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SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J. :
Simple and uncomplicated though the issue which it presents, the case at bar is remarkable in being charged with unintended ironies. It provides Congress as the National Board of Canvassers, without its prior design and without being made a party, 1 the staging moment to secure the judicial imprimatur of constitutionality and legitimacy 2 for the proceedings of its creation, the Joint Committee of Congress To Canvass, which was haled to this Court although it is devoid of legal personality independent of its creator . 3
The petition posits in the main that the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee is invalid and unconstitutional following the alleged adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on 11 June 2004. The argument is plainly puerile, as it exhibits a fundamental misappreciation of the nature and role of the National Board of Canvassers, as well as the life of Congress itself.
Congress simply cannot will itself into or out of being. Neither can it abandon its canvassing task. These existential truths, derived no less from the textual and historical perspectives of the Constitution, dictate the outright dismissal of the petition.
The Textual Perspective
The textual command of the Constitution is clear. The authority to canvass bestowed by the Constitution is separate and apart from its legislative function. The special task which is canvassing is administrative in nature, while the regular function of law-making is of course legislative in character. Hence, while the legislative function is delineated under Article VI 4 of the Constitution governing the Legislative Department, the canvassing authority is delegated under the next Article 5 on the Executive Department.
Thus, when Congress meets in "joint public session" 6 as the National Board of Canvassers or delegates the preliminary canvass to the Joint Committee, it does not function in the exercise of its legislative authority; rather, it operates in a different constitutionally mandated capacity. Consequently, the effective duration of the canvassing authority is neither related to nor determined by the duration of its legislative sessions. The canvassing authority of Congress endures for as long as the life of Congress itself.
The petition mistakenly equates Congress' meeting in legislative session with the term of its existence. The period during which Congress meets in session is within its discretion to prescribe, subject only to the condition that it cannot convene in regular session thirty days before the opening of the following Congress on the fourth Monday of July. 7 Every Congress bows out of existence at noon, on 30 June of every election year . That is the date when the terms of all of the members of the House of Representatives and half of the members of the Senate expire. 8 Thus, until the 30th of June, the members of Congress retain the privilege of their offices, 9 and may even be called to meet in special session, notwithstanding the prior adjournment of its regular legislative sessions, subject only to the thirty-day constitutionally prescribed interregnum between Congresses. So, on the same date and time the outgoing Congress fades into history and the incoming Congress commences its existence.
Petitioner's argument is also tantamount to allowing the legislature to shorten the constitutional term of office of its members. That, of course, is preposterous. For one, a congressional enactment can never trump a constitutional command. 10 And for another, Congress and the National Board of Canvassers cannot, by the simple expedient of adjourning its session, derail the completion of the canvassing task imposed on it by the Constitution.
This brings us to the petitioner's corollary stance that the sine die adjournment of Congress has rendered the Joint Committee functus officio . That is specious. The life of the Joint Committee is co-terminus with its creator that is Congress. Hence, the Joint Committee becomes functus officio only at the end of the Twelfth Congress on June 30,2004, or earlier upon the completion of its task with the approval of its final canvass report by Congress acting as the National Board of Canvassers.
The Historical Perspective
There is a tradition, still evident in many jurisdictions, that legislative sessions are relatively brief. 11 The reasons are varied, from the early notion of non-professional legislators who required abundant time to take care of their personal enterprises, to the intolerant Washington heat that, in the days prior to air-conditioning, ensured a dormant U.S. Congress in the summer. With the promulgation of the Jones Law in 1916, the custom of the abbreviated regular legislative session was adopted into Philippine practice. 12 The 1935 Constitution retained the Jones Law provision that no regular session shall continue longer than one hundred days, exclusive of Sundays. 13
This limitation may have proven too constricting, as subsequent Constitutions did not adopt the old one-hundred day rule. 14 However, this was the rule in force from 1935 to 1973, spanning eight presidential elections 15 and eight congressional canvasses. 16 A look back at how the old legislative system worked, considering the limited days allocated for the regular session, indubitably highlights the segregate nature of the functions of Congress as canvasser from Congress as a legislative body.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Congress convened in regular session once every year on the fourth Monday of January for no longer than one hundred days, exclusive of Sundays. This entailed the end of the regular legislative session sometime in May, and a lengthy respite for the rest of the year. However, after the presidential and vice-presidential elections held every year on the second Tuesday of November, it was necessary for the members of Congress to return to the legislative halls on the second day of Tuesday of December and canvass the votes cast in the presidential and vice-presidential elections. 17 The canvass had to be completed before the start of the term of the incoming President and Vice-President at noon of the 30th of December. 18
Obviously, by the time the congressional canvass commenced in December, the regular legislative session, beginning as did in January and lasting for only hundred days, had long expired. Yet, this did not preclude Congress coming into life as a canvassing board, for it drew breath from the direct command of Article VII, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution. This was the legislative practice for four decades, and not once was any of the eight national canvasses challenged on the ground that Congress could no longer canvass as it had adjourned its session seven months before.
