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[G.R. No. 145817.� August 1, 2005]
URBAN BANK vs. PE�A
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 1 2005.
G.R. No. 145817 (Urban Bank, Inc. vs. Magdaleno Pe�a, et al.)
G.R. No. 145822 (Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., et al. vs. Magdaleno Pe�a.)
G.R. No. 162562 (Magdaleno Pe�a vs. Urban Bank, Inc., et al.)
On 12 December 2002, Unimega Properties Holdings Corporation (Unimega), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with this Court a Motion For Reconsideration with Intervention [1] cralaw dated 10 December 2002. Unimega alleged, among other things, that:
1.���� It is a buyer in good faith in an execution sale pending appeal conducted per Special Order dated 29 October 1999 which was pursuant to the Decision dated 28 May 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bago City, Branch 62, in Civil Case No. 754 entitled, "Atty. Magdaleno M. Pe�a versus Urban Bank, et al.";
2.���� That the said Special Order authorizes the execution pending appeal of the said Decision of the RTC to satisfy the judgment thereof, which Special Order was later affirmed in an Amended Decision of the Former Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55667 entitled, "Urban Bank, Inc., et al. versus The Honorable Henry J. Trocino, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 62, Bago City, et al";
3.���� That of the various properties offered for sale in the said execution sale, Unimega bid and won the following:
a.�� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56053;
b.�� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56054;
c.�� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56056;
d. Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56058;
e.�� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56057;
f.��� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56060;
g.�� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56062;
h.�� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56063;
i.��� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56059; and
j.��� Condominium Certificate of Title No. 56061.
All registered with the Registry of Deeds, City of Makati;
4.���� That thereafter, the Branch Sheriff of the RTC issued the corresponding Certificates of Sale for the above described condominium units in favor of Unimega;
5.���� That on 26 and 29 October 2001, respectively, the said Certificates of Sale were annotated and inscribed in its respective condominium certificates of title in the Registry of Deeds, Makati City;
6.���� That in a Resolution dated 19 November 2001 of this Honorable Court, the supersedeas bond, belatedly posted by Urban Bank, was approved, which approval came twenty-five (25) days after the auction sale it was supposed to enjoin;
7.���� That on 24 October 2002, Urban Bank filed a Manifestation before the RTC effecting redemption of the properties sold in various auction sales, specifically that of 25 October 2001;
8.���� That the redemption period expired on 27 and 30 October 2002, respectively, without Urban Bank effecting a valid redemption;
9.���� That for lack of proper and rightful redemption as prescribed under the Rules of Court, the ownership of the above described condominium units, by operation of law, was immediately consolidated in the name of Unimega;
10.�� That in view of the expiration of the redemption period without Urban Bank exercising its right within the framework of the Rules, the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC issued the corresponding Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Non-Redemption in favor of Unimega;
11.�� That thereafter, Unimega paid the corresponding Capital Gains Tax and other taxes payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
12.�� That upon motion of Unimega, the RTC issued an Order dated 13 November 2002, directing the Registry of Deeds of the City of Makati to cancel the existing Condominium Certificates of Title in the name of Urban Bank and to issue new ones in favor of Unimega;
13.�� That on 13 November 2002, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution, upon a Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank and Makati Sports Club, Inc. seeking clarification on the effects of the posting of the supersedeas bond on its right to redeem the properties sold, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby RESOLVES to clarify that, as a consequence of its approval of the supersedeas bond, the running of the one-year period for the petitioner Urban Bank to redeem the properties sold at the public auctions held on October 4, 11 and 25, 2001, as well as the consolidation of the titles in favor of the buyers, is SUSPENDED OR STAYED. MSCI is also prohibited from transferring petitioner Urban Bank's MSCI club shares to the winning bidders in the execution sale held on October 11, 2002."
Thus, the transfer of titles to Unimega was held in abeyance. [2] cralaw
It prays that the 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Court be reconsidered with respect to its rights relative to the condominium units it has purchased in the execution sale dated 25 October 2001. [3] cralaw
On 20 January 2003, this Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to Comment on Unimega's motion.
On 24 February 2003, petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 -- Benjamin De Leon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr. and Eric Lee - who were members of the Board of Directors of Urban Bank, Inc., as nominees of corporate stockholders of the latter, filed their Manifestation and Comment. [4] cralaw They manifested that although their properties were not the subjects of Unimega's motion, they, however, disagree with the factual and legal conclusions advanced by Unimega. They said that since this Court's Resolution dated 13 November 2002 declared that the one-year period for redemption of the titles of Urban Bank, Inc. was stayed or suspended by virtue of the filing and approval of the supersedeas bond, then the redemption period had not yet expired at the time the bond was filed. The consolidation, therefore, of the titles in the name of the purported buyer cannot proceed. [5] cralaw
On 30 April 2003, Urban Bank, Inc. filed its Opposition to Unimega's motion. It alleged, among other things, that Unimega is not a buyer in good faith of the subject condominium units. It bared that despite the fact that the condominium units have different floor areas, Unimega's bid and subsequent purchase had a uniform price of P1,000,000.00 per unit which was grossly disproportional to its zonal and fair market values. It emphasized that under Unimega's Articles of Incorporation on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the latter's paid-up capital is only Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), which is only half of the purchase price of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) at which it acquired the ten condominium units.
