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[A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1524-MTJ.
FERCOL vs. MORALLOS
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1524-MTJ (Erlinda Fercol vs. Judge Jose P. Morallos and Sheriff III Benjamin Cabusao, Jr., Branch 68, MeTC, Pasig City.)
Considering the Report dated
The instant administrative complaint emanated from an action for ejectment that was instituted by Ms. Maribeth Cabusao Gavino, daughter of Sheriff Cabusao, against the herein complainant.
Records show that the complainant is a market vendor and lessee/stall holder of Stall No. 25 at the Fruit and Vegetable Plaza, Caruncho Market Complex, Malinao, Pasig City. The stall is located in the property owned by Mr. Gerry Chua. Complainant Fercol claims that she has been leasing the said stall from Mr. Chua for more than fifteen years already at the rate of P100.00 a day or P3,000.00 a month.
The complainant contends that sometime in the latter part of October 2002, she received a notice from a certain Maribeth Cabusao Gavino, allegedly the Assistant Administration Officer of the Pasig Fruits and Vegetable Plaza, increasing the rent of her stall from P100.00 to P150.00 a day. Other stall holders leasing their premises from Mr. Chua likewise received the same notice. To clarify the matter, the complainant and the other stall holders approached Mr. Chua to inquire about the rental increase. Mr. Chua allegedly informed them that a certain group led by respondent Sheriff Cabusao was interested in getting the leased property. Since Mr. Chua allegedly wanted to avoid involvement in any dispute over the subject premises, he requested the Vendor's Association to consign or deposit the rentals in a bank in trust for him.
The complainant likewise claims that when she and the other stall holders met with Mr. Chua, the latter did not advise them of any contract of lease which he executed in favor of any 3rd party. Mr. Chua also allegedly told them that he was not the one demanding the increase of rental fees. He however admitted that Ms. Cabusao-Gavino was working for the Jellicom Manpower and Transport Services (Jellicom) which is owned by her father, Sheriff Cabusao.
Sometime in the last week of December 2002, Maribeth
Cabusao-Gavino filed a complaint with the Office of
the Barangay of Malinao,
Pasig City, for non-payment of rental fees/ejectment
against the President of the Pasig Fruits and Vegetable Vendors Association,
Inc. and its members, including the herein complainant. Not having reached any
agreement, a Certificate to File Action in Court was thereafter issued by the Lupon Secretary on
On
a)� two (2) cases were raffled to Branch 68 of the Pasig MetroTC where Sheriff Cabusao is assigned and where respondent Judge Morallos is acting as its presiding judge;
b)� three (3) cases (including the case against Fercol) were raffled to Branch 70, respondent judge's regular branch where he sits as presiding judge;
c)� another three (3) cases were raffled to Branch 72;
d)� one (1) case was raffled to Branch 71; and
e)� the remaining two (2) cases were raffled to Branch 69.
On
Complainant Fercol appealed the decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court. She also filed the instant complaint claiming that Judge Morallos committed the following "crimes":
1)� Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in violation of Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC);
2)� Causing undue injury to her by giving Sheriff Cabusao, through Maribeth C. Gavino, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in violation of Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 3019 (also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); and
3)� Estafa by means of "Other Deceits" in violation of Art. 318 of the RPC when he abetted the fraudulent second lease contract in favor of Sheriff Cabusao.
Complainant Fercol also alleges that Judge Morallos, Gerry Chua and Sheriff Cabusao are civilly liable to her for damages when:
1.� They obstructed, impeded, and impaired her right to the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises in violation of Art. 32 (h) of the New Civil Code (NCC);
2.� Wrongfully interfered in her business trade or calling amounting to unlawful deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines;
3.� Cabusao induced Gerry Chua to violate the lease agreement of the latter with Fercol in violation of Art. 1314 of the NCC;
4.� Gerry Chua willfully breached his obligation as lessor to maintain Fercol in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises which she has been occupying for the last 15 years; and
5.� They violated Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court.