A similar scenario obtains under the 1987 Constitution in view of the prescribed period for regular sessions and the required interval between Congress under Section 15 of Article VI. Given the exigencies of the calendar, it is foreseeable that by the time Congress is precluded from meeting in regular session, it would have yet to complete the canvass. 19 However, there should be no problem with applying and accepting the past precedents, as they are grounded on solid constitutional footing, there being a clear textual commitment segregating the role of Congress as canvasser from its legislative functions.
Conclusion
Clearly, petitioner's argument runs counter to the Constitution and historic tradition. The hypothesis also defies practicality, as to uphold it would unnecessarily create a vacuum in the office of the Presidency come 30 June, and frustrate the Government in the business of governing. The Constitution reigns superior, and the Court will have no qualms upholding its supremacy even if short-term practical difficulties evolve as a result. But as the petition has no intrinsic worth, we do not hesitate asserting the rational mechanism set in place by the Constitution, assured of its internal logic and cognizant of the political stability it ensures.
I therefore , vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Endnotes:
1 See Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 The prime functions of judicial review are two sides of a coin, namely: "that of imprinting governmental action with the stamp of legitimacy and that of checking the political branches of government when these encroach on ground forbidden by the Constitution as interpreted by the Court." C.L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court (1960), p. 223.
3 See Sec. 1, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 See Sec. 1, Art. VI, 1987 Const.
5 See Sec. 4, Art. VI, 1987 Const.
6 See Sec. 4, Art. VII, 1987 Const.
7 Sec. 15, Art. VI, Const.: "The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time."
8 Sec. 4, Art, VI, Const.: "The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
. . . .
Sec. 7, Art. VI, Const.: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
9 The exception being those Senators in the middle of their six-year term.
10 "The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature." Dimaporo v. Mitra, G.R. No. 96859, 15 October 1991, 202 SCRA 790.
11 To cite a few examples, by custom, British Parliament sits for only around one hundred fifty days in a year. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments of the Philippine Government 216 (1985). In the United States, the annual regular legislative session of the state legislature of Alabama is limited only to thirty legislative days within one hundred five calendar days, while that of Montana runs only from January to April. See Duncan and Lawrence, POLITICS IN AMERICA 1998: The 105th Congress 1, 843 (1997).
12 See Section 18, Jones Law (1916), which provided that no regular session of Congress last longer than one hundred days, exclusive of Sundays.
13 Article VI, Section 9, 1935 Constitution, which reads: "The Congress shall convene in regular session once every year on the fourth Monday of January, unless a different date is fixed by law. It may be called in special session at any time, by the President to consider general legislative or only such subjects as he may designate. No special session shall continue longer than thirty days and no regular session longer than one hundred days, exclusive of Sundays."
14 Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution provided that the Batasang Pambansa continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine. The same rule was adopted by the 1987 Constitution, with the qualification that Congress may no longer hold its regular session from thirty days before the opening of the next regular session. Supra note 2.
15 Particularly, in 1941, 1946, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965 and 1969.
16 As in the present, the canvass of votes for President and Vice-President under the 1935 Constitution was allocated to the Congress. See Article VII, Section 2, 1935 Constitution.
17 See Republic Act No. 180, (Revised Election Code), 1940. Section 6. Regular Elections for National Offices. - (a) On the second Tuesday of November, 1949, and upon the same day every four years thereafter, the President and Vice-President of the Philippines shall be elected. The canvass by both houses of the Congress of the Philippines shall begin on the second Tuesday of the following December, for which purpose said body shall meet in a special joint session. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at twelve o'clock noon, on the thirtieth day of December." The 1935 Constitution left it up to the legislative to determine the date of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. See Section 4, Article VII, 1935 Constitution. The 1941 presidential elections were held on 11 November 194], see Lava v. Vitug, 73 Phil. 390, 391 (1941), although the succeeding presidential elections were held on 23 April 1946, a unique situation arising from the special circumstances brought about by the liberation from Japanese rule and the restoration of the Osme�a Commonwealth government. See Sotto v. COMELEC, 76 Phil. 516, 532 (1946), J. Perfecto, concurring.
18 See Section 4, Article VII, 1935 Constitution.
19 This in fact happened in the 1992 Presidential Elections, when the 8th Congress proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph E. Estrada as the duly-elected President and Vice-President only on 22 June 1992. See J. Salonga, "1992 and 1998 precedents are against FPJ," The Philippine Star , p. 15, 20 June 2004. Considering that the 9th Congress was due to convene on 27 July 1992, the 8th Congress was prohibited from meeting in regular session by 15 June 1992. On the other hand, Joseph Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were proclaimed by the 10th Congress on 29 May 1998, well before the date said Congress was barred from convening in regular session. Salonga, id .
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