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[G.R. No. 144476.
YONG vs. TIU
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEP 17 2003.
G.R. No. 144476(Ong Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson T. Ong, Anna L. Ong, William T. Ong, Willie T. Ong and Julie Ong Alonzo, petitioners, vs. David S. Tiu, Cely Y. Tiu, Moly Yu Gaw, Belen See Yu, D. Terence Y. Tiu, John Yu, Lourdes C. Tiu, Intraland Resources Development Corp., Masagana Telamart, Inc., Register Of Deeds Of Pasay City, And The Securities And Exchange Commission, respondents.)
G.R. No. 144629(David S. Tiu, Cely Y. Tiu, Moly Yu Gaw, Belen See Yu, D. Terence Y. Tiu, John Yu, Lourdes C. Tiu and Intraland Sources Development Corp., petitioners, versus Ong Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson T. Ong, Anna L. Ong, William T. Ong, Willie T. Ong and Julia Ong Alonzo, respondents.)
Before us are the motions for reconsideration, with prayer to refer the consolidated cases to the Supreme Court en banc of our April 8, 2003 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 144629 and 144476, filed on May 13, 2003 by movants Tius, [1] cralaw Intraland Resources Development Corporation [2] cralaw and Masagana Telamart, Inc. [3] cralaw (the Tiu group).
In our July 23, 2003 Resolution, we required the Ong group, the petitioners in G.R. No. 144476 and respondents in G.R. No. 144629, to comment on the Tiu group's motions for reconsideration with prayer to refer the case to the Court en banc. However, prior to the receipt of the Court's July 23, 2003 Resolution, petitioners/respondents Ongs already filed, on July 29, 2003, an opposition to the Tius' MR with prayer to refer the case to the en banc. The Ong group then merely adopted their July 29, 2003 opposition as their comment.
Granting the prayer of the Tiu group, the Special Second Division referred these cases, on July 15, 2003, to the Court en banc which, however, ordered their return to the said Division.
Thus, the only matter that remains for resolution now are the motions for reconsideration of the Tiu group.
We deny the motions.
Movants insist that the pre-subscription agreement can be validly rescinded pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code since the law does not preclude the rescission of a subscription contract. They vehemently deny that they were guilty of substantial breach of the pre-subscription agreement and insist that it is the Ong group which violated their contract.
The Court finds that these are mere reiterations of previous arguments already fully considered and discussed in the Court's April 8, 2003 Resolution. The points raised in the instant motions for reconsideration do not present any new and substantial arguments not yet invoked, considered or passed upon by the Court.
Movants further argue that the subject Resolution was void for violating Section 2 of Administrative Matter No. 99-8-09-SC (Re: Rules on Who Shall Resolve Motions for Reconsideration in Cases Assigned to the Divisions of the Court) promulgated on February 15, 2000.
A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC provides that the resolution of a motion for reconsideration shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision sought to be reconsidered. If the ponente is no longer available, he shall be replaced by another justice who shall be chosen by raffle from among the remaining members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution and who concurred therein.
In the case at bar, movants point out that the members of the Division when the original decision was rendered on February 1, 2002 were Associate Justices Josue Bellosillo, Leonardo Quisumbing, Vicente Mendoza (retired), Sabino de Leon, Jr. (deceased) and Arturo Buena (retired). But instead of assigning the writing of the subject resolution to Associate Justices Bellosillo, Mendoza (prior to his retirement) or Quisumbing in accordance with A.M. 99-8-09-SC, Associate Justice Renato Corona (who was not yet a member of the Division when it rendered the decision) was designated to write the same. Thus, the Resolution was void, according to movants.
These cases were originally raffled to then Associate Justice Arturo Buena, the ponente of the Second Division's Decision dated February 1, 2002. The Division, however, was unable to resolve the motions for reconsideration thereof as of the retirement of Justice Buena on March 25, 2002. On April 9, 2002, Associate Justice Renato Corona was appointed to fill the vacancy created by Justice Buena's retirement. In accordance with the standing practice of the Court, all cases assigned to Justice Buena were transferred to Justice Corona, then the newest member of the Second Division. These cases included G.R. 144476 (Ong et al. vs. Tiu et al.) and G.R. 166629 (Tiu et al. vs. Ong et al.) and the unresolved motions for reconsideration therein.
On September 1, 2002, the entire Court was reorganized and Justice Corona moved to the Third Division. Again, in accordance with the practice of the Court, these two cases continued to be part of his caseload but, because they were cases of the Second Division, a Special Second Division was formed composed of Justices Bellosillo, Mendoza (who retired on April 4, 2003), Quisumbing, Corona and, sometime later, Romeo Callejo.
From the time he took over the two cases therefore, Justice Corona was the one who extensively reviewed and studied the facts, issues and other incidents involved. In addition, on January 29, 2003, the Division held oral arguments during which both sides were represented by batteries of lawyers and all the issues were thoroughly discussed, ventilated and argued. In effect, the oral arguments threw the issues in these two cases wide open for review from beginning to end. Never was the issue of the ponente ever raised or touched upon by any of the parties.
