
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