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G.R. No. 152309. September 18, 2002

AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 18 SEP 2002 :

G.R. No. 152309. (Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine vs. University of the Philippines Board of Regents, Francisco Nemenzo II, Emerlinda Roman, Maria Serena Diokno, Consuelo Paz, Isagani Medina, Roger Posadas, Olivia Caoili, Pacifico Agabin, Carmelita Guno and Marichu Lambino).

For consideration is a motion, dated August 21, 2002, entitled CAUSE/JUSTIFICATION WITH OMNIBUS MOTION (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DATED JULY 29, 2002 (A), MOTION TO INHIBIT THE HONORABLE JUSTICE VICENTE MENDOZA, MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE SANCTION BY SC ETHICS COMMITTEE AGAINST JUSTICE MENDOZA AND MOTION TO REFER THE CASE TO THE SC EN BANC), filed by petitioner Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.

Re: Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 29, 2002

In its resolution, dated July 29, 2002 , this Court already denied with finality for lack of merit petitioner's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RESOLUTION OF HER CASE BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT, dated May 20, 2002 . While petitioner claims that the present motion is neither a second motion for reconsideration nor a supplement to her previous motion for reconsideration, the fact remains that she is asking for a reconsideration of the Court's earlier resolution denying her petition for review. In her prayer, she seeks the following reliefs:

"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:

"1. Accept Petitioner's cause/justification why she should not be cited in contempt for certain statements she has made in her letters and in previous pleadings;

"2. Inhibit the Honorable Justice Vicente Mendoza from Further Proceedings of the Case;

"3. Refer the Matter to the SC Ethics Committee for Appropriate Sanction against Justice Mendoza;

"4. Refer the Case to the SC En Banc for adjudication on the merits of the case, to Reconsider the Resolution (a) dated July 29, 2002, and eventually to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to order the U.P. to release Petitioner's doctoral diploma, and to refer the case back to the RTC for continuation of the proceedings on damages.

"Other remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for." [1] cralaw

The present motion is thus a second motion for reconsideration. As such it should be denied outright pursuant to Rule 52, Section 2, in relation to Rule 56, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained."

All the more the present motion should be denied because the arguments set forth therein are the same ones already raised in petitioner's first motion for reconsideration dated May 20, 2002 , arguments which were found by this Court to be without merit.

First . Petitioner reiterates her contention that the provision for payment of sheriff's fee and clerk's Commission applies only "in cases where the injunction is issued by this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction."

Payment of sheriff's fees and clerk's commission, in addition to the docket fee and the other lawful fees, is required when, as here, a party appealing seeks an injunctive relief. Revised Circular No. 1-88 (effective July 1, 1991), par. 1 (c) of this Court is explicit on this point, and the failure to pay the fees in question warrants the dismissal of a petition under Rule 56, Section 5 (c) of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Subsequent payment, as provided in par. 5 of the said circular, will not cure the defect.

Second . Petitioner failed to attach to her petition in the Court of Appeals her petition for mandamus and the comment of U.P. which had been filed in the RTC, Branch 104, Quezon City. For this reason the Court of Appeals correctly denied her petition. Petitioner contends that the RTC decision appended to her petition was sufficient to comply with the requirement of Rule 42, Section 2 because that decision contains the material portions of the record. According to her, "if this Court could decide (without the mandamus petition and the comments thereon) on the merits of the case, why could the Court of Appeals not do/say the same (since both petitions in G.R. No. 147888 and 152309 contain the same materials)?"

This Court found the petition in this case to be without merit precisely because it was insufficient in form and substance. In any event, the requirement to append a copy of the pleadings filed below to a petition for review is a requirement of Rule 42, Sections 2 and 3 thereof, which provide that noncompliance with these requirements, as to "the form and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition," is a ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Third . Petitioner claims that the present case is based on a different cause of action because "the corpus delicti has now been acknowledged as a thesis of UP. Diliman" and "is [being used as] a resource material for the UP. Community in the field of history"; that the Court, in avoiding this material fact, did not comment on that portion of the RTC decision authorizing her to sue UP. for damages such that "if [she] can be entitled to damages, why can she not be entitled to her degree?"; that "even granting that the factual findings in G.R. No. 134625 (that petitioner plagiarized her thesis) was sustained in the second action of petitioner against UP., the acknowledgment of the said thesis as a 'thesis of UP. Diliman' and the usage of the same as a reference material for the UP. community, indicates that plagiarism is the standard of U.P., and that, . . . the respondents are merely being academic hypocrite[e]s or scholastic pretenders in refusing to grant petitioner her due."