Did the failure to strictly comply with A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC therefore result in a void decision, as claimed by the Tiu group? We do not think so.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is empowered to:
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(5)������������� Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. xxx [4] cralaw
Among the limitations to our rule-making power is that substantive rights must not be diminished, increased or modified by any rule promulgated by this Court. [5] cralaw
In the exercise of this rule-making power, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC:
"Rules On Who Shall Resolve Motions For Reconsideration
In Cases Assigned To The Divisions Of The Court
The following supplemental rules on who shall take part in resolving motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions promulgated by Divisions are hereby adopted:
1.� Motions for reconsideration of a decision or of a signed resolution shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other members of the Division, whether special or regular, who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution sought to be reconsidered, irrespective of whether or not such members are already in other divisions at the time the motion for reconsideration is filed or acted upon; for this purpose, they shall be deemed constituted as a special division of the division to which the ponente belonged at the time of promulgation of the decision or the signed resolution.
2.� If the ponente is no longer a member of the Court or is disqualified or has inhibited himself from acting on the motion, he shall be replaced by another Justice who shall be chosen by raffle from among the remaining members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution and who concurred therein. If only one member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or resolution remains, he shall be designated as the ponente.
3.� Any vacancy or vacancies in the special Division shall be filled or raffled from among the members of the Court to constitute a special division of five (5) members.
4.� If the ponente and all the members of the Division that rendered the decision or resolution are no longer members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him with the participation of the other members of the Division to which he belongs. Should the membership of this Division be less than the number required for a special division, the vacancy or vacancies shall be filled by raffle from among the other members of the Court.
5.� Motions for reconsideration shall be resolved by the Division with the concurrence of at least three of its members."
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the rule is merely procedural, the main purpose behind it being to facilitate the resolution of motions for reconsideration. By assigning a particular MR for study and drafting of resolution to one of the division members who participated in the rendition of the decision sought to be reconsidered, the motion can expectedly be disposed of with depth and greater efficiency and dispatch. Obviously, the fundamental rationale is the thorough familiarity of the resolution-writer with the facts, issues and over-all perspective of the case.
In determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive, we said that:
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but If it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure (emphasis ours). [6] cralaw
A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC merely provides for the procedure on how motions for reconsiderations shall be resolved. No additional rights are granted nor any taken away. We are thus unable to accept movant's argument that the failure to strictly comply with such rule results in a void judgment. Besides, this Court can deviate from procedural rules which are not founded on Public policy and when no substantial injury is caused to any of the parties, particularly when such deviation tends to achieve a morespeedy and just administration of justice. [7] cralaw
Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and neither substantive nor jurisdictional, movants have not shown in what general or specific manner they were prejudiced by the proceedings of the Special Second Division.There is furthermore absolutely no showing that, in the process of arriving at our said Resolution of April 8, 2003, the Tiu group's right to procedural due process was violated.
Under Section 4, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution, [8] cralaw three requirements must be met before a Supreme Court Division's decision or resolution can be considered valid:
(1)������������� a Division of five associate justices is deemed constituted for deliberation only if there is a quorum of three members;
(2)������������� in arriving at a decision or resolution, at least three members who participated in the actual deliberation must have concurred therewith and
(3)������������� the decision or resolution shall be written by a member who actually participated in the deliberations on the issue.
In this way, the parties' right to procedural due process is effectively respected and recognized. They are therefore mandatory requirements to afford due process to the parties concerned.
Given the foregoing, the movants Tiu group cannot complain of violation of their right to procedural due process because all the constitutional requirements for the rendition of the subject April 8, 2003 Resolution were met: (1) four out of the five members of the Special Second Division were present during the deliberations, namely, Associate Justices Josue Bellosillo, Leonardo Quisumbing, Renato Corona and Romeo Callejo; (2) the four members present unanimously came up with a resolution on the issues of the case and (3) Associate Justice Renato Corona, the ponente, participated fully not only in the deliberations of the division but also in the oral arguments on January 29, 2003. Thus, we hold that the right to procedural due process of movants Tius and Masagana Telamart, Inc. has not been violated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions for reconsideration of the Tiu group dated May 13, 2003 are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY as all basic issues have been passed upon and no new substantial matters have been raised to justify a reversal of our April 8, 2003 Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B.
MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Petitioners in GR No. 144629 /Respondents in GR 144476.
[2] cralaw Petitioners in GR No. 144629 /Respondents in GR 144476.
[3] cralaw Respondent in G.R. No. 144476.
[4] cralaw Article VIII, Sec. 5 (5).
[5] cralaw Ibid.
[6] cralaw Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 [1998].
[7] cralaw Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo , 28 SCRA 890 [1969], citing Ordeveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 [1936].
[8] cralaw Cases or Matters heard by a Division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
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