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[G.R. No. 168246.� August 10, 2005]
FERNANDEZ vs. CA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 10 2005.
G.R. No. 168246 (Belen T. Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals and Hipolito S. Cayabyab.)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81557, dated 26 November 2004, [1] cralaw the dispositive portion of which reads -
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Resolution, dated June 28, 2002, of public respondent NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that backwages shall be computed from the time of private respondent's dismissal on January 24, 2001 up to the finality of this Decision, whereas, separation pay shall be computed from private respondent's employment on May 18, 1990 up to his termination on January 24, 2001. [2] cralaw
and the Resolution of the same court, dated 14 April 2005, [3] cralaw denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned Decision filed by herein petitioner Belen T. Fernandez.
Private respondent Hipolito S. Cayabyab was employed as a truck
driver by petitioner Fernandez on 18 May 1990. As a truck driver, he made at
least two trips a week from Dagupan to Manila and from Manila to Dagupan,
earning P600.00 per trip.
On 10 January 2001, private respondent Cayabyab was involved in a
traffic accident wherein the truck he was driving collided with a tricycle. As
explained by private respondent Cayabyab himself, the truck he was following
suddenly stopped and in order to avoid bumping into the said truck, he swerved
his own truck to the left, invading the opposite lane and, thus, running into
the tricycle coming from the opposite direction. The driver and passengers of
the tricycle were injured and were rushed to the Specialized Group Hospital
& Trauma Center. Petitioner Fernandez paid for their hospital expenses in
the amount of P157,065.58.
According to petitioner Fernandez, private respondent Cayabyab never reported back to work since the accident, perhaps to evade his financial responsibility to her for the expenses she incurred by reason of the accident.
Private respondent Cayabyab, on the other hand, alleged that after the accident, which occurred on 10 January 2001, he was detained at the Police Station at Perez Blvd., Dagupan City. The next day, he was released and was fetched by Jeffer Son, his immediate supervisor. Thereafter, from 12 to 23 January 2001, private respondent Cayabyab was tasked to repair the truck damaged in the accident. On 24 January 2001, he reported back to work but he was asked to surrender his key because he was grounded. When he inquired with management as to the reason for his grounding, he was merely told to rest. On the first week of February, private respondent Cayabyab again reported for work and was told to return the following week because his case was already referred to petitioner Fernandez, the General Manager. When private respondent Cayabyab attempted to report for work on the second week of February, he was informed by petitioner Fernandez herself that he was being terminated and that his separation pay was not even enough to cover the amount she paid for the expenses arising from the accident on 10 January 2001.
On 04 April 2001, private respondent Cayabyab filed a Complaint for "Illegal Dismissal and Illegal Suspension with Prayer for Payment of Backwages, 13th Month Pay and Separation Pay" against petitioner Fernandez before the Labor Arbiter. On 21 June 2001, he filed an Amended Complaint, modifying the date of his supposed dismissal from work.
On 29 November 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,
[4]
cralaw dismissing private
respondent Cayabyab's Complaint. The Labor Arbiter found private respondent
Cayabyab liable for the accident because he followed the truck before him too
closely that he was unable to stop his own truck in time to avoid collision.
While the Labor Arbiter ruled that there was ground to terminate private
respondent Cayabyab for his gross negligence in the performance of his tasks,
nevertheless, the ground did not involve an act of moral turpitude, so that
private respondent Cayabyab would still be entitled to separation pay at the
rate of one-half month pay for every year of service. However, since his total
separation pay would not be enough to reimburse petitioner Fernandez for the
expenses she incurred because of the accident, private respondent Cayabyab
would end up receiving no amount as separation pay. The claim for 13th
month pay was denied since it appeared from the evidence on record that the
same had already been paid in the sum of P6,000.00 for the year 2000.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in its Resolution, dated 28 June 2002, [5] cralaw reversed and set aside the afore-mentioned Decision of the Labor Arbiter, ruling that private respondent Cayabyab's dismissal was not based on valid grounds provided by law and was in violation of due process; thus, private respondent Cayabyab was illegally dismissed by petitioner Fernandez. Petitioner Fernandez was ordered to pay private respondent Cayabyab unpaid backwages from the time of illegal dismissal up to the date of promulgation of judgment, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the strained relations between the parties, and attorney's fees.
When the case was brought on appeal before the Court of Appeals, it rendered the Decision assailed herein essentially affirming the Resolution of the NLRC.
In her Petition, petitioner Fernandez insists that as an employer, she has the right to discipline and supervise her employees. She further argues that as a driver, private respondent Cayabyab's negligence affects not only his employer, but also third persons using the highway as what happened to the tricycle driver and his passengers in the accident on 10 January 2001.