The question of plagiarism was laid to rest in G.R. No. 134625 and the RTC, Branch 104 appropriately dismissed the mandamus suit under the principle of res judicata. As such, the issue can no longer be relitigated, not to mention that whether, as alleged, petitioner's thesis is used in UP. as a reference book is a question of fact which is subject to proof. Petitioner's references to "plagiarism {as} the standard of UP., and that . . . the respondents are merely being academic hypocrites or scholastic pretenders are deplorable in the case of a candidate for a doctoral degree.

Fourth . Petitioner also insists that the title "Dr." should not be removed from the caption of this case citing as reasons that the Court appears to have acquiesced in her continued use of the title as it "was sustained in the first resolution" {dated April 1, 2002} of this Court; that U.P. had recognized her right to the degree because a copy of the U.P. Newsletter mailed to her added the title "Ph.D" to her name; and that "this Court ha{d} not stated (in the second resolution dated July 29, 2002) anything against petitioner's using her doctoral title."

Petitioner was allowed to graduate with the doctoral degree in anthropology subject to the outcome of the plagiarism charge against her. As she was found guilty thereof, her degree was accordingly withdrawn. Consequently, she cannot use the title "Dr." or the degree "Ph.D." to her name in the pleadings she files before this Court and in other courts or tribunals for that matter. Her use of the title or degree cannot ripen into a right.

Indeed, so as not to give the impression that the Court had acknowledged petitioner's right to use such title, Joseph Bryan Hilary P. Davide, Chief Justice's Staff Head, in a letter to petitioner, dated August 7, 2002 , wrote her:

7 August 2002

Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine

70 C. Salvador Street, LoyolaHeights

1108 span style='font-size:8.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Quezon City

Ms. Celine,

"This refers to our letter of 3 August 2002 .

"Our attention has been called to the fact that the Second Division has denied on 29 July 2002 your motion for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing your petition for review as well as your motion to require the members of the Second Division, individually, to resolve the motion. In addition, it required you to show cause why you should not be punished for contempt for statements contained in your two letters addressed to the Chief Justice.

"Considering the action of the Second Division and the previous cases relative to your alleged doctoral degree, we hereto withdraw the title 'Dr.' and the term 'Ph.D in our greeting in our letter of 3 August. You are warned not to use that letter as a recognition of a right to the Ph.D. degree. Henceforth, all your communication, if any, shall be addressed to the Second Division of the Court.

Truly yours,

For the Chief Justice

(Sgd.) JOSEPH BRYAN HILARY P. DAVIDE"

Re: Motion to Refer the Case to the SC En Banc

Petitioner seeks the referral of this case to the Court en banc for resolution stating that:

"Petitioner is of the opinion that the SC Second Division could not rule in favor of Petitioner in the second action even if it is based on a different cause of action, because it had decided the first case (in G.R. No. 134625) against her. If this II Division is bound by its previous ruling in G.R. No. 134625, regardless of the subsequent turn of events in the relations between the petitioner and the respondents, then, Petitioner would like to request that the case be referred to the SC En Banc.

"At any rate, as per the resolutions of the Honorable Supreme Court, it is the En Banc which can modify or reverse a doctrine or principle laid down by a Division, to wit:

"The following are considered en banc cases

xxx

"7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or division may be modified or reversed;

xxx

(SC En Banc Resolution dated Nov. 18, 1993 )

"Hence, petitioner requests that this case be immediately referred to the SC En Banc for adjudication on the merits, (Even when it is referred to the En Banc, the Honorable Justice Mendoza should not participate in this case.)" [2] cralaw

As stated in Circular No. 2-89 (effective March 1, 1989), par. 3 of this Court, the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. Cases are referred either to the Court en banc or to the different divisions according to the nature of the case and the questions raised therein. Petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, like the one at bar, are referred to the Divisions. Decisions rendered by the Court, whether en banc or through any of its divisions, represent the decisions of the Supreme Court itself.

Re: Motion to Inhibit Justice Vicente Mendoza from Further Proceedings and Motion to Refer the Matter to the SC Ethics Committee for Appropriate Sanction against Justice Mendoza

Petitioner alleges that:

"In G.R. No. 134625, Justice Mendoza reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals (granting the Petition for Mandamus) even before the U.P.'s Petition for Review was given the course. Now, without even asking the U.P. to comment on the Petition filed by Petitioner, he has dismissed it on untrue grounds.

