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[G.R. No. 159302.� August 17, 2005]
CITIBANK vs. NLRC
THIRD DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 17 2005.
G.R. No. 159302 (Citibank, N.A. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Rosita Tan Paragas.)
For consideration by this Court is petitioner's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ADMIT (Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration). Petitioner, as in its first motion for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution of September 24, 2003 - which denied the subject petition for review due to late filing and other procedural grounds, prays that the petition be given due course.
While petitioner timely filed with this Court a MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI, the motion was denied by Resolution dated September 3, 2003 on the ground that a copy thereof was not served upon the Court of Appeals. Said motion having been denied, the MOTION FOR Second AND Last EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI and the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI which petitioner subsequently filed were likewise denied by this Court by Resolution of September 24, 2003 mentioned above. The Court also noted in the same Resolution of September 24, 2003 that the petition lacked proof of service on the Court of Appeals and proof that the person who signed the verification and certification against forum shopping was actually authorized by petitioner to sign on its behalf.
The rule prohibiting second motions for reconsideration is not absolute. In Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership vs. Velasco [1] cralaw the Court held: "A second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinary persuasive reasons, and only upon express leave first obtained" (Emphasis supplied).
After giving the present petition a second hard look, this Court is persuaded that it appears on its face meritorious and that the ends of substantial justice would be better served by allowing the instant motion, pursuant to the ruling in Somoso v. CA [2] cralaw which teaches:
x x x The right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570 [1985]; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 76595, May 6, 1988). x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Subject of the petition is the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution dated October 24, 2001 granting private respondent's MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION in connection with her appeal in an illegal dismissal case.
Private respondent, as found by the labor arbiter, was an employee of petitioner from August 8, 1979 to September 4, 1997. She occupied the position of filing clerk when her employment was terminated by petitioner for serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties and gross inefficiency. She then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney's fees. The complaint was dismissed by the labor arbiter for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, but with the modification that private respondent should be paid separation pay "as a form of equitable relief". Thereafter, private respondent filed a MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION praying that petitioner be also ordered to pay her the benefits under its retirement plan, which the NLRC granted by the aforementioned October 24, 2001 Resolution being questioned in the present petition.
Petitioner proffers, inter alia, that the claim for retirement benefits was a new claim raised for the first time only in private respondent's MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of the NLRC decision and by granting the same, the NLRC violated its right to due process.
Petitioner's assertion that the claim for retirement benefits was a new claim is amply supported by the documents attached to its petition. The Position Paper of private respondent clearly does not include a prayer for said retirement benefits. [3] cralaw The Court of Appeals Decision of January 24, 2003, which affirmed the questioned NLRC Resolution, itself states:
While it is true that the claim of private respondent for retirement benefits was brought up for the first time in this case in her motion for partial reconsideration [of the NLRC decision], it is also settled that "the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to served the demand of substantial justice, it is therefore improper to nullify the NLRC's resolution on a mere technicality". [4] cralaw (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, the NLRC granted the claim not on account of any express mention thereof in private respondent's earlier pleadings, but on account of its finding that her general prayer for "such other reliefs as may be just and equitable" [5] cralaw was broad enough to include the same.
The doctrine that technical rules of procedure should be liberally construed in labor cases is circumscribed within limits in order to prevent abuse. The case of Ma�ebo v. NLRC [6] cralaw is instructive:
We wish, however, to stress some points. Firstly, while it is true that the Rules of the NLRC must be liberally construed and that the NLRC is not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC itself must not be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious, and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. One such provision is Section 3, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which requires the submission of verified position papers within fifteen days from the date of the last conference, with proof of service thereof on the other parties. The position papers "shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latter's testimony." After the submission thereof, the parties "shall.not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents." (Underscoring supplied).
Furthermore, the general prayer for "other just and equitable relief" may not be interpreted so broadly as to include even those which are not warranted by the factual premises alleged by a party. The January 24, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals itself states: "It has been ruled in this jurisdiction that the general prayer for "other reliefs" is applicable to such other reliefs which are warranted by the law and facts alleged by the respondent in her basic pleadings and not on a newly created issue." [7] cralaw (Underscoring supplied) This statement of the appellate court is consistent with jurisprudence, particularly the case of People v. Lacson [8] cralaw where the Court stated:
x x x Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief. A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void.
In light of petitioner's claim then that by the NLRC's grant of relief on a new issue raised only in a motion for partial reconsideration of its decision, its (petitioner's) right to due process was violated, substantial justice would be served by reinstating the petition, the procedural errors committed by petitioner notwithstanding, albeit it later on served copies of its motions filed with this Court upon the appellate court and filed the requisite documents it earlier failed to submit.
WHEREFORE, THE court resolves to GRANT petitioner's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ADMIT (attach Second Motion for Reconsideration) and SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by REINSTATING its Petition for Review.
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, private respondent is hereby REQUIRED to file a COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw 254 SCRA 234, 240 (1996).
[2] cralaw 178 SCRA 654, 663 (1989).
[3] cralaw Rollo at 81-82.
[4] cralaw Id. at 61.
[5] cralaw Id. at 82.
[6] cralaw 229 SCRA 240, 248 (1994).
[7] cralaw Rollo at 61.
[8] cralaw 413 SCRA 20, 48 (2003).
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