This Court recognizes the following management prerogatives -
Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. (NLU vs. Insular La Yebana Co., 2 SCRA 924; Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 21 SCRA 226, 235)" (Perfecto V. Hernandez, Labor Relations Law, 1985 Ed., p.44) [6] cralaw
Petitioner Fenandez is not precluded from disciplining her employees and imposing reasonable penalties, including dismissal. However, the power to dismiss is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. This is so because the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. [7] cralaw
Hence, the State assures a regular employee security of tenure by providing that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause. [8] cralaw The two facets of this legal mandate are: (a) the legality of the act of dismissal, that is, dismissal under the grounds provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (b) the legality of the manner of dismissal, that is, with due observance of the procedural requirements under Article 277 (b) of the same Code. The illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause, while illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process. [9] cralaw By setting these standards, the State is able to ensure that the power of dismissal is exercised by an employer without abuse of discretion or arbitrariness.
According to petitioner Fernandez, her dismissal of private respondent Cayabyab was justified because of the latter's gross negligence. She alleged that even prior to the accident on 10 January 2001, private respondent Cayabyab already figured in two other accidents. Although admittedly, gross and habitual negligence is one of the just causes for termination of an employee by an employer under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, petitioner Fernandez failed to substantiate with evidence her allegation that private respondent Cayabyab had been grossly and habitually negligent in the performance of his duties. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, was illegal. [10] cralaw
The Court of Appeals already thoroughly reviewed the evidence submitted by petitioner Fernandez, and accurately came up with the following findings -
Petitioner relies heavily on the Police Blotter (Annex I of Position Paper) in which private respondent Cayabyab was identified to have been "recklessly driving" which caused the accident and, therefore a sufficient ground or a just cause for his termination.
We do not agree. In the case of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, (295 SCRA 334), it was held that:
".the entries in the police blotter should not be given significance or probative value, as they do not constitute a conclusive proof of the truth thereof. These entries are usually incomplete and inaccurate, as sometimes they are taken from either partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting and are hearsay, untested in the crucible of a trial on the merits."
Proceeding from the above doctrine, the entries in the police blotter relied upon by petitioner Fernandez, cannot and should not be considered as conclusive evidence that proved with certainty, private respondent Cayabyab's alleged recklessness as a driver which constitutes gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282(b) of the Labor Code.
Moreover, petitioner Fernandez asserts that private respondent Cayabyab in January 2001 alone, was involved in series of accidents which as per investigation were all due to his fault; that one of which happened in Cubao, Quezon City; and that he went against petitioner's admonition to be always careful in driving and to observe traffic rules and regulations.
Apart from the police blotter involving the January 10, 2001 accident and the receipts showing the expenses incurred for the hospitalization of the victims of the January 10, 2001 accident, petitioner Fernandez failed to substantiate by further evidence, except through bare allegations in her Position Paper, the supposed previous accident involving private respondent Cayabyab in Cubao, Quezon City and the result of the investigation showing that the same was private respondent's fault or that there was an admonition given advising private respondent to be careful in driving.
On this point, the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Paguio Transport Corporation vs. NLRC (294 SCRA 657) is instructive, to wit:
"Private respondent's admission that he was involved in the November 4, 1993 accident did not give petitioner a just cause to dismiss him. Mere involvement in an accident, absent any showing of fault or recklessness on the part of the employee, is not a valid ground for dismissal."
In fine, private respondent Cayabyab, therefore, must be deemed to have been illegally dismissed because mere involvement in an accident absent any showing of fault or recklessness on the part of an employee is not a valid ground for his dismissal (Ibid.). It is worth reiterating that the Police Blotter relied upon by petitioner Fernandez is not sufficient to prove the alleged recklessness in driving of private respondent Cayabyab. [11] cralaw
Petitioner Fernandez challenges the above-quoted findings of the Court of Appeals by pointing out that private respondent Cayabyab was investigated by the police and was even jailed; and that private respondent Cayabyab himself admitted that he collided with the tricycle coming from the opposite direction when he swerved his truck to avoid bumping into another truck before him. Petitioner Fernandez even asserts that private respondent Cayabyab's negligence was a violation of the Land Transportation Code.
While private respondent Cayabyab may have been detained by the police, such detention was only for a day and he was released the following day without any charges being filed against him. It is reasonable to presume herein that the police detained private respondent Cayabyab for questioning and investigation purposes only. If indeed, as claimed by petitioner Fernandez, the police found after due investigation that private respondent Cayabyab was driving recklessly and was the cause of the accident on 10 January 2001, then why did they allow him to walk out of jail the very next day? Moreover, petitioner Fernandez failed to submit the Police Report or any other documentation that may present the results of the police investigation of the accident on 10 January 2001. Again, the police blotter alone is insufficient proof of private respondent Cayabyab's gross negligence for, at most, it only proves that the accident did occur on 10 January 2001 and that private respondent Cayabyab was involved therein, but not necessarily that he was responsible therefor.