"When a Motion for Reconsideration is filed against a Decision, said motion is either denied or granted on the basis of the contents of the same Decision. However, to deny Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration against the resolution dated April 1, 2002, Justice Mendoza has stated (in the resolution dated July 29, 2002) some reasons other than what were laid in the April 1 resolution.

"The Honorable Justice Mendoza has deliberately misquoted and suppressed the facts and issues of the case, and even the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. He has also misrepresented petitioner's statements with regard to payment of docket fees.

"In this situation, Petitioner does not believe that the Honorable Justice Mendoza could objectively resolve the instant pleading hence, she seeks his immediate inhibition from the case. Earlier, Petitioner had sought the individual resolution of her MR. dated May 20, 2002 because she was not very sure who the 'writer of the decision' was. Now, from the 'style of the writings', Petitioner is convinced that the ponente in the instant case is the same as the one in G.R. No. 134625. Hence, the request for the exclusion of the said Honorable Justice.

"Since Petitioner believes that the resolution dated July 29, 2002 contains untrue statements and deliberate misrepresentation of facts and issues (in order to arrive at a negative decision against her), she also requests that the matter be referred to the SC Ethics Committee {for} appropriate sanction against Justice Mendoza.

"Petitioner also requests that she be not cited in contempt of this Court for this motion, because she is only being articulate about the realities of life and is fighting for justice for herself.

"At this point, Petitioner would like to report to this Honorable Supreme Court about the developments of the administrative case she instituted at the Office of the Ombudsman against the respondents:

Petitioner's Complaint, to which only the RTC Decision was attached, was 'Dismissed for Lack of Merit' (and not for the 'deficiencies') by Graft Investigating Officers Vitaliano Mendoza and Julita Calderon. So, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with Motion to Inhibit Vitaliano Mendoza and Julita Calderon.

"Since Petitioner pointed out anomalies and irregularities on the part of the aforementioned investigators, the Honorable Ombudsman Aniano Desierto granted the inhibition of Vitaliano Mendoza and Julita Calderon, and created a 3 men {sic} panel to examine the allegations of petitioner (Annex 'J').

"Petitioner hopes that the Honorable Justice Vicente Mendoza would be inhibited from further handling her case." [3] cralaw

The resolutions in this case are per cur/am. They do not bear any authorship and they therefore cannot be attributed to any member. Hence, the motion for inhibition of Justice Mendoza and the motion for appropriate sanctions against him are both denied for lack of any factual and legal basis. Based on her assumption that Justice Mendoza is likewise the author of the resolutions in this case as in the prior case (G.R. No. 134625), petitioner's idea of a fair decision or resolution appears to be one that is rendered in her favor. It would seem that any decision or resolution that is not in her favor is biased. While a party litigant may file a motion for disqualification of a member of the Court, the same must be based on justifiable grounds and not on unfounded and malicious imputations aimed at casting aspersions on the dignity and integrity of a member.

In her letter dated May 22, 2002, to the Chief Justice, petitioner stated: "I am not sure if Justice Mendoza is again the ponente (who described me as 'fraud', 'dishonest', etc. in G.R. No. 134625), the latest resolution makes me suspect that Justice Mendoza could have denied my new petition in order to save his face or to save the face of the U.P. or both."

This statement is both malicious and false. The use of the words "fraud" and "dishonest" was in the context of the decision in G.R. No. 134625, based on the results of several investigations conducted by the various committees of the University of the Philippines, as the following portion of the decision in that case shows:

"As the foregoing narration of facts this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D degree. (Emphasis supplied) [4] cralaw

". . . If an institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

"Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the 'graduation' of such a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the 'graduation' of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993 , it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate." (Emphasis supplied) [5] cralaw

There was no specific reference to petitioner but to the general grounds upon which a university, and not only U.P., may cancel or revoke a degree it has granted.

In an attempt to justify her motion for the inhibition of Justice Mendoza and her contemptuous language, petitioner further states:

"In her letters and in the MR., Petitioner has not said anything new. In an effort to make sure that the 'unpleasant past happenings' do not get repeated, Petitioner only reiterated certain statements which she had said at least two years ago, and which have not been protested or condemned by either the Honorable Justice Mendoza or any other member of this Court.

