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[G.R. No. 168019.� August 10, 2005]
VELIGANIO vs. DEL BARRIO
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 10 2005 .
G.R. No. 168019 (MS. GUILLERMA VELIGANIO vs. LOLITA MAIZ DEL BARRIO And All Persons Claiming Rights Under Her.)
For resolution is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] cralaw and Resolution [2] cralaw of the Court of Appeals dated 25 January 2005 and 05 May 2005, respectively, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 112, Pasay City, dated 27 November 2002, which, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 47, Pasay City, dated 21 June 2002, dismissing petitioner's complaint for ejectment.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
In her complaint, petitioner alleged that: she is the owner of the subject property consisting of one (1) unit of two (2) storey house situated at No. 510 B, Viscarra St., Malibay, Pasay City, Metro Manila; her ownership thereof being based on the Contract of sale dated 06 November 2000 which was entered into by petitioner with certain Natividad Mais Escobar, as the vendor; while petitioner and her caretaker or administrator were in actual and prior physical possession of said property, respondents surreptitiously entered and took possession of the upper portion of said property sometime in May 2001, through stealth, strategy, force, intimidation and threat; respondents likewise padlocked the comfort room of the house and converted the lower portion of the house as garbage storage; petitioner sent a demand letter dated 31 August 2001 to respondents demanding that the latter immediately vacates the subject property; and the controversy was likewise brought to the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay 169, Zone 17, Pasay City, but no settlement was ever reached. Thus, petitioner instituted this Complaint for ejectment, damages and attorney's fees.
Upon the other hand, respondents, in their Answer, alleged that: respondent Pedro Maiz was married to Claudia Maiz and they had two children, namely: Lolita Maiz Del Barrio and Natividad Maiz Escobar; during their marriage, the spouses built and owned the subject property, which house they occupied for more than 40 years now; Mrs. Claudia Maiz died on 03 May 1989 and as a result of her death, respondent Pedro Maiz, the surviving husband, automatically became the owner of one-half (1/2) of the subject property and the other one-half (1/2) portion to be divided equally between Pedro Maiz, Lolita Maiz Del Barrio and Natividad Maiz Escobar; that as co-owner of the subject property, Natividad Maiz Escobar (the vendor of the subject property to the petitioner) can sell, convey and transfer only her share of the subject property and nothing more; the Deed of Conditional Sale dated 06 November 2001 entered into by Natividad Maiz Escobar and petitioner is valid only insofar as the share of Natividad is concerned but not the share of Pedro and Lolita. Thus, respondents sought for the dismissal of this ejectment case and for damages and cost of suit.
To be entitled to relief in forcible entry, the petitioner must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendants through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth [3] cralaw . This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning [4] cralaw . In resolving this issue, the appellate court held:
In forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building. Thus, petitioner must prove and allege prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the respondent. This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning. The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the respondents can outrightly prevent the Court from taking cognizance of the case. Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the petitioner needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
Mindful of the foregoing doctrinal ruling laid by the Supreme Court while We studiedly determine the merits of this case, We arrive at the conclusion that the Petitioner was unable to prove the attendance of any of the requisites for forcible entry. Thus, this Petition should be denied for lack of merit.
First, petitioner alleged that she and a caretaker or administrator named Ms. Julieta Fajardo were in actual and prior physical possession of the subject property. Such possession is allegedly based on the Contract of Sale dated 06 November 2002 entered by the petitioner with a certain Natividad Maiz Escobar, as the vendor. However, petitioner failed to prove the fact of her physical possession of said property. She not only failed to allege, much more present clear and convincing evidence, to show the date that such possession actually started. Neither did she adduce any physical evidence that would demonstrate her lawful and material occupation of said property nor did she present witnesses, not even her alleged caretaker or administrator, who can attest to the same material facts. Rather, the single piece of evidence that is attached to the records of this case is the Joint Affidavit executed by petitioner and her alleged caretaker where they made mere general and unsubstantial attestations of their alleged actual and prior physical possession of the subject property.
Second, petitioner, again made averments that respondents surreptitiously entered and took possession of the upper portion of the property sometime in May 2001through stealth, strategy, force, intimidation and threat. Other than such statements, petitioner made no effort to demonstrate, by clear, credible and convincing evidence, the factual circumstances that occurred during petitioner's dispossession of said property. Petitioner did not even allege the kind of stealth or strategy and the nature or degree of force and intimidation that was purportedly employed by the respondents. In fact, petitioner's allegation of respondents' alleged "surreptitious" entry of the property is largely inconsistent with the allegation that force, intimidation and threat were employed against the petitioner.
Lastly, it is not clear to Us how petitioner was unduly deprived of their prior physical possession of the subject property especially in the light of respondents' allegation that they are the owners and have been in actual and continuous possession of the subject property for more than forty (40) years. The mere padlocking of the comfort room and the conversion of the ground floor to a storage area do not amply support the allegation that petitioner was thrown out of the subject property, if indeed she was in actual possession thereof at the time that respondents allegedly entered the property.
We find no reversible error in the disposition of the controversy by the Court of Appeals especially in the light of the fact that both the RTC and the MTC decreed that the evidence does not support a finding that petitioner and her caretaker were in prior physical possession of the subject property. [5] cralaw Verily, in petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is confined to reviewing questions of law. [6] cralaw For a question to be one of law, it must not involve any examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. [7] cralaw Thus, the rule of thumb is that findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive on this Court which is not a trier of facts, [8] cralaw except when there is a serious ground to believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result, [9] cralaw which we find no application in the case at bar. In herein case, we find no cogent reason to depart from the factual disquisition of the appellate court that petitioner failed to prove her allegation that she had been in prior possession of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Cecilia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.
[2] cralaw Ibid.
[3] cralaw Bongato v. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, 14 August 2002, 387 SCRA 327, 333.
[4] cralaw Ibid.
[5] cralaw Rollo, pp. 167 and 172.
[6] cralaw Gener v. de Leon, G.R. No. 130730, 19 October 2001, 367 SCRA 631, 642.
[7] cralaw Ibid.
[8] cralaw Ibid.
[9] cralaw Danofrata v. People, G.R. No. 143010, 23 September 2003, 412 SCRA 351.
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