The admission by private respondent Cayabyab that he swerved his truck to the left and invading the other lane and, thus, hitting the tricycle that was traveling the opposite direction, is not consequentially an admission of his negligence or recklessness. It is simply his narration of the events that led to the accident on 10 January 2001. there are other matters that need to be determined and investigated first before any conclusion can be made as to who should be held accountable for the accident, such as the weather and road conditions, the speed of all the vehicles involved in the collision, the condition of the same vehicles, among other things.
Even petitioner Fernandez's assertion that private respondent Cayabyab violated the Land Transportation Code deserves scant consideration since she did not even identify which precise provisions of the Land Transportation Code had been violated, nor did she present evidence that private respondent Cayabyab had been held liable for such violation.
Furthermore, petitioner Fernandez also failed to observe procedural due process when she terminated the employment of private respondent Cayabyab. Procedural due process requires that the employee can only be dismissed after he has been given ample opportunity to be heard. [12] cralaw Once more, the Court of Appeals already adequately addressed this point in its assailed Decision, to wit -
Even on the assumption that private respondent was a reckless driver which called for his dismissal, however, due process demands that the employer should furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) for termination and afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires (Manuel vs. N.C. Construction Supply, 282 SCRA 326). This first written notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and a second notice informing him of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Brahm Industries, Inc. vs. NLRC, 280 SCRA 828).
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, provides:
"(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Art. 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may suspend effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass layoff."
In light of the foregoing, We affirm the findings of public respondent NLRC that private respondent Cayabyab's dismissal was not preceded by any notice o the charges against him and a hearing thereon, making his dismissal/termination illegal. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in cases of dismissal of employees. The purpose of the first requirement is obviously to enable the employee to defend himself against the charge preferred against him by presenting and substantiating his version of facts (Tanala vs. NLRC, 252 SCRA 314). [13] cralaw
There is no merit to the argument of petitioner Fernandez that the police investigation already constitutes substantial compliance with the due process requirement of notice and hearing. First, the due process requirement for termination is imposed on the employer. Petitioner Fernandez, as the employer, must prove actual compliance therewith, and she cannot claim as her own the act performed by another person who is not her agent (i.e., investigation conducted by the police). Second, due process for dismissal of an employee is a labor issue, necessarily different from due process for police investigation of a crime of offense. Compliance with one does not mean compliance with the other. Third, even if the law need not be observed to the letter, the procedure for valid dismissal of an employee must at least be done in the natural sequence of notice, hearing, and judgment. [14] cralaw Petitioner Fernandez skipped the essential elements of notice and hearing, and proceeded immediately to judgment. Indubitably, private respondent Cayabyab was not accorded any opportunity to defend himself from the charge of gross and habitual negligence levied against him by his employer.
Consequently, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals were correct in declaring that private respondent Cayabyab's dismissal was illegal, having been made without just cause and without due process. As provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, an employee unjustly terminated shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent. However, due to the strained relations between the employer, petitioner Fernandez, and the employee, private respondent Cayabyab, the latter is entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner Fernandez, the award of backwages and separation pay to private respondent Cayabyab does not constitute a reward or premium for his supposed negligence; such award was made for his wrongful dismissal. It should be noted that while the supposed negligence of private respondent Cayabyab was not sufficiently proven by the evidence on record, his illegal termination from employment was duly established before the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Neither is petitioner Fernandez being punished for attempting to discipline her employees, but rather, she is merely being ordered to give to private respondent Cayabyab what is due the latter had she not illegally dismissed him.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring; Rollo, pp. 17-31.
[2] cralaw Id., p. 30.
[3] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring; Id., p.34.
[4] cralaw Penned by Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera, Id., pp. 78-81.
[5] cralaw Penned by Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo with Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring, and Presiding Commissioner Roy V. Se�eres, on leave; Id., pp. 53-54.
[6] cralaw San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) v. Ople, G.R. No. 53515, 08 February 1989, 170 SCRA 25, 27-28.
[7] cralaw Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78763, 12 July 1989, 175 SCRA 277, 281; Euro-Linea, Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782, 01 December 1987, 156 SCRA 78, 82-83.
[8] cralaw Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended.
[9] cralaw Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74229, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 385, 390, referring to Primero v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72644, 14 December 1987, 156 SCRA 435, 444-445.
[10] cralaw Royal Crowne Internationale v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78085, 16 October 1989, 178 SCRA 569; Polymedic General Hospital v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64190, 31 January 1985, 134 SCRA 420.
[11] cralaw Supra, note 1, pp. 24-25.
[12] cralaw Maneja v. NLRC and Manila Midtown Hotel, G.R. No. 124013, 05 June 1998, 290 SCRA 603.
[13] cralaw Supra, note 11, pp. 27-28.
[14] cralaw Ferrer, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100898, 05 July 1993, 224 SCRA 410.
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