"On April 27, 2000 , Petitioner filed (in G.R. No. 134625) a motion to inhibit Justice Mendoza {Annex 'A'} from handling her motion to reopen the case. In the said motion, Petitioner pointed out that 'Justice Mendoza - being a former UP. Diliman University Council which voted to withdraw petitioner's Doctorate, as well as the husband of Thelma Lee-Mendoza who was a member of the same Council until the outcome of the SC Decision in G.R. No. 134625 - should have the delicadeza to voluntarily inhibit himself.' Pointing out that Justice Mendoza had found 'factual errors' in the Court of Appeals' Decision although the U.P. had appealed that said decision only on 'errors of law', Petitioner also stated (in the Motion to Inhibit Justice Mendoza) that she 'cannot have any further trust that he would do justice in resolving her Motion for Reopening.' Petitioner further said in the inhibition motion, 'the decision (in G.R. No. 134625) seems to have been penned by a representative of the U.P. Administration.' Said motion was published by the Manila Standard on May 2, 2000 [Annex 'B']. But no member of this Court, not even Justice Mendoza, said anything against those statements.

"On June 15, 2000 , in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice [Annex 'C'], copy furnished to the II Division, Petitioner stated, 'Justice Mendoza considers himself as part of the UP. System and he has committed himself to dispense the case against me to the extent of subverting the facts of the case.' The Honorable Chief Justice referred the said letter to the SC Second Division for appropriate action [Annex 'D']. But nothing was said by the II Division against it.

"When Petitioner filed with this Court the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 147888, she sought the inhibition of Justice Mendoza and she pointed out the foregoing facts. She further stated that 'the Motion to Reopen was denied on an allegation that the Entry of Judgment was made on November 16, 1999 when actually such entry was made only on March 20, 2000 as per Notice of Entry of Judgment from the SC Judgment Division' [Annex 'E']. The resolution denying the Motion to Reopen and the notice of entry of judgment are hereto attached as Annexes 'F' & 'G', respectively.

"Since neither Justice Mendoza nor any other member of the SC had expressed any negative reaction against the various allegations of Petitioner against him, she was convinced that those allegations have entirely been admitted (as true) by this Court and by Justice Mendoza himself.

"In writing the subject statements, petitioner did not definitely show any ill will against Justice Mendoza, and she only tried to protect her interest in the litigation." [6] cralaw

Justice Mendoza, while once a member of the faculty of the U.P.College of Law, was never a member of the University Council of U.P. which conducted the investigations of the plagiarism charge against her. His wife, Professor Thelma L. Mendoza, of the U.P.College of Social Work and Community Development, was once a member of the University Council, but she never sat therein when petitioner's case came before that august assembly. In the prior case (G.R. No. 134625), the motion to reopen the case and to inhibit Justice Mendoza on the same ground now invoked by petitioner was expunged from the records per resolution, dated June 14, 2000, of this Court, which read,

"The motions of respondent for the reopening of the case and for the inhibition of Justice Vicente Mendoza from the disposition of her motion for reopening are EXPUNGED from the records of this case, the case having been decided on 31 August 1999 , entry of judgment made on 16 November 1999 and the records remanded on 20 March 2000 . Besides, the Court has stated in the resolution of 08 December 1999 that no further pleadings or motion shall be entertained in this case."

The effect was to disregard the petitioner's motion as not filed and, hence, it was not to be acted upon by the Court. This is why it became unnecessary to pass upon petitioner's allegation that Justice Mendoza was disqualified from the consideration of the first case because he had acted on the matter as a member of the University Council of U.P.

Re: Petitioner's Compliance with the Resolution of July 29, 2002 (b) Requiring her to Show Cause Why She Should not be Cited for Contempt of this Court

In its resolution, dated July 29, 2002 (b), the Court required petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why she should not be held in contempt of this Court for the contemptuous language and threat contained in her letters of May 22, 2002 and July 11, 2002, to the Chief Justice.

Petitioner now says:

"Petitioner has very high regard and respect for the Honorable Supreme Court and she has been confident to get Justice from this High Court, for which reason she filed two petitions (docketed as G.R. No. 147888 and G.R. No. 152309) here. It is only the Honorable Justice Vicente Mendoza in whom Petitioner has been disappointed because of the way he has handled her case - very negative against her.

"In her letters addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice and in her Motion for Reconsideration dated May 20, 2002, what Petitioner has said are meant for Justice Mendoza only and not for any other member of this Court. If the other Justices have been offended by those 'statements' of Petitioners, she sincerely apologizes for the same.