The complainant likewise administratively charges Judge Morallos with -
1.� Violation of Art. 1409 (1) of the New Civil Code which provides that contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning;
2.� Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended;
3.� Violation of Art. 32 of the NCC;
4.� Violation of Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution;
5.� Violation of Art. 1409 of the NCC;
6.� Violation of Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court; and
7.� Violation of A.O. No. 162 providing for the "Canons of Judicial Ethics," more specifically:
a.� Rule 1.01 - a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence;
b.� Rule 1.02 - a judge should administer justice with impartiality and without delay (Canon 1); and
c.� Rule 3.01 - a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
The complainant includes only general allegations against Sheriff Cabusao. She does not specify acts of the sheriff which constitute any administrative offense.
EVALUATION:
The instant complaint was brought against both Judge Jose P. Morallos and Sheriff Benjamin Cabusao, Jr.
A careful reading of the Complaint-Affidavit shows that it neither alleges nor describes any particular act or omission on the part of Cabusao that amounts to any administrative offense. The fact that he is the sheriff in Branch 68 where Judge Morallos is acting as presiding judge does not constitute an administrative violation. In the first place, the ejectment case against Fercol was not even raffled to Branch 68. Additionally, the circumstance that Judge Morallos acts as presiding judge in Sheriff Cabusao's branch does not by itself establish any collusion between them. Moreover, the complainant has not disputed the presumption of regularity in the rendition of the subject decision as herein later discussed.
Sheriff Cabusao's act of entering into a contract with Gerry Chua, by itself, is not actionable, absent any showing that he used or abused his position as Sheriff in the execution of such contract. The records are however bereft of any proof that there was such an abuse. Consequently, insofar as Sheriff Cabusao is concerned, we find no reason to hold him administratively liable.
We likewise find baseless the administrative charges against Judge Morallos. The respondent judge rendered the decision in question in the exercise of his judicial functions. The mere fact that he was acting as presiding judge in the sala where Sheriff Cabusao is assigned is not sufficient ground to establish any irregularity in the said decision. The appropriate remedy for the complainant - which records show she has already taken - is to question the said decision on appeal and await the resolution thereof.
Additionally, even if the respondent judge has committed an error of judgment, he still may not be administratively charged for such error absent any showing of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose. (Dela Cruz vs. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 596, citing the Court's resolutions in A.M. Nos. 93-8-1204-RTC and RTJ-93-978, 7 February 1994.)
We have no reason to entertain the statements of the complainant that the respondent judge violated certain provisions of the RPC. The general allegations impute the commission of crimes, and, under our laws and rules, such charges should be filed with the appropriate prosecution office as well as charged and proven with the required evidence in the courts. There is no basis to consider these general allegations of criminal acts in the instant administrative case.
The complainant also charges Judge Morallos of causing her undue injury by giving Cabusao and Gavino unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The fact that Judge Morallos' decision was in favor of Cabusao's company, Jellicom, does not prove that he has given Cabusao any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. Neither does it show evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. A general allegation is not sufficient to establish wrongdoing, especially so if the charges constitute criminal acts. Fercol must substantiate her allegations of wrongdoing. This, however, she has failed to do.
Administrative charges against judges should not be taken lightly. Their duties are burdensome enough without them contending with administrative cases that are intended to harass them. They should be protected from malicious attacks, especially from baseless ones filed by disgruntled litigants.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a judge may not be administratively liable for every erroneous decision or order he renders. As held by the Court in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo (241 SCRA 405), "Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence, it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith."
A contrary ruling would make the judge's position unbearable and would smack of harassment, "for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment" (Ibid.). For a judge to warrant disciplinary sanction, the error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith. These elements are however lacking in the instant case.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the instant administrative complaint against both Judge Jose P. Morallos and Sheriff III Benjamin Cabusao, Jr., of Branch 68 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Pasig City be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
and finding the evaluation and recommendation thereon to be in accord with law and the facts of the case, the Court approves and adopts the same.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaints against Judge Jose P. Morallos and Sheriff III Benjamin Cabusao, Jr. are DISMISSED .
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
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