On 22 December 2003, Magdaleno M. Pe�a filed his Comment to Unimega's motion. Pe�a manifested that he does not interpose any objection to Unimega's motion, and even joins the latter in its prayer for reconsideration of the 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Court.
The issues, therefore, that must be resolved are: whether or not Unimega has the legal standing to intervene in this case, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether or not the reconsideration of the 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Court is proper.
As to the first issue, Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, are pertinent:
Section 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to he adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
Strictly speaking, the motion to intervene may be filed before the rendition of judgment by the trial court. Clearly, movant Unimega did not file its motion to intervene before the trial court, and not even in the Court of Appeals. The motion was filed only in this Court. However, the filing of Unimega's motion before this Court was its first opportunity to do so. The execution sale subject of Unimega's motion was held on 25 October 2001. At this time, G.R. No. 145817 and No. 145822 were already pending with this Court. Undoubtedly, Unimega could not have filed its motion before the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Unimega had the opportunity to intervene earlier, its motion may still be granted.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, [6] cralaw we allowed intervention even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. In this case we held in part:
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [7] cralaw like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
In Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, [8] cralaw we allowed intervention almost at the end of the proceedings.
The Rules on Intervention is to be interpreted liberally, as we held in Pinlac v. Court of Appeals: [9]
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.
In Mago v. Court of Appeals, [10] intervention was granted even after the decision became final and executory. In this case we held:
. . . The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition from relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject property cannot be disputed.
Coming now to the right of Unimega to intervene, it appears that it has the legal standing to do so.
Unimega has a legal interest in the success of either of the parties. The Court's judgment would affect its rights, favorably or otherwise, over the ten condominium units it supposedly purchased in the execution sale held on 25 October 2001, evidenced by the copies of the Certificates of Sale attached to its motion. Clearly, the intervention of Unimega is necessary to protect its rights over the properties bought. The constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by it which appears to be an indispensable party, at least to the two cases at bar (G.R. No. 145817 and No. 145822). We need not accentuate the point that Unimega is, indeed, an indispensable party, with such an interest in the dispute that a final adjudication cannot be had in its absence, without respecting, even ignoring, such interest.
Unimega's intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties since its claim hinges only on the settlement of the main issues in this case. Further, multiplicity of suits will be avoided if Unimega is permitted to intervene.
Having declared that the intervention of Unimega is proper, we shall now resolve the second issue of whether or not the reconsideration of the 13 November 2002 Resolution is proper.
Our resolution dated 13 November 2002, the dispositive portion of which was cited earlier, was a mere clarification of our Resolution dated 19 November 2001 which granted the motion and approved the supersedeas bond of Urban Bank, Inc.
The resolution of this issue at this time, however, would preempt the decision that will eventually be laid down in these three (3) consolidated cases. The pivotal issue in G.R. No. 145817 is the propriety of the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowing execution pending appeal. In G.R. No. 145822, the main issue is the aptness of the Sheriff's act of levying and executing further on the individual and personal properties of the petitioners therein. As for G.R. No. 162562, the central issue is the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the Decision dated 28 May 1999 and Special Order dated 29 October 1999 of the RTC. These decision and special order of the RTC were the bases of the execution sale conducted by the Sheriff. G.R. No. 162562, however, is not yet submitted for decision. To rule then on Unimega's motion for reconsideration would mean that this Court is already passing judgment on G.R. No. 162562 which, we emphasize, is not yet ripe for adjudication.
WHEREFORE, Unimega's Motion for Intervention is GRANTED. The resolution of Unimega's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby held in abeyance for the reasons stated above. Urban Bank, Inc., De Leon, et al., and Magdaleno Pe�a are hereby required to manifest to this Court, within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, whether they are adopting their respective Opposition/Comment earlier filed as their answer to Unimega's pleading-in-intervention. If not, they are directed to file their answer within the said period.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo, pp. 991-1004.
[2] cralaw Rollo, pp. 992-998.
[3] cralaw The Certificates of Sale and the Minutes of Auction Sale for the ten condominium units are attached to the Motion as Annexes A to A-9 inclusive; Rollo, pp. 1005-1034. The Condominium Certificates of Title are attached to the Motion as Annexes B to B-9 inclusive; Rollo, pp. 1035-1064.
[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 3224-3227.
[5] cralaw Rollo, p. 3225.
[6] cralaw G.R. No. L-45168, 25 September 1979, 238 SCRA 239, 246.
[7] cralaw The Rules on Intervention is now embodied in Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
[8] cralaw 203 Phil. 652 (1982).
[9] cralaw G.R. No. 91486, 10 September 2003, 410 SCRA 419, 424-425.
[10] cralaw G.R. No. 115624, 25 February 1999, 303 SCRA 600.
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