"If Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated May 20, 2002 had been resolved in her favor, she would have felt sorry for having said that Justice Mendoza has been biased against her. But, indeed, the new resolution (denying the MR. dated May 20, 2002 ) even strengthens Petitioner's allegations against Justice Mendoza. So, on the same ground Petitioner is also hereto filing a Motion for Reconsideration (against the said Resolution) with Motion to Inhibit Justice Mendoza and to Refer the Matter to the SC Ethics Committee for Appropriate Sanction against him." [7] cralaw

This Court finds petitioner's explanation to be unsatisfactory. The Court cannot tolerate petitioner's use of vituperative language suggesting that Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the ponente in the first case (G.R. No. 134625), was moved by considerations other than that of upholding justice and the rule of law. As this Court ruled in In re Almacen, [8] cralaw "undeniably the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistent with the intrinsic nature of a Collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office."

Indeed, what petitioner does not seem to know is that the opinions written by members of the Court are actually decisions of the Court. Hence, we speak of "decisions of the Court written by Mr. Justice so-and-so" because, although written by a member of the Court, they are in actuality the decisions of the Court. In this connection, Art. VIII, Section 13 provides that "The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court."

Nor can petitioner justify the use of contemptuous language on the ground that the Court did not censure her or take any action against her when she made the same allegations in her pleadings and letters in G.R. No. 134625. As already stated, no action was taken against her before because the offensive language was contained in a pleading which had been expunged. Moreover, to the Court then the petitioner's bitterness was due to the understandable feeling of losing a case. The Court hoped that in time petitioner would see her way clear and accept the decision against her. Unfortunately, however, petitioner has mistaken the Court's tolerant attitude as an invitation to commit further abuse against the Court and one of its members.

Nor can petitioner justify her attack on the ground that "what said are meant for Justice Mendoza only"; that she had no intention to offend the other justices of this Court; and that had the resolution been issued in her favor, "she would have felt sorry for having said that Justice Mendoza been biased against her." As already explained, an attack on the person of any member of this Court is an attack on the integrity of the entire Court. [9] cralaw In at least two recent decisions, [10] cralaw attacks on individual members of this Court and of the Court of Appeals were considered attacks on the Courts concerned and punished as contempt of these Courts.

More recently, in In re Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera, [11] cralaw a member of the Bar was fined P20,000.00 for contempt of this Court for statements made in a pending case. It was held that maintaining the dignity of the courts and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice. Thus, Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.

Finally, petitioner explains that "she is only being articulate about the realities of life and is fighting for justice for herself." Freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court's integrity and authority and interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and it must be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. [12] cralaw One does not need to be a lawyer to know this. In any event, petitioner has not in reality engaged in the free exercise of freedom of expression but in abuse and slander, for which she should be sanctioned. A fine of P10,000.00 is appropriate for this purpose.

WHEREFORE , the Court RESOLVED to:

(a)������ DENY the Motion for Reconsideration praying for the reconsideration of the Court's resolution, dated July 29, 2002 , for being a prohibited pleading. No further pleadings will be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course;

(b)������ DENY the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc for lack of merit;

(c)������� DENY the motion to inhibit Justice Vicente V. Mendoza from participating in the deliberations of the present case for lack of factual and legal basis;

(d)������ DENY the motion for appropriate sanction against Justice Vicente V. Mendoza by this Court for lack of factual and legal basis; and

(e)������ DENY petitioner's use of the title "Dr." and "Ph.D." in her pleadings in this case.

Petitioner Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is found GUILTY of contempt of court and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd) TOMASITA M. DRIS

Clerk of Court


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw RoIIo, p. 149.

[2] cralaw Id., pp. 148-149.

[3] cralaw Id., pp. 147-148.

[4] cralaw University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 404, 421 (1999).

[5] cralaw Id., pp. 423-424.

[6] cralaw Rollo, pp. 136-137.

[7] cralaw Id., pp. 135-136.

[8] cralaw 31 SCRA 562, 601 (1970) citing Sarcos vs. Castillo, 26 SCRA 853 (1969).

[9] cralaw See In re Almacen, supra.

[10] cralaw MichaeI T. Vistan vs. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, AM. No. RTJ-02-1672, February 26, 2002 (Min. Res.); United BF Homeowners vs. Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, 343 SCRA 162 (2000). See also In re Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 (1995); In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 383 (1987).

[11] cralaw A.M. No, 01-12-03-SC, July 29, 2002 .

[12] cralaw Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316, 354 (